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Abstract 
The number of organisations that rely on computerised systems to perform their day-to-
day operations and to help them in making decisions has grown rapidly over the last few 
years and continues to expand. On the other hand, the destruction or loss of these 
systems can be a nightmare and, in many cases, may leed to an end of providing services 
or trading for the organisation. Thus, the growing dependence on computer systems and 
the fear of being out of business have increased management awareness and 
understanding of the importance of plans to prevent or recover from a computer failure. 
Although senior management and IT directors have begun to appreciate the need for 
Disaster Recovery Plans (DRPs), they often raise common questions, such as. How long 
the organisation can tolerate the failure of its computer systems? Are we spending too 
much or too little on a recovery strategy? What type of recovery strategy is most 
appropriate for our IT centre? 
To look more closely at the effects of disasters on organisations and the importance of 
adopting DRPs, the researcher carried out a case study involving III organisations in 
Kuwait to examine their DRPs before and after the Iraqi Invasion in 1990 and to identify 
major problems facing IT managers on disaster recovery issues 
The literature review and the case study show that there is a lack of a comprehensive 
methodology and of a computerised intelligent system to guide organisations in selecting 
the most appropriate recovery strategy for their computer centres. Therefore, this 
research has developed a methodology and delivered an expert system that would assist 
IT directors to obtain answers to the above-mentioned questions and perform fast 
recovery from any type of computer disaster. The methodology consists of five phases 
that provide a step-by-step approach to ensure that the entire recovery strategy selection 
process is covered. The phases are: Threats Assessment, Business Impact Assessment, 
Recovery Strategy Analysis, Cost Analysis. and Recommendations 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Statement of the Problem 
Recent years have seen a revolution and a tremendous growth in technologies as they 
have come to playa central role in shaping the evolution of organisations Computer 
technology used by organisations nowadays has been one of the most pervasive 
applications of technology in this revolution. It is rapidly bringing us out of the 
industrial age into a new epoch, 'the information age'. It has been said that computer 
technology will prove more important than the steam engine, which in its own time 
laid the foundations for the industrial revolution (Daler, Gulbrandsen, Melgard, & 
Sjolstad, 1989). Computers provide a myriad of everyday conveniences and benefits 
to organisations and customers such as Automated Teller Machines (ATM), 
controlling telephone networks, diagnosing the body's internal ills, recording the price 
of groceries at the supermarket check-out, reserving tickets, forms of decision-
making, etc. It seems that no other machine in history has so rapidly and so 
completely changed the world. In short, 'we are living under the very fabric of 
modem life, making computer avoidance, if not computer ignorance, particularly 
impossible' (Hassig, 1991). 
The introduction of computers, therefore, has created a technology revolution for 
modem organisations. Since the early birth of computer machines, organisations have 
been computerising the storage, retrieval, and the processing of huge amounts of data 
as a technical approach to improving the content and flow of information within and 
between organisations and society. Year after year, organisations are becoming 
increasingly aware of the contribution that the computer centre makes to the overall 
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well being of the company. In fact, in today's environment 'infonnation is the life 
blood of the business, and the heart that pumps this blood is the computer' (Williams, 
1995). 
Furthennore, infonnation systems are now considered to be a basic component of 
nearly all private and government organisations US companies, for instance, spent 
close to $30 billion on their infonnation systems in 1987, and are reaping the fruits of 
their investments in the fonn off aster, more refined, more meaningful data - the kind 
of data that supports decisions and creates wealth (Toigo, 1989). As a result 
infonnation processing has become the nerve centre of most organisations (Baylus, 
1991). 
However, there is a side to this symbiosis of organisations and machines that is rarely 
examined. It is business's dependency on the uninterrupted flow ofinfonnation from 
its systems and the consequences for a company if the computer machine was to be 
suddenly switched off The occurrence of such unscheduled and inconvenient 
switching-off is called 'Computer Disaster' (Toigo, 1989). According to Baylus, the 
tenn computer disaster means 'any accidental or intentional event that causes 
disruption to a company's operations' (Baylus, 1991). Toigo, a disaster recovery 
expert, defines a computer disaster as "the interruption of business due to the loss or 
denial of the infonnation assets required for nonnal operations." He adds "it refers to 
loss or interruption of the company's data processing function, or to a loss of data 
itself' (Toigo, 1989). 
It is human nature to think we will not be hit by a disaster, whether at home or at 
work, because disasters are perceived as low probability events. But in the last few 
years a seemingly endless procession of fires, floods, hurricanes, earthquakes and 
bombings have proved otherwise. Past studies show that organisations are not 
adequately prepared for computer disasters and they exhibit a reluctance to spend 
money on acquiring the services needed for a recovery plan. This often occurs when 
management does not fully understand the risks and exposures that an organisation 
faces without a recovery capability. Computer managers have tended to ignore the 
-
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possibility of disasters occurring. Some managers have the attitude 'it will not happen 
to us'. Some learn the hard way that this is not so, and few are lucky enough to 
survive the experience (Smith, 1989). 
1.1.1 Potential losses 
Although the probability of disaster occurrence may be quite low, the potential 
business impact is generally large and possibly long lasting. The impact may manifest 
itself in a number of different ways. With a prolonged and total loss of service, the 
consequences may be severe - terminal for around 80% of companies (Hiles, 1992). 
Existing customers may transfer business elsewhere and prospective ones may tum to 
other competitors. New business is strangled, even loyal customers quickly become 
disaffected and market share drops. Automated order-taking or telephone-based 
reservations, supported by on-line transaction systems, often have no alternative 
manual means of input. For those the equation is quite simple: no computer - no sales. 
The distribution of products to many large retailers may be severely affected if the 
computer is down. Many products in the warehouse cannot be despatched; those 
which are sent off are either late or may arrive in the wrong quantities. This then 
constitutes a drain on the manufacturer's cash (Heirlein, 1993; Robinson, 1993; 
Copenhaver, 1997). 
Financial losses can also be indirect. Additional staff, hired to take over clerical 
workloads until the computerised information systems are restored, must be paid. 
Collection of money owed to the company could slow down significantly if 
computerised debtors defer settling bills, knowing that credit control systems are not 
available to pursue them (Hiles, 1992). Important deadlines for payment are missed -
payroll, tax, instalments on contracts etc. Understandably, staff loyalty may be 
severely tested and key staff may fear for their future and join the competition - as, 
indeed, happened in a well-publicised case involving Hackney Borough Council 
(Smith, 1990) and in some organisations in Kuwait after the Iraqi invasion (see 
Chapter 4 a recent survey into the effect of the Iraqi invasion on organisations in 
Kuwait). 
-
Perhaps an even more important result oflosing the computer systems is the loss of 
control of the organisation by senior management. If management information is 
corrupted or out of date, poor decisions may be made on vital business issues. The 
increasing corporate dependence on Decision Support Systems and Executive 
Information Systems renders this threat even more serious. Thus, the organisation's 
image and credibility may be damaged beyond recovery (Hiles, 1992; Smith, 1990). 
Other indirect losses are related to legal issues. An organisation might have a contract 
that allows a major customer to impose penalties if goods are not delivered on time. 
Government regulations might strictly govern a company's business activities, and 
legally such a company must be available to conduct business. The top management of 
a company might also have special obligations to its shareholders. Thus. the company 
officials could be held liable for both criminal and civil damages if they neglect to 
develop an effective means of protection (Epich & Persson, 1994; Copenhaver, 
1997). 
1.1.2 The Need for Disaster Recovery 
The most widely adopted means of protection, to avoid or minimise the above-
mentioned losses, include one or more of the following: 1) transferring the risks via 
insurance; 2) adopting a disaster avoidance plan to reduce or limit the risks; and 3) 
adopting a recovery plan to guide the organisation in resuming services and vital 
business functions. 
Being indemnified for a financial loss thorough insurance is not always sufficient to 
compensate for other indirect losses like loss of market share and goodwill. 
Moreover, it should be noted that information systems insurance is a complex issue. 
Comprehensive cover is rarely offered; if it is available, it is very expensive (Haack, 
1984; Orr, 1988). However, most disaster recovery experts recommend that the 
insurance coverage should be part of the disaster recovery plan (but not an alternative 
to a recovery plan) to fund the recovery efforts following a disaster (Arnell, 1990; 
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Hearnden, 1993). In fact, organisations that have disaster recovery plans pay lower 
insurance premiums (Baylus, 1991). 
Some organisations apply a disaster avoidance plan by installing some safeguards, 
particularly for minor threats such as viruses, hackers, and small fires Despite the 
high cost of installing safeguards against more serious disasters, even the best 
avoidance plans cannot prevent every disaster (Redmond, Luongo & Tietz, 1996) 
There are many disasters, like recent terrorist activities and major earthquakes, which 
are beyond the control of any type of preventive countermeasures. Thus, according to 
Ed Devlin, a senior vice-president with Strohl Systems, "we cannot prevent disasters 
from occurring; therefore we must plan for a fast recovery to minimise their impact" 
(Devlin, 1996). 
Organisations tended in the past to apply the two above-mentioned options insurance 
and disaster prevention. In recent years, however, organisations dependent on their IT 
systems have shifted their focus towards: 
• Resuming vital operations within a specified time after the incident occurs; 
• Establishing alternative means of operation; and 
• Returning to normal operations as soon as practicable (Hyde, 1993; Baylus, 
1991). 
Therefore, attention began to shift toward disaster recovery. This is not to say that 
Insurance and disaster avoidance measures were completely dismissed; in fact, their 
relevance in some situations was acknowledged. This turn-around was first observed 
in the 1990s, when new technological developments changed the way in which 
organisations worked. Investment in sophisticated corporate networks and business 
systems has increased the number of points of potential failure within an 
organisation's information systems structure. So top management has begun taking 
more interest in disaster recovery planning. This was demonstrated at many seminars 
such as the one held in 1993 by CDRS Europe, entitled "Out of the Computer Room 
and Into the Board Room", where a healthy proportion of the audience comprised 
-
6 
senior directors and mangers at board level (Hyde, 1993). Another indication of 
senior management's increasing awareness of the importance of disaster recovery was 
the presence of senior banking and financial executives at a nation-wide 
teleconference, hosted by SunGard Recovery Services in 1993 to discuss only disaster 
recovery issues (Datapro, 1993). 
Furthermore, the importance of disaster recovery was demonstrated when a major fire 
destroyed the trading room of the Credit Lyonnais, one of the biggest banks in 
France, in May 1996. Patrick Hummel, the IT director, proudly announced that 
although the fire happened on a Sunday morning, their disaster recovery plan along 
with the alternative site for real-time recovery strategy enabled the bank to conduct 
'business as usual' for traders when they arrived at work on the Monday morning 
(Hars, 1996). 
The clear message to emerge from past incidents and recent seminars is that there is a 
compelling need for adequate disaster recovery plans. 
1.2 Purpose of the Study 
In today's information intensive economy, survival of a company may depend on 
management's ability to use its information resources to provide services, to compete 
effectively, to strategise, to hold market share and to expand, in essence to survive. 
Thus, organisations, nowadays, cannot tolerate the denial of the computer systems for 
a long period of time. The consequences of failing to survive after a disaster are so 
dire that more and more organisations have been forced to recognise the importance 
of disaster recovery plans. 
Although senior management and IT directors have begun to appreciate the need for 
disaster recovery plans, they often raise common questions, such as: How long the 
organisation can tolerate the failure of its computer systems? Are we spending too 
much or too little on a recovery strategy? What type of recovery strategy is most 
appropriate for our IT centre? 
-
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Much of the literature in the field of disaster recovery dealt with the need for disaster 
recovery planning, how to develop and implement disaster recovery plans, and the 
consequences of not having one. It shows that the issue of selecting the most suitable 
recovery strategy, including answers to the above-mentioned questions, has not been 
fully and adequately addressed. Therefore, a structured methodology is needed to 
address the issue in a comprehensive way, covering a wider spectrum of possible 
scenarios in the disaster recovery area. 
The aim of this research, therefore, is to address more fully the fast recovery of IT 
services from unscheduled interruptions caused by computer disasters. To this end the 
following objectives have been adopted: 
1. To develop a comprehensive methodology for IT managers and officers who 
are responsible for disaster recovery activities that includes 
i) A method for classifYing threats so that it actually contributes to solving 
the problem of recovery strategy selection; 
ii) A full business impact analysis that includes automatic computation of the 
exact maximum allowable downtime; 
iii) An approach to estimating how much to spend on disaster recovery; and 
iv) Methods of constructing organisational requirements and defining 
recovery strategy characteristics so that they can be utilised by expert 
system technology to select the most appropriate recovery strategy. 
2. Through this developed methodology, to provide a basis for the development 
and implementation of a structured prototype expert system to assist IT 
managers in reaching decisions during the disaster recovery selection process. 
In addition, the present research complements the work already completed by Tawfig 
Danish, who obtained his Ph.D. at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne In his 
research, he addressed the utilisation of expert systems technology in the field of 
disaster prevention (Danish, 1994). To provide the complete picture of disaster 
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preparedness, the present research investigates the later activities - recovering from a 
disaster. Taken together the two pieces of research will produce a more 
comprehensive perspective on the disaster preparedness concept using expert systems 
technology. 
1.3 Contribution of the Research 
The present research can make several contributions to the information technology 
and disaster recovery communities. The content of this research, presented in 
Chapters 2 to 7, contains the following elements: 
• The literature review, which highlighting some of the key milestones and 
methodologies, underpins the proposed solution which is developed. 
• A recent case study that shows the importance of disaster recovery planning and 
identifies some of the key problems facing IT managers regarding disaster 
recovery issues. The study also makes a significant contribution to the design of 
the required methodology and the proposed system. 
• A methodology for solving the problem of selecting the most appropriate 
recovery strategy is presented. 
• A new classification of threats that can enhance the recovery strategy selection 
process is developed. 
• A review of available technologies to find a suitable tool for implementing the 
developed methodology concludes that an expert systems approach is feasible to 
achieve the objectives. 
• A prototype expert system to assist IT managers in decision-making on disaster 
recovery issues is implemented. 
1.4 Outline of the Research 
The ultimate purpose of this study is to address the concept that IT departments 
should be secure and reliable and, therefore, those departments should be prepared for 
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unexpected threats to the continued conduct of their business if they wish to assure 
sutvivability. The following chapters set out the various aspects of the study: 
Chapter 1 describes the background of computer applications and potential losses 
expected from a computer disaster. It presents the purpose, contribution, and 
structure of the research. 
Chapter 2 describes the causes of disasters and the impact of computer disasters on 
organisations. It also identifies and briefly describes the major milestones of 
development in the field of disaster recovery. The utilisation of expert systems 
technology in disaster recovery is also reported 
Chapter 3 identifies, briefly describes, and compares major available recovery 
strategies in the disaster recovery field. Some major prospective recovery strategies 
are also reported. 
A recent study, fonning part ofthe work, that analyses the disaster preparedness of 
Kuwaiti organisations before and after the Iraqi invasion in August 1990 is reported in 
Chapter 4. The study highlights the consequences of not having disaster recovery 
plans and identifies major problems facing IT managers on recovery issues. Some 
results from the study are used to help in designing the proposed solution. 
Chapter 5 presents and explains the proposed methodology for selecting the most 
appropriate recovery strategy, including threats assessment, business impact 
assessment, recovery strategy selection and a model for calculating investment. 
Potential technologies and tools for implementing and delivering the computerised 
system are presented in Chapter 6. An analysis comparing and evaluating available 
technologies and tools is then carried out to enable the most suitable one to be 
selected. 
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Chapter 7 describes the proposed prototype Expert System for Disaster Recovery 
Strategy Selection (ESDRSS). Several examples are introduced to illustrate the 
operation mechanism of its components. 
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes the study by citing possible areas for future research in 
this field. 
Chapter 2 
Contemporary Methods in Disaster Recovery 
2.1 Introduction 
A substantial review of related literature shows that there is a great deal of work that 
has been carried out in respect of computer disasters and their effects on businesses. 
The literature also shows that some attempts have been made to prevent some types 
of disasters and/or mitigate the overall effects of others. This mitigation takes the 
form of setting a set of safeguards and/or recovery procedures. In this chapter, a full 
investigation of all areas related to the proposed problem is carried out. The 
investigation covers the following areas: 
• Background of computer disasters. This includes looking at some recent 
disasters, impact of disasters in businesses and the importance of having 
Disaster Recovery Plans (DRPs). 
• Disaster prevention area. This includes the methods used in risk analysis and 
installing safeguards. 
• The use of insurance as a method of mitigating disasters consequences. 
• Disaster Recovery area. This involves looking at methodologies that are used 
in developing a Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP). 
• Expert systems technology. This includes looking at existing expert systems 
in the disaster recovery area. 
-
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2.2 Background 
Several catastrophes have dominated the news over the past few years. These 
disasters range from major devastating threats such as earthquakes, floods, fires and 
terrorism attacks to relatively minor ones such as power outages, hackers and 
computer failures. This research, however, will focus only on disasters that affect 
computer centres and data processing facilities. 
2.2.1 Causes of Disasters 
A computer disaster, which is the focus of this study, can be defined as "any 
accidental or intentional event that causes disruption to a company's operations" 
(Baylus, 1991). Toigo (1989) however defines computer disaster as ''the interruption 
of business due to the loss or denial of the information assets required for normal 
operations." He adds, "it refers to loss or interruption of the company's data 
processing function, or to a loss of data itself" 
A considerable amount of attention has been given in the past to natural disasters such 
as earthquakes, floods and tornadoes. New attention, however, is being directed to 
the raising incidents of terrorist attacks such as the bombings in Manchester City, 
Oklahoma City and the World Trade Centre in New York. But there are other types 
of problem that bring about disturbance to businesses. Fires destroying buildings, 
power outages, equipment failures, hackers and viruses are some of these problems. 
Some of these incidents are certainly less dramatic but they are no less disastrous 
when it comes to grinding the Information Systems to a halt. According to the 
Computer Disaster Casebook produced by BIS Applied Systems, which covers more 
than 175 computer disasters in the UK, fires and explosions have the greatest number 
of disaster occurrences amounting to 36%; software failures 24%; power outages 
21%; water damages 9%; other disasters represent 10% (CCTA, 1989). 
Another survey which was carried out by the Contingency Planning Research, 
covering the period between 1982 and 1985, showed that power failures accounted 
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for almost 28% of US computer outages, followed by storm damage 11.7%, floods 
9.6%; hardware error 7.7%; bombings 7.2%; hurricanes 6.3%; fires 56%; software 
error 5.4%; power surge 5.1%; and earthquake 4.9% (DRJ, 1997). 
Unfortunately, the number of disasters affecting organisations and businesses is on the 
increase. The United Nations has designated the 1990s as the International Decade for 
Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) to reduce the loss of life, property damage and 
economic disruption caused by natural disasters especially in developing countries 
(Katayama, 1993). According to an independent survey commissioned by the 
London-based International Computer Room, specialists in the Hardware 
Environmental Protection Agency in the UK, an estimated 90% of all computer rooms 
are at the mercy of an environmental time bomb that has nothing to do with software 
bugs, network access times or user intolerance (Reed, 1992). Another survey by 
Arthur Young is quoted to have predicated that 1 in 10 of all companies in the UK 
will experience a computer disaster (Allen, 1992). 
2.2.2 Impact of Computer Disasters on Organisations 
Nowadays, organisations in the public and private sectors depend heavily on 
computer information systems in running their businesses. The number of 
organisations that rely on computer technology to perform their day-to-day 
operations and to help them in making decisions has increased rapidly over the last 
few years and continues to do so. A disruption of computer systems for a few days or 
even a few hours can, therefore, cause severe financial loss and threaten the survival 
of the business. When the system is down, the business comes to a halt during the 
time it takes to recover the system, recreate the lost data and applications, and deal 
with the backlog of data transactions which occurred during the downtime (RatlitI: 
1993). 
Recent surveys and studies have shown that the impact of disasters on organisations is 
enormous. Negative consequences may emerge immediately after the disaster or they 
may appear gradually in the following years. According to a survey by Price 
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Waterhouse, 70% of UK companies which have not recovered from a major disaster 
within 48 hours tend to fail in the follOwing years (Allen, 1992). The Chubb Insurance 
Group of America commissioned a research project amongst computer-dependent 
companies which suffered a disaster. The result showed that 9 out of 10 went into 
liquidation within 18 months (Reed, 1992). This should serve as a serious warning to 
all computer dependent organisations 
Additional national studies and statistics give further evidence to the increasing impact 
of catastrophes as organisations continue to evolve into a computerised information 
dependent economy: 
• 50% of all computer dependent businesses that experience a disaster and do 
not re-establish processing and operations within 10 days never recover 
(Wesselingh, 1990). 
• 60% of companies which are affected by a major disaster in the USA go out 
of business within two years (DRJ, 1997). 
• According to a study by Amedahl Executive Institute, a UK retailer cannot 
operate its distribution depot for more than 24 hours without computer 
support ( Smith, 1990). 
• Each on-line outage, averaging 4 hours, costs companies an average of 
$329,000 in lost revenues and productivity (DRJ, 1997) 
• Every five minutes, a business catches fire in the US; of these 90% suffer 
catastrophic losses and 40% never reopen (Wesselingh, 1990). 
The first study concerning the impact of computer disasters was carried out in 1978 
by the University of Minnesota. According to the study (see Figure 2.1) a data 
processing failure in a financial institution, one-half day in length, will degrade normal 
business activity by 13% for the two weeks following the failure. A ten-day outage 
will result in 96% loss of business activity. The study also examined the relative 
vulnerability of specific industries and demonstrated the Maximum Allowable 
Downtime (MAD) allowed by industry before recovery would be nearly impossible. 
As summarised in Figure 2.2, financial institutions have the lowest tolerance to a 
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prolonged downtime, while insurance companies have the largest MAD of all The 
survey also produced an analysis of dollar loss following a data centre disaster in 
manufacturing or distribution industries with over $215 million annual gross sales, 
Figure 2.3 (Toigo, 1989). 
Figure 2.1 - Decline in Operational Activities for the Financial Sector _ 
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Figure 2.3 - Dollar Loss in Manufacturing or Distribution Industry with 
$215+ Million Annual Gross Sales in 1978 and 1989 
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The University of Minnesota's study is almost two decades old covering a period 
when only mainframes and midrange computers were available. Since then, substantial 
changes in the computer technology have occurred, including the proliferation of PCs, 
networks and telecommunication. Due to these changes and the rising dependency on 
computers, the results nowadays would not be the same as those in 1978. Percentages 
in the loss of business activity are enormously greater, organisation's MADs are 
substantially reduced (this can be seen in the survey presented by the researcher in 
Chapter 4), and dollar loss following computer disasters is definitely larger. To 
illustrate this, Alvin Arnell, a disaster recovery expert, compared his observations in 
year 1989 regarding the cost in dollars following a computer disaster in the 
distribution industry to those produced by the 1978 study. The cost of denial of 
computers for 5 days in 1978, according to the University of Minnesota study, is 
$94,200, whereas this amount would be lost in less than one day in 1989. Figure 2.3 
depicts a comparison between Arnell's observation in 1989 and the University of 
Minnesota's study in 1978 in terms of the dollar loss. To further illustrate the growing 
impact, a recent study in 1990 by Price Waterhouse (Figure 2.4) showed the impact of 
computer disasters on financial industry in the UK (Danish, 1994). 
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Figure 2.4 - Impact of Computer Disasters on Financial Sector 
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With this increasing number of threats striking organisations in different parts of the 
world and the growing impact of computer disasters, awareness of the vulnerabilities 
of businesses to those unexpected interruptions has dramatically increased. To deal 
with these risks, there are three types of response available to IT managers: 
• Prevention measurements 
• Insurance 
• Recovery facilities 
2.3 Disaster Prevention 
Disaster prevention (risk management or risk analysis) seeks to avoid threats in the 
future by installing protective measures, so that the consequential losses are minimised 
(Faithfull and Watt, 1991). It is considered to be completely different from the 
disaster recovery concept (Orr, 1988; Danish, 1994). The process of any disaster 
prevention policy is summarised below (Orr, 1988; Amell, 1990; Danish, 1994): 
I. Identify assets which need to be protected; 
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2. Identify threats that may strike followed by risk assessments, and 
3. Select appropriate countermeasures to protect the identified assets from the 
expected threats. 
Work in disaster prevention began in the early 1970s in the USA. The first milestone, 
represented by FIPS PUB 31 in 1974, was enforced by the Public Law B9-306 
(Brooks Bill), Part 6 of which is entitled Code of Federal Regulations. Although the 
Bill provided Federal agencies with a handbook for use when implementing physical 
security and risk management programs in their IT installation, it was only intended to 
be a basic reference document and check-list for general use (Danish, 1994) 
Following the initiative set in FIPS PUB 31 in 1974, several risk analysis systems and 
methods were introduced in the disaster prevention area. The systems and methods 
which are available today fall generally into one of two categories, quantitative and 
qualitative. Examples of the quantitative methods are the Federal Information 
Processing Standards publication number 65 (FIPS 65), a method which has been used 
by IDM draws on FIPS 65 and a software named RISKCALC. Examples of qualitative 
methods are Los Alamos VulnerabilitylRisk Assessment (LAVA), CCT A Risk 
Analysis and Management Method (CRAMM) and software package called 
RISKP AC, which was jointly developed in the US by Chemical Bank Information 
Systems and Profile Analysis Corporation of Ridgefield. 
In addition to these attempts, an interesting methodology for disaster prevention in IT 
centres which uses expert system technology was introduced recently in 1994 by 
Danish in the Computing Science Department at the University of Newcastle upon 
Tyne. (Since disaster prevention is not the scope of this research, disaster prevention 
and risk analysis approaches will not be included and explained here. Further reading 
of the approaches and methods used in disaster prevention can be obtained from NBS 
(1985), Jackson and Hruska (1992), and Danish (1994» 
As mentioned before, the area of disaster prevention is considered to be completely 
different from the area of disaster recovery. However, there is one issue that can be of 
19 
interest In this research. The issue is the cost-benefit analysis performed in selecting 
and implementing suitable countermeasures for preventing a threat to occur 
The cost-benefit analysis, in disaster prevention, is the process of comparing the 
estimated expected losses as consequences of an expected threat to the cost of 
countermeasures to be implemented to prevent such losses. The method for selecting 
an appropriate countermeasure is described below (Baylus, 1991; Moses, 1992; 
Danish, 1994) : 
• Identifying the potential cost of a single occurrence of each identified threat 
for each resource and asset. 
• Estimating the likely frequency of occurrence of identified threat sources. 
• Computing the Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE) for each resource 
• Selecting the suitable countermeasures based on cost-benefit analysis. 
In disaster prevention, if the cost of installing countermeasures is less than the total 
ALE, then the proposed countermeasures can be installed. However, if the cost of 
countermeasures exceeds the total ALE, then other alternatives such as insurance or 
disaster recovery should be considered (Danish, 1994). 
The ALE calculation method was first introduced by the Federal Information 
Processing Standards publication number 65 (FIPS 65), which was mainJy used in the 
disaster prevention area. It is a traditional and proven way for calculating the 
investment needed for a typical preventive countermeasure. However, there are 
several problems associated with this method. These problems are explained in section 
2.5.1 of this chapter, when the Expected Value Analysis Method is presented. 
In conclusion, there are some disasters which can be avoided by implementing some 
preventive countermeasures such as power failure and small fires. However, there are 
other types of disaster which are beyond the control of any type of preventive 
countermeasures such as terrorism and major earthquakes. To deal with these 
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uncontrollable risks, IT managers need to look into the other two alternatives 
insurance and recovery. 
2.4 Insurance 
Some organisation's management may choose the option of being insured in order to 
deal with computer disasters. One of the major findings of a recent survey carried out 
on UK organisations in January 1993 by the University of Loughborough in 
association with the Computing Services Association and the National Computing 
Centre, is that many companies lie in the comfort factor of being insured. In fact, over 
eight out of ten companies in the study claimed to have some form of insurance 
against computer disasters (Hearnden, 1993). 
However, it should be noted that information systems insurance is a complex issue 
and a comprehensive cover is rarely offered or it is very expensive (Orr, 1988) 
Although some computer facilities such as hardware, software, network and media 
can be insured easily, other issues such as the value of data, customer satisfaction, 
contractual issues are difficult to insure, if not impossible. According to an mM 
report in 1993 reviewing the Loughborough survey 'there is some evidence to suggest 
that the view of what companies believe they are covered for may be more optimistic 
than the reality.' Although 68% claim to be covered for loss of data, the 1991 Audit 
Commission Report showed that only 9% of such losses were actually claimed against 
insurance (mM Report, I 993b ). The Loughborough survey indicates that the level of 
insurance cover by organisations which claimed to have some form of computer 
insurance was far from perfect. The survey produced the following warning results 
regarding information systems insurance coverage: 
1. Over 30% of organisations on UK are not covered against loss of software 
or the cost of reconstituting data. 
2. Nearly 40% have no cover against consequential business or financial losses. 
3. 60% do not have fidelity bonding (insurance against employee negligence or 
abuse). 
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4 Over 75% are not covered against software failure. 
5. Nearly half the companies which claimed to have insurance have no 
emergency recovery facilities 
Furthermore, business interruption insurance resulting from computer disasters is 
expensive, and could cost an organisation almost four times what it would pay for OP 
property insurance (Subhani, 1989). To demonstrate how expensive insurance is, 
Lawrence Cox, president of Cox Insurance Services, gives the following example. 
Earthquake deductibles can be 10% of the insured value of the damaged building, 
multiple buildings will mean multiple deductibles. For a large loss of say $100 million 
the company may face a deductible expense of more than $10 million. For a company 
with a $100,000 loss, a $10,000 deductible may shut them down (Cox, 1996). 
In addition to the above-mentioned drawbacks, more importantly, insurance does not 
put the company back in business serving the customers, or provide the necessary 
organisational computer services (Arnell, 1990). 'However good the insurance cover, 
it remains a case of shutting the stable door after the horse has bolted' (IBM, 1993b). 
Having said that, there is no way in which absolute protection and recovery from a 
disaster is possible. Realistically the organisation must minimise possible loss and 
cover by insurance (Baylus, 1990). In fact, insurance money is needed to fund the 
recovery efforts after a disaster. An insurance company provides the required money 
to repair or replace the lost hardware, software and financial expenses which the 
business would not ordinarily have if there had been no disaster. 
Although the computer disaster insurance issue is very complex, most disaster 
recovery experts recommend that the insurance coverage should be part of the 
disaster recovery plan, not an alternative to a recovery plan (Arnell, 1990; Hearnden, 
1993). In fact, insurance companies recommend disaster recovery to clients and 
usually consider a reduction in insurance premiums when an adequate recovery plan is 
in place. Moreover, a company may be prepared to concentrate on certain recovery 
aspects and simply insure other aspects (Baylus, 1990; Peach, 1991). 
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As has been explained, insurance is not considered to be a recovery alternative and it 
does not put the company back in business, Rather it should be an integral part of the 
recovery plan Therefore, to insure the continuity of the business during and after an 
unexpected disaster, a recovery strategy is needed, 
2.5 Disaster Recovery 
Disaster recovery planning, or what is also called contingency planning, business 
continuation, or business resumption, is relatively new, It was first introduced in the 
United States in the late 1970s with the introduction of the mainframe recovery 
industry (Wrobel, 1990), The defining moment was the establishment of SunGard 
Recovery Services in Philadelphia, Penn, in the early 1980s, Since then awareness of 
the importance of disaster recovery has been raised due to the increasing dependency 
on computers and a number of events affecting the IT environment. This in turn has 
led to rapid market growth particularly in the US and the UK, but also in other 
countries (Hyde, 1993), The industry grew to over 100 commercial providers of 
backup computer centres located throughout the US (Schreider, 1995), A recent 
report by Datapro (I 993) showed that all disaster recovery vendors world-wide who 
were interviewed by Datapro have enjoyed a good growth rate of around 25%, even 
during a world economic recession (Hyde, 1993). According to a report by G-2 
Research Incorporated, the world business recovery spending in 1995 was 
approximately $3, 1 billion dollars and is estimated to grow at 20 percent annually 
through 1999 (DRJ, 1997), 
Although the UK is still behind the US, industry analysts agree that the UK is the 
fastest growing market. Many analysts suggest that the reason for this acute 
awareness is that, because of recent events, UK organisations are more aware of the 
threats around them (Hyde, 1993). Hyde adds that other European countries are 
approximately three years behind the development of the UK, She claims that the 
problems faced by vendors in these countries amount to general awareness and 
education in the disaster recovery concept. 
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Because of the newness of the disaster recovery area, efforts are still made to develop 
effective methodologies for solving different problems which are related to this area. 
Most previous attempts in disaster recovery are prescriptive in nature. They detail 
steps to be taken in order to prevent disasters and steps to develop a workable 
contingency plan for disasters. Some others are reports of actual distress in businesses 
describing the nature of the disaster, what preventive measures were in place, damage 
suffered by the business, and lessons learned from the disaster. 
In the sections that foUow, brief explanations of existing methodologies in the disaster 
recovery or related areas are presented. Some of these methodologies are prescriptive 
and are considered as guidelines and steps. Others are models to be adopted in solving 
certain problems related to risk analysis, such as the Expected Value Analysis method 
and the Subhani modeL 
2.5.1 Expected Value Analysis Method 
The traditional approach for risk analysis of computer disasters is based on the 
expected value analysis. The expected value analysis is also known as the Annual Loss 
Expectancy (ALE). The ALE approach was first introduced by FIPS Publication 65 in 
1979 (FIPS 65, 1979). (The ALE method was explained earlier under the disaster 
prevention's heading) Although this method has been widely used in the disaster 
prevention area, some traditional disaster recovery experts apply it in order to decide 
whether to adopt a particular recovery strategy or not. The principle behind the 
application of the ALE method in disaster recovery is that the maximum allowable 
cost of any recovery strategy should not exceed the expected losses (FIPS 87, 1981). 
A major strength of this method is that it produces a cost analysis which can be easily 
understood by managers. In other words, it gives doUar estimates of expected losses 
resulting from a computer disaster. 
The ALE approach or one of its variants has been used extensively for some years, 
particularly in the US, and is very popular with the IT community because of its heavy 
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emphasis on money figures throughout the method. However, it has been found to be 
fundamentally flawed. Indeed, the publishers of FIPS 65, ~ational Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST), do not seem to support the ALE approach any 
longer (Jackson and Hruska, 1992; Moses, 1992). 
The main problems and major criticisms associated with the ALE approach are given 
below: 
• Estimating the probabilities of threats is often misleading and inaccurate 
(Baylus, 1991; CCTA, 1989) 
• Threats occurring probabilities are not available in different parts of the 
world. 
• It is not realistic to use cost values for all aspects oflosses; for example, a 
cost value is not appropriate for such issues as embarrassment, loss of 
goodwill, and legal obligations (Moses, 1992). 
• The attribution of cost values to data is very subjective, and thus an ALE 
based review commences on unsound bases (Moses, 1992; CCT A, 1989) 
• A high degree of IT security expertise is required, particularly because no 
real guidance is offered on security countermeasures (Moses, 1992; Baylus, 
1991; CCTA, 1989). 
• Full ALE calculations of all application systems and facilities against all 
possible threats are time consuming and need a lot of manpower effort 
(Moses, 1992; Baylus, 1991; CCTA, 1989). 
Due to these disadvantages, the ALE approach will therefore not be used for cost 
analysis in the present research. Another approach, which is considered to be more 
acceptable by disaster recovery experts, is applied (the approach is explained later in 
section 2.5 8). 
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2.5.2 Security Assessment Questionnaire 
This method was developed by IBM in 1980, and revised in 1985. It consists of 
fourteen categories, which are divided into three key security areas 
I. Physical Security; 
2. Controls and Procedures; and 
3. Contingency Planning. 
At the end of each of the fourteen categories, a space for rating risk for the entire 
category is given as extremely low / necessary / acceptable / high. Advantages of this 
method are that it is brief, and allows the user a quick assessment of an installations 
security status. The questionnaire, however, puts more emphasis on security and 
controls to prevent disasters rather than on recovery issues (NBS, 1985) .. 
In addition to not providing enough emphasis on recovery process, the questionnaire 
does not give guidance on how to arrive at the risk rating for each category. Also, it 
does not relate to techniques in calculating maximum allowable downtime and 
investment required for selecting recovery strategies (NBS, 1985; Danish, 1994). 
Thus, the questionnaire method does not meet the objectives of the present research 
2.5.3 CCTA Risk Analysis and Management Methodology 
The CCT A Risk Analysis and Management Method (CRAMM) was developed by the 
UK Government's Central Computer and Telecommunications Agency (CCTA) and 
BlS Information Systems Ltd (BIS), London, UK The method is embodied in a 
software support tool which runs on IBM PCs and compatibles. It was produced after 
examining existing methodologies in order to determine if any, at the time, existed 
which could be taken for government use. Several methodologies were identified 
including the ALE approach. However no existing methodology was found to meet 
their requirements. So the CCT A released its own risk analysis and management 
approach in 1988 (CCT A, 1989). 
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The methodology compnses three stages, data for these stages are collected from 
completed questionnaires The stages are 
A. Physical, applications and data asset identification and valuation , 
B, Threat and vulnerability followed by risk assessments; and 
C. Countermeasure identification and selection. 
The CRAMM and its software tool are used in many UK government organisations 
and the CCT A tries to expand its use to private sectors. However, the method and the 
software have much to be commended, because deficiencies such as difficulties of 
application to PCs, the need for extensive training, and a brief management summary 
are addressed (Moses, 1992). 
Furthermore, the CRAMM was developed for the concept of risk analysis and 
management. It does not go into a great level of detail in covering the whole disaster 
recovery concept. The CRAMM developer, CCTA, acknowledges this drawback by 
planning to enhance CRAMM in this respect in the future (CCT A, \989). In addition, 
CRAMM does not place explicit monetary values on data assets or on the costs of 
disruption associated with a loss of service. Therefore, the CRAMM approach is not 
very suitable and will not contribute much to the objectives of the present research. 
2.6.4 CCTA IT Infrastructure Contingency Planning Module 
This module was developed by the IT Infrastructure Library at the CCTA in 1989. It 
was developed shortly after the release of CRAMM to be a CCT A guidelines for 
Contingency Planning (CP). It is aimed at IT Directors, Heads of IT services and 
senior officers who are responsible for risk management and contingency planning. 
The module deals with planning to cope with, and recover from, an IT disaster (i e 
loss of service for protracted periods) which requires that work to be moved to an 
alternative site in a non-routine way. It also provides guidance on safeguarding the 
existing system (CCT A, 1989) 
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According to the IT Infrastructure Library (CCT A, 1989), the main application of the 
module consists of the three following phases: 1) planning, 2) implementation, and 3) 
post-implementation. The planing phase describes a preliminary task which analyses 
the risks to a department's IT facilities by using the CCTA Risk Analysis and 
Management Method (CRAMM), which is explained in the previous section. It also 
addresses the management approval issue for staffing the contingency planning project 
and to define terms of reference for it. It also describes the recovery options available 
and the process of setting up a project team. 
The implementation phase covers the development of the contingency plan which 
includes identifYing potential threats and listing critical resources. It also gives some 
guidance of how and when the plan should be invoked. The final phase, post-
implementation, deals with testing and reviewing the plan. 
The CCT A IT Infrastructure Contingency Planning Module is currently used by some 
UK government organisations. Although this module provides acceptable guidelines 
and steps to follow for contingency planning, it utilises the CRAMM method which 
suffers from several drawbacks as explained in the previous section. Also, it does not 
relate to any techniques that help in determining the maximum allowable downtime. 
This may be because it was developed for the government sector which constitutes 
non-profit organisations. However, the CCTA announced that, as mentioned earlier, it 
will enhance the CRAMM approach in terms of the disaster recovery issue in the 
future. Therefore it would be interesting to see new modifications which may 
contribute more to the disaster recovery area, especially when some officials of CCT A 
also indicated that they were thinking of utilising expert system technology in their 
next version (Danish, 1994). Until these modifications take place, this module does 
not meet the objectives of the present research 
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2.5.5 Subhanl Model 
A recent decision model for calculating the optimal investment required for a disaster 
recovery plan was developed by Subhani in 1989. The model is made up of two 
independent steps I) determining the Maximum Allowable Downtime (MAD); and 2) 
applying the developed "Contingency Cost-Response Time Function". 
The inputs needed for the first step, MAD determination, are the loss characteristics, 
size and risk attitude of the firm, contingency plan cost, threat probability, and 
contingent loss distribution. The MAD is then substituted in the Contingency Cost-
Response Time Function, the second step, to derive an estimate of the optimal 
investment required for recovery strategy. The two steps are completely independent 
(Subhani, 1989). 
The model is a more accurate approach compared to other disaster recovery 
methodologies for calculating the required investment Another major strength of this 
model is that it does not require a lot of manpower effort for execution. It is also not 
complex and a high level of recovery skills is not required to implement it. 
Having said that, however, the model suffers from the following major drawbacks 
• The probability of threats is one of the inputs used, in the first part of the 
model to arrive at the maximum allowable downtime estimate. This is , 
considered to be a drawback because probability of disaster occurrences are 
not firm and they are not available in many countries (Amell, 1990; CCT A, 
1989). 
• It does not include all available recovery strategies and does not present 
sufficient analysis of the characteristics of those included. 
• It does not help the users by giving recommendations in terms of what type of 
recovery strategy they should select. 
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The second part of the model, Contingency Cost-Response Time Function, however, 
is acceptable and it has received no criticisms from disaster recovery experts. In fact, 
the function was validated, and approved by a panel of 24 disaster recovery experts 
Then the function was tested in real-life situations. It was applied to three companies 
already adopting recovery strategies The three cases were predicted fairly well 
(Subhani, 1989), 
Since the second part of the model is independent from the first part and is acceptable 
by disaster recovery experts, the present research will adopt it in calculating the 
required investment for a recovery strategy (the Contingency Cost-Response Time 
Function and its application will be explained in more details in both Chapters 5 and 
7), 
2.5.6 SeminarlWorkshop Methodology 
The SeminarlWorkshop Methodology was created and has been used by DIA·log 
Management, Inc, It is a comprehensive practical guide for IT managers or those 
assigned the responsibility of designing, implementing, testing and maintaining 
Disaster Recovery Plans, It consists of a master plan which is further divided into 
"miniplans", The miniplans are listed below (Arnell, 1990): 
• Preplanning and Assumption 
• Prevention and Security 
• Disaster Preparedness 
• Disaster Recovery Action Plan 
• Training for Disaster Recovery 
• Plan Update 
Arnell (1990) stated that the primary aim of the SeminarlWorkshop Methodology is 
to enable IT managers and disaster recovery co-ordinators to develop their own in-
house disaster recovery plan, Emphasis in the methodology is placed more on plan 
development However, the risk analysis issue is by-passed because the methodology 
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builder believes that 'the need is virtually mandated by an organisation's total 
dependence on computer' (Arnell, 1990) 
Although the Seminar/Workshop Methodology provides skilful guide to disaster 
recovery co-ordinators, it contains very lengthy procedures and guidelines The 
methodology has been developed to deal with all aspects of business interruption 
preparedness issues, This may be seen as an advantage to some planners, but it is 
considered to be a time consuming task and it needs much manpower effort, Also, the 
methodology does not provide management with any indication of how much to 
spend on disaster recovery planning, Although this is in agreement with some disaster 
recovery experts who say that the cost analysis of fitting a recovery strategy should be 
avoided, it is considered to be a potential weakness by others Therefore, this 
methodology does not meet the required demands ofthe present study, 
2.5.7 Generic Disaster Recovery Plan Methodology 
This methodology was introduced by Carl1ackson, a senior manager with Ernst & 
Young in Houston, USA The author cited that today's organisations are making 
ever-increasing use of information systems technologies in order to provide the most 
cost effective and efficient services, He added, "while increases in productivity and 
efficiency are the desired result, we often overlook the pitfalls associated with this 
dependence on sometimes fragile computer systems to support time-critical business 
functions," 1ackson's methodology is composed of five fundamental steps which are 
given below (1ackson, 1994): 
1) Project Initiation; 
2) Vulnerability Assessment; 
3) Recovery Alternatives; 
4) Recovery Plan Development; and 
5) Recovery Plan Testing and Maintenance, 
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The Generic Disaster Recovery Plan methodology provides only guidelines just like 
the previous method (Seminar/Workshop Methodology) However, an obvious 
advantage of this methodology is that it concentrates only on disaster recovery, not on 
other aspects such as disaster prevention or security 
The above methodology is prescriptive in nature since it only contains steps and 
guidelines to follow. It does not provide any recommendations at the end 
Furthermore, this methodology lacks any techniques for calculating the required 
investment on disaster recovery strategies. Another disadvantage of this approach is 
that it does not show the organisation how to conceive and calculate its maximum 
allowable downtime. Thus, this method does not fulfil the purpose of the present 
research. 
2.6.8 Commercial Disaster Recovery Software 
There are a few vendors who sell disaster recovery planning software that are based on 
PCs and larger CPUs. These software packages can be used for in-house development. 
They help to reduce the learning curve and the costs of the disaster recovery planning 
project. Also, some of them are easy to use (i.e. word processor driven). However 
commercial software has several drawbacks as shown below (Toigo, 1989; Robinson, 
1993): 
1. Most software requires the organisation to adopt the methodology of the 
software author. This is a benefit for organisations whose requirements 
dovetail with the software features, otherwise it will be inefficient for those 
who do not. 
2. Many commercial software systems set forth a system recovery strategy that 
presumes the use of hot site services (recovery strategies are explained in 
chapter 3). Other recovery strategies such as service bureaux or reciprocal 
agreements are not considered. 
3. These software systems are mostly just guidelines and plans. They do not 
estimate the investment required for adopting a recovery strategy. 
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4. Most of them are based on what the vendor offers For example, if a 
company needs only a mobile site and the vendor does not provide this, the 
option is excluded from the software system. 
Although these software systems are not available for investigation due to their high 
cost and their location in the US, the above-mentioned criticisms made by disaster 
recovery experts indicate that they do not meet the objectives of the present research. 
2.6 Expert System Technology 
Since the arrival of the computer, solutions to problems are usually implemented using 
conventional systems technology. Since then, individuals have been developing 
programs to perform rapid calculations, to access data, or to perform modelling of 
complex process. In the last decade or so, the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in 
many fields has increased. Durkin (1994) defines Artificial Intelligence as afield of 
study in computer science that pursues the goal of making a computer reason in a 
manner similar to a human. Another special purpose computer programs, subset of 
AI, called Expert Systems were also applied in many areas. These are programs or 
systems that employ human knowledge which is captured in a computer to help solve 
problems that usually require human expertise (Turban, 1992). 
Expert systems, or knowledge-based systems, are used to give advice and to make 
decisions in the light of evidence given to them in much the same way as human 
experts would be consulted. They can preserve knowledge, increase productivity, 
capture scarce expertise and make it widely available, improve and speed up decision 
making, enhance problem solving and provide training with the explanation facility. 
With the proliferation of pes and the introduction of easy-to-use expert systems in 
recent years, the growth rate of the use of this technology in many areas has been 
tremendous. According to Durkin (1994), an expert and author of many books and 
articles in expert systems technology, the opportunity to expand the expert system 
technology in many areas will be enormous in the near future. The application, benefit 
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and growth of expert systems have been extensively addressed in the literature and 
need not be expanded on the present research. (Additional readings of the subject can 
be obtained from materials located in the Reference section at the end of this 
document.) However, what most concerns this research is the utilisation of expert 
systems technology in disaster recovery. 
2.6.1 The Use of ES In Disaster Recovery 
Both disaster recovery and expert systems are considered to be relatively new fields. 
In addition to their novelty appearances, their applications have grown tremendously 
over the last few years. Much of expert systems work in the past was related to 
medical consultations, computer configurations and engineering. They have been 
applied with great success in disease diagnosis, fault finding and design. In recent 
years, expert systems technology was introduced to areas related to the disaster 
recovery such as risk analysis and disaster prevention. 
An example of utilising expert systems in risk analysis is the introduction of an 
approach called LAVA, which is an acronym for 'Los Alamos Vulnerability and Risk 
Assessment'. The Los Alamos National Laboratory under the auspices of the US 
Department of Energy introduced LA V A in 1988 (Moses, 1992). Then several 
prototype systems were introduced to utilise the expert systems technology in the 
disaster prevention area. Such attempts are the Prototype Expert System for Disaster 
Mitigation in the Caribbean (Chin, 1992) and the Knowledge-Based System for 
Computer Disaster Prevention in IT Centres (Danish, 1994). Looking at these 
attempts and talking to the author of the latter prototype gave a strong indication to 
the researcher that utilising expert system technology in disaster recovery is feasible 
In fact, the work produced by Danish plays a major role in the decision to proceed 
with expert system technology in this research. 
The literature also shows that there are some new research projects going on, 
particularly in the US and the UK, to utilise expert system technology in the disaster 
recovery area. As mentioned earlier, the UK Government's Central Computer and 
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Telecommunications Agency (CCTA) will utilise expert systems in the next version of 
its Contingency Planning Module. The recent research which fully applies the expert 
system technology in disaster recovery has just been introduced during the writing up 
of this project The following section explains this research. 
2.6.1.1 AUDIT 
A prototype expert system for disaster recovery planning auditing called AUDIT was 
presented in late 1996 in the US. According to Marcella and Rauff (1996), the 
prototype system was constructed by using the product LevelS, that is an expert 
system shell. The knowledge base consists entirely of IF-THEN rules. The rules 
encode the heuristic knowledge of one expert concerning the protection of off-site 
backup and retrieval of critical data, applications of software and documentation, and 
system support software. Most of the rules in the system were deterministic, and thus 
ask for a yes-no or multiple choice response. 
The two professional developers of the AUDIT prototype system came up with 
interesting results to this research. They say that 
The results of our exploration into the possibility of using expert systems for 
auditing DRPs are encouraging. We believe that automated auditing DRPs utilising 
expert systems, is feasible and cost effective in at least three contexts. First, expert 
systems along the lines of AUDIT could be quite effective as an aid in developing a 
DRP. Second, an auditing expert system could serve as an inexpensive pre-auditing 
tool for an organisation. It would provide a means by which a firm could get the 
"bugs" out of its DRP before incurring the expense of a professional audit. Finally, 
an expert system for DRP auditing can provide almost continuous investigation of 
DRPs ' (Marcella and Rauff, 1996) 
Although the results of AUDIT's development were introduced towards the end of 
the present research, it presents the following interesting conclusions which would 
assist in meeting some of the objectives of this study: 
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A) Utilising expert systems m disaster recovery area is feasible and cost 
effective. 
B) Expert systems could serve as inexpensive pre-auditing tools for an 
organisation 
C) Expert systems can be used to give some indications of what to expect 
before seeking, contracting and incurring the expense of a professional audit. 
At a first glance, the author of the present research thOUght that the AUDIT prototype 
system is similar to the end product of this research. However, after further 
investigation the AUDIT system is found to be different in the following aspects 
1) The AUDIT prototype system does not use or follow any DRP 
methodology, whereas one of the objectives of the present research is to 
produce a comprehensive methodology and then to deliver the end-product 
system based on the developed methodology. 
2) The system does not address the threats assessment and the business impact 
assessment issues. 
3) The AUDIT system does not provide IT managers with a model of 
estimating the required investment on disaster recovery. 
4) It also does not provide IT managers with any techniques of estimating the 
maximum allowable downtime. 
5) More importantly, it does not include the characteristics of available 
recovery strategies and, hence, does not assist in recommending a suitable 
strategy. 
Therefore, unless future developments take place, the AUDIT prototype system, 
which was introduced in the US last year, does not meet most of the objectives of this 
research. However, it provides the researcher with more confidence that he is on the 
right path. 
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2.7 Summary of Literature Review 
Organisations are becoming increasingly aware of the value of the computer centre to 
the overall success and continued operation of a company. They are also becoming 
more aware of the tremendous liability it imposes when a disaster occurs. Because 
most businesses nowadays depend heavily on technology and computer systems, 
disruptions for even a few hours can cause a severe financial loss and can threaten the 
survival of the company. The growing dependence on computers and the increasing 
awareness of threats have therefore created the need for disaster recovery 
It was not until as late as 1979 that the concept of disaster recovery was introduced. 
It first began to appear in the United States with the introduction of the mainframe 
recovery industry. Since then, several attempts to avoid or minimise the impact of 
disasters have been made. Disaster prevention and insurance have been adopted as 
approaches to protect the survival of organisations. To that end several methods have 
been introduced, particularly in the prevention area. These methods may protect the 
business from some minor threats, or provide a means of compensation by insuring 
the assets, but they do not contribute much to keeping the service or business running 
during, or shortly after, the disaster. 
As a result, more attention was devoted to recovery plans rather than the two 
previous approaches. At the end of the 1980s, some disaster recovery plans and 
guidelines were introduced, followed by the development of automated approaches 
utilising the computer systems. Research into applying expert systems technology in 
the field of disaster recovery was not, however, introduced until the mid-1990s. 
Indeed, some officials of the main UK government computer agency, CCTA, have 
indicated that they will use expert system technology in the next version of CRAMM. 
After an extensive analysis of the literature given above and after examining the 
requirements and objectives of this research, it is clear that the previous work does 
not adequately and fully address the recovery strategy selection problem The 
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published work has therefore a number of deficiencies in terms of meeting the 
objectives of this research as follows: 
I. There is no comprehensive methodology for IT managers and officers who are 
responsible for contingency planning that includes: 
i) a method for classifying threats in which a greater contribution to the 
recovery strategy selection problem would be obtained; 
ii) a full business impact analysis including the calculation of the exact 
mrucimum allowable downtime; 
iii) an approach to estimating how much to spend on disaster recovery; and 
iv) methods of constructing organisational requirements and recovery strategy 
characteristics in such a way that they can be utilised by expert systems 
technology to select the most appropriate recovery strategy. 
2. There is a still a lack of a full use of expert systems technology in the disaster 
recovery area, to assist IT managers in decision-making. 
Therefore, the present research is intended to present a solution to the recovery 
strategy selection problem. The description of available recovery strategies, the 
proposed methodology, the expert systems technology and the proposed prototype 
system are all parts of that solution and they are presented in the following chapters. 
38 
Chapter 3 
Disaster Recovery Strategy Options 
3.1 Introduction 
The aim of this research is to help organisations select a suitable recovery strategy to 
keep their businesses going during an unexpected outage. But before developing the 
required methodology to help IT managers and others more towards the above aim, it 
is important to explain the recovery strategy options currently available in the field of 
disaster recovery and those which are expected to become available in the near future. 
Any successful disaster recovery plan should include adequate backup procedures for 
recovering the lost applications and systems. Selecting an alternative recovery site to 
recover the computer systems and keep the business running during the outage is part 
of these backup procedures. The alternative recovery site is called (in disaster 
recovery term) recovery strategy. In this chapter, major recovery strategy options 
available in the disaster recovery area are briefly described, with their respective 
advantages and disadvantages outlined. Then a comparison between all the various 
options is carned out. In addition, since the computer-related recovery industry has 
only been around for a relatively short period of time, there are several recovery 
strategy options the feasibility of which are still under investigation. These strategies 
are also briefly described in this chapter. 
3.2 Recovery Strategy Types 
There is a wide range of recovery strategy options available for consideration. They 
may be grouped into the following five types (see Table 3.1): null strategy, internal, 
39 
mutual aid, co-operative, and commercial The null strategy, as the name may 
indicate, is having no backup procedures at all. Internal recovery strategies are those 
which can be performed within the organisation The third type, mutual aid, is signing 
an agreement between two companies or through a third party to use each other's 
computer facilities in the event of a disaster. The co-operative type is when two or 
more companies share the cost of managing and maintaining an alternative site 
However, commercial recovery strategies are the most commonly adopted type. It is 
a recovery strategy that is provided by a commercial company which spreads the cost 
across a number of subscribers (Baylus, 1991). 
Table 3.1 - Types of Recovery Strategy 
Recovery Strategy Type Examples 
Null Doing nothing 
Internal Manual procedures, withdrawal of service, duplicate 
site. 
Mutual Aid Informal mutual aid, reciprocal agreement, time 
broker 
Co-operative Co-operative hot site, co-operative cold site. 
Commercial Service bureau, commercial hot site, commercial 
warm site, commercial cold site, hardware vendor, 
realtime recovery, mobile hot site, portable site. 
A full account of all the strategies would take a book by itself. Thus, in the following 
sections the researcher identifies and briefly explains major recovery strategies to give 
the reader some knowledge of potential recovery options in the disaster recovery 
field. 
3.3 Null Strategy 
As would be the case with any alternatives, there is always the null strategy option 
The null strategy option in the disaster recovery area means simply that there is no 
backup at all In this case, management has made a decision to ignore all potential 
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hazards, and will not fund any strategy to backup their data processing facilities. 
Those who chose this option usually believe in the saying 'it will not happen to me' 
There are few, if any, organisations that can justifiably adopt this option They JUstify 
the null strategy because they rely on insurance coverage As explained in Chapter 2, 
this is not considered by many disaster recovery experts to be a genuine recovery 
alternative. It should be noted, as described in section 2.4, that information systems 
insurance is a complex issue; comprehensive cover is rarely offered or may be 
prohibitively expensive (Orr, 1988). 
Other organisations may rely on preventive measurements to minimise a disaster's 
impact on any computer facility without considering the recovery procedures 
Although the disaster prevention measurements may seem sound and robust for some 
organisations, even the best avoidance plans cannot prevent every disaster (Redmond, 
Luongo & Tietz, 1996). 
In summary, this strategy may appear financially attractive, but any organisation that 
is able to function without its computer services for a long time after a disaster must 
ask itself whether it needs them at all. 
3.4 Internal Strategies 
Internal recovery strategies are those which can be performed within an organisation. 
The possible internal recovery strategies are manual procedures, withdrawal from 
computer services, and establishing a duplicate site. 
3.4.1 Manual Procedures 
The manual procedure strategy cannot be directly dismissed. It holds promise, 
particularly for those organisations that have little dependency on computers. Manual 
procedures may be in place for the short term disaster For example, banks always 
have manual procedures for making deposits and handling withdraws when their 
computer services are down for any reason (Arnell, 1990). 
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If manual operation is the strategy to be employed, it must be thought out completely. 
Manual fonns must be ready. Provision for temporary staffing may also be necessary 
However, if functions have been supported by automation for a long period of time, 
manual procedures may have been forgotten Even if the data and paper fonns are 
available, the workload may be too large, the time too short, and the staff's memory 
of the old manual procedures too dim. 
3.4.2 Withdrawal of Services 
The withdrawal of services strategy is applied when there is no urgent need to recover 
and run the computer systems during or immediately after a catastrophe. This strategy 
is normally considered for long-range work which can be transported to another 
location and run whenever feasible. There are some application systems which may fit 
here, such as long-range analytical and planning work, small business programs, and 
some types of research and development work, where the obvious strategy is simply 
not to perfonn the job until the computer facilities have recovered from the disaster. 
However, this strategy is considered to be unacceptable by customers. Also, since the 
job will not be perfonned until the computer is up again, staff productivity will 
decrease dramatically (Baylus, 1991). 
3.4.3 Duplicate Site 
The duplicate (redundant) site strategy is setting up an entire alternative data centre in 
another location. Many organisations consider their security and dependence on 
computer systems to be so great that they cannot afford the time it takes to re-
establish service at a commercial backup site. Such organisations are those involved in 
operations related to national security, defence production, and critical financial 
activities. For these organisations, building another duplicate site is the only 
acceptable alternative for disaster recovery backup, despite its high start-up cost 
(Hyde, 93) 
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In the event of a disaster, redundant systems at a separate facility are brought on-line 
Users are either transported to an operations centre that is co-located to the backup 
site or are provided with remote access tenninals and printers and connected to the 
backup CPU via communications. For example, Sears (the giant retailer in the USA) 
has a data centre in Chicago suburb (north of USA) dedicated to running the Sears 
nation-wide computer systems. A mirror site in Dallas (south of USA) is also in place, 
ready to take over command of the computer systems in the event of disaster hitting 
the Chicago centre (Burch & Grudnitski, 1989). 
Organisations which have built their own recovery site have justified the often 
considerable expense of the second computer centre by using it for research and 
development, training, and overflow work such as large batch processes Besides 
being the most reliable method of systems backup, the duplicate site strategy is also 
the most expensive (Hyde, 1993; Toigo, 1989). 
3.5 Mutual Aid Agreements 
The mutual aid strategies entail having a formal or informal agreement directly 
between two companies or through a third party, to use each other's computer 
facilities in the event of a disaster. The possible recovery strategies within this 
category are informal mutual aid, reciprocal agreement, and time broker. 
3.5.1 Informal Mutual Aid 
It is possible to have agreements on an informal basis. This is usually done when there 
is no complexity involved in recovering systems. There are some organisations which 
provide assistance when a neighbouring company is hit by a disaster. Another example 
is when one company is a major customer of another. The vendor party might not 
wish to sign a contract, but would certainly like to help during an emergency. This 
strategy is becoming more feasible as vendors increasingly provide computer services 
to their clients (Baylus, 1991). 
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3.5.2 Reciprocal Agreement 
The shared contingency, reciprocal or mutual aid, agreement is when two or more 
organisations, usually in the same industry, having identical or similar computer 
environments, formally agree to use each other's computer resources if either of them 
suffers a disaster, One of the major factors which has to be considered when adopting 
this strategy is location, Organisations using this strategy cannot be within the same 
locality, They have to be geographically far apart, For example, they may be in the 
same city but not in the same street, if they are to have confidence that they are both 
protected from a regional disaster (Hyde, 1993), 
The issue of security also has to be considered when running applications in the 
"backup" organisation computer centre (either during testing or after a real disaster), 
An obvious disadvantage of a reciprocal agreement is testing, as this usually generates 
unwelcome disruptions in the ''backup'' organisation, However, security and testing 
issues are usually covered in the contract and with the disaster recovery co-ordinators 
(Baylus, 1991), The cost of this strategy is relatively low because each organisation 
uses the other firm's resources, 
Despite its complications and disadvantages, this strategy is still the only realistic and 
affordable option for some organisations, It is certainly feasible for medium and small 
organisations and for larger firms with numerous subsidiaries (Toigo, 1989; Hyde, 
1993), 
3.5.3 Time Brokers 
The time broker strategy involves a third party keeping a list of firms, with available 
computer resources and time, who would be willing to provide such resources and 
time to other organisations on a temporary basis, The broker enters into contracts 
with all the parties involved and can guarantee the availability of predetermined 
computer facilities, All decisions in the use of the facility and the contractual terms are 
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made with the broker. There is no direct negotiation between the other two parties 
(Baylus, 1991). 
This is a type of mutual aid agreement in which the computer users do not have to 
take the time to search for compatible computers. The broker usually charges a 
monthly fee. This strategy is an inexpensive approach and has very favourable 
logistics if several companies in an area are brought into the agreement It can work if 
good relationships develop between the companies that are involved. However, there 
are serious problems with maintaining system compatibility over time, with being 
assured of availability when testing, and if all parties are subject to the same disaster 
(Hyde, 1993; Baylus, 1991). 
3.6 Co-operative Recovery Strategies 
The co-operative recovery strategy options category covers the situation when two or 
more companies share the cost of owning, managing and maintaining an alternative 
site. This normally involves one of two options co-operative cold site and co-
operative hot site. 
3.6.1 Co-operatlve Cold Site 
This strategy becomes an option when several organisations, usually within the same 
industry, form a group and agree to build an alternative "empty shell" site for long 
term occupation. The co-operative empty shell, another term, is similar to the 
commercial cold site provided by disaster recovery vendors. It is a building or a 
computer room on a fixed site. The room is equipped with the necessary power, 
environmental controls and telecommunications connections. The site is managed and 
maintained by a dedicated team assembled from the group (Arnell, 1990). 
When a disaster strikes one member of the group, the affected organisation starts the 
recovery procedures by ordering and installing the required hardware and software to 
resume its business The affected organisation can stay as long as needed, normally 
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until it rebuilds its original computer centre site. Although the size of the co-operative 
cold site is designed so that it can accommodate two or three organisations at the 
same time, the members of the group are carefully selected to be geographically 
remote from one another in order to avoid the chances of two organisations being 
affected by the same disaster. 
The adoption of the co-operative recovery strategy option is usually feasible for large 
organisations. Small organisations cannot afford the cost of managing and maintaining 
the alternative site. Although this option is considered to be suitable as a long term 
strategy and is relatively inexpensive for large organisations, the process of finding 
suitable members to form the required group is not easy. It may take a considerable 
period of time to reach a mutually acceptable agreement with all the members 
3.6.2 Co-operatlve Hot Site 
This strategy employs the same concept as the co-operative cold site in that several 
organisations form a group and agree to build an alternative site. However, the co-
operative hot site is a building or a computer room which is fully equipped with 
necessary hardware and software for fast recovery. In addition, the site is only utilised 
for a short period not exceeding six, or at the most, eight weeks. 
The co-operative hot site's membership comprises organisations that use identical 
computer platform environment. For some co-operative hot sites, the recovery 
services, however, are not limited only to those organisations which originally formed 
the group, but are also available to secondary level members This is executed with a 
contractual stipulation that if an original member experiences a disaster, the secondary 
member is asked to leave the facility at short notice. Members of the co-operative hot 
sit carry out this technique, on allowing secondary memberships, to cover the 
expenses of managing and maintaining the hot site. Therefore, subscribing to a co-
operative hot site as a secondary member is much cheaper than subscribing to a 
commercial hot site (Amell, 1990). 
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The virtue of the co-operative hot site strategy is that cost-sharing and the further 
acceptance of secondary level membership reduce the expenditure of the primary 
members. Also, the secondary members benefit from the relatively low cost because 
the co-operative hot site is established as a non-profit site. However, having to be 
ejected from the site at short notice is a drawback for the secondary members. Finally, 
as with the co-operative cold site strategy, finding members to form the group and 
reach a co-operative agreement may be difficult and take a long time 
3.7 Commercial Recovery Strategies 
This category contains the majority of the recovery strategy options Commercial 
recovery strategies are those provided by commercial companies which spread the 
cost across a number of subscribers. The various possible commercial recovery 
options in the disaster recovery market are described in the following sections 
3.7.1 Service Bureaux 
Service bureaux are commercial data centres which offer shared use of computer 
systems. They offer both batch services and on-line or time-sharing services. They 
vary from two-person operations, with little equipment, to large corporations with 
multiple equipment. Some of the problems of using service bureaux are similar to 
those found with mutual aid agreements (e.g. security and location). Some companies 
may not even have a service bureau located in the same city to provide needed 
recovery services. Another problem is that there may be configuration changes from 
time to time which cause extra effort and cost (Blair, 1987; Baylus, 1991; Hyde, 
1993). 
However, semce bureaux have a unique capability to satisfy many processing 
requirements and should be given careful consideration as one of the strategies to be 
used. Risk, cost, and effectiveness are moderate for this option. The service bureau 
strategy would probably be an acceptable arrangement for a company that does not 
require its systems to be recovered within a very short time scale (Hyde, 1993). 
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3.7.2 Hardware Vendors 
The hardware vendor strategy involves an agreement with a vendor to utilise its 
facilities for regular backup procedures in the event of a disaster. Vendors always 
have equipment available to be used at the time of a disaster. The equipment may be 
at the demonstration area centre, test centre, or at internal or sales sites. 
Historically, computer vendors' efforts have been excellent in providing the necessary 
equipment when it is needed. Also, hardware vendor strategies are often considered 
to be attractive because of their pre-tested compatibility and support. Although the 
systems may possibly be compatible at the time of the agreement, vendor facilities are 
subject to continuous modifications because of the rapid changes in technology 
(Amell, 1990; Baylus, 1991). 
In addition, there are some problems associated with this strategy. Vendors' facilities 
are usually showcases or sales sites, which make them subject to serious security 
problems. Another problem is that the hardware vendor does not have the relevant 
experience in disasters and recovery procedures. In fact, some of them indicate in 
advance that they will not agree to participate in the disaster recovery procedures 
3.7.3 Commercial Cold Site 
The commercial cold site is a commercial computer-ready room held in reserve for the 
subscriber's system. It usually contains a power supply, a raised floor, and air-
conditioning units. It does not contain computer processors or peripherals, although it 
may be equipped with dial-up lines for a communication network. Cold sites can also 
be private. Any company, if it can afford to, would build its own empty room at a site 
remote from all other data centres. The empty site needs not to be unproductive space 
because it can be used as a warehouse for supplies and equipment (Baylus, 1991; 
Hyde, 1993;, 1995). 
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In this strategy, separate arrangements need to be made to acquire the necessary 
hardware and software to run at the cold site. Ordering, shipping and installing the 
required equipment may take several days. One of the advantages of this option is that 
access should be available to the site almost immediately. The cost is relatively low 
compared to other options such as service bureaux and hot sites. In the commercial 
cold site strategy, there are many companies who may subscribe to the same cold site. 
This will reduce the cost to any individual member. However if one disaster affects 
several subscribers, the services may not be as promised. 
A cold site is best utilised in conjunction with a hot site. The hot site is used while the 
new equipment is shipped and installed at the cold site. When the new system is 
brought up at the cold site, processing can be transferred from the hot site to the cold 
site location. In fact most hot site providers also offer the cold site option. The cold 
site is usually available for a period from twelve to sixty months (Schreider, 1995) 
However, this strategy has several problems. One of the more serious problems is that 
there is no way the organisation can test its disaster recovery plan. When the disaster 
actually happens, they can only follow the steps laid out in the plan Since it will be 
the first time they have operated the plan, they will be confronted with many 
unexpected issues. This will affect the performance of the plan, which will, in tum, 
affect the overall business. Another problem is the inevitable delay in obtaining 
replacement equipment. When ordering equipment after the disaster, it must be 
realised that equipping a cold site will take at least a week. 
3.7.4 Commercial Warm Site 
The warm site strategy is relatively new to the market. It has been established to take 
its place between the cold site and hot site strategies. It is similar to the service bureau 
strategy and can be relatively expensive. Contracts are usually for a one year period. 
Warm sites are better equipped than cold sites. In addition to the usual cold site 
capabilities, they have telecommunications capabilities. They may also have lower 
specification hard disks and peripherals. mM has taken warm sites further than most 
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and has provided servtces very close to hot site specification IBM can occupy their 
wann sites for up to twelve weeks (Hiles, 1992; IBM Report, 1993a) 
3.7.5 Commercial Hot Site 
A commercial hot site is a complete data centre, from the commercial point of view, 
fully equipped with different sizes of processors, peripherals, communications. 
networks, and any necessary equipment Hot sites are usually equipped to run any 
application that is compatible with its hardware and operating system (Robinson, 
1993). Professional personnel are usually available to assist the organisation's 
operation team in their efforts to get the system up and running again In addition, 
specialised equipment can be provided to satisfY the customer's backup requirements 
Once a disaster is declared, the affected organisation sends its backup media to the 
hot site. Applications are mounted and tested, users are provided with terminal and 
modems at the location, and a data processing service is restored. Location of hot 
sites is not an issue. Network capabilities allow a subscriber to communicate with the 
hot site remotely, thereby eliminating the need to move employees away from their 
families (Hyde, 1993). 
Maintaining a commercial hot site is an expensive disaster recovery strategy, but a 
necessary one for many organisations with critical applications. Financial-oriented 
organisations tend to utilise hot sites more frequently due to the critical nature of their 
operations. In fact, over 52% of all hot site recoveries involve this type of 
organisation (Schreider, 1995). 
The hot site strategy has proven to be an effective strategy for recovering computer 
centres. Since 1982, 582 successful recoveries were completed at over 25 hot site 
locations in the USA. Until now, the industry has comprised 31 companies, 
representing the majority of the hot site providers and generating subscription fees of 
$620+ million annually in the USA alone. The majority of recoveries have occurred at 
the major hot site vendors: IBM, SunGard, and Comdisco. These three vendors alone 
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have supported over 67% of all disaster recoveries in the USA (Robinson, 1993; 
Schreider, 1995) 
Hot sites are increasingly becoming the recovery option preferred by medium to large 
organisations Also, hot site vendors are beginning to provide end-user and PCILAN-
based recovery services for smaller organisations which can afford the cost of having 
a hot site. Hot sites are recommended for any organisation which cannot manage 
without its computer system for more than one day (Toigo, 1989; Hyde, 1993, 
Schreider, 1995). 
3.7.6 Portable Site 
A portable site is transported to the affected organisation, in the event of a disaster, 
and built on a site prearranged with the subscriber, normally the car park. The amount 
of accommodation provided is tailored to the size of the configuration required. 
Electricity supply and telecommunication links may be required from the original site 
to the portable site (CCT A, 1989; Hiles, 1992). 
The cost of this option is usually the same as the cold site, which is inexpensive. The 
advantage of this strategy, apart from the relatively low cost, is that the portable site 
can be constructed adjacent to the home site. The portable site strategy can support 
organisations with smaller hardware configurations which can manage without its 
computer systems for as long as one week or more (Schreider, 1995). This strategy is 
commonly used as a long term strategy alongside another short-term strategy such as 
commercial or mobile hot sites. 
A potential disadvantage of the portable site lies in the need to provide a suitable 
secure location near the home office. This strategy also has similar disadvantages to 
the cold site strategy, such as the time needed to construct and commission the site, 
which can vary from seven to ten days. In addition, there is no wayan organisation 
can practice and rehearse its disaster recovery plan in advance (CCT A, 1989). 
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3.7.7 Mobile Hot Site 
A mobile hot site strategy is a stand-alone unit on a mobile trailer. A recovery vendor 
contracts to deliver an agreed system to the customer site, within a certain time limit 
The trailer is fitted out as a computer room with the necessary environment services 
The organisation needs to provide a secure area on which the trailer can be parked 
Like the portable site, electricity supply and telecommunication links are probably 
required from the original site to the mobile site (CCT A., 1989). 
In addition to the advantage of having the mobile site adjacent to the home site, it can 
be brought into use as a very quick response to a call for help, probably by the next 
day. A major disadvantage of this option is that it can only accommodate a limited 
amount of hardware platforms. Also, a location has to be provided near the original 
site. This option is usually recommended to small businesses as well as bank branches. 
3.7.8 Realtime Recovery 
Traditional forms of disaster recovery strategies such as hot and cold sites and mobile 
options remain the correct solutions for many companies. There are, however, a 
growing number of organisations with business continuity requirements which 
demand more immediate systems recovery. 
Currently, systems recovery is based on creating backup tapes (vital records) at some 
particular point in time. This affords the organisation recovery to the last backup. 
Traditionally, these backups have been sent off-site by road. At the time of a disaster, 
these tapes must be retrieved and then dispatched to the recovery site. This can be 
financially hazardous, time-consuming, devastating to the reputation of the 
organisation, and vulnerable to human error. 
To avoid all these problems a new concept of realtime recovery has been introduced 
to the field of disaster recovery. It is a strategy which has yet to be employed on a 
major scale in the US and Europe. The primary reason is cost. Although many clients 
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would like to take advantage of this type of service, the high cost has kept all but a 
few from implementing it The realtime recovery can be done by either remote 
joumaling or electronic vaulting which provides the ability to capture the intra-day 
transactions and transmit them to a commercial hot site. By using the realtime 
recovery strategy, the customer has the ability to recover to the actual point of failure, 
minimising the manual effort needed to recreate information (Ratlif( 1994). Realtime 
recovery is emerging as a popular service. However, it will take a few more years for 
it to become cost-effective and then more widely accepted (Schreider, 1995) 
To have an easy overview of the various options, list of the major advantages and 
disadvantages of most recovery strategies are shown in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 - Major Advantages and Disadvantages of Recovery Strategy 
Options 
Rec. Strategy Advantages Disadvantages 
Null Strategy • No preliminary cost • Very high risk that may 
.Good for long range analytical leads to loss of business 
and planning work • Unacceptable by customers 
Manual • Keeps some customer service • Impossible for on-line 
Procedure • Preliminary cost is low operations 
• Procedures could be 
forgotten 
• Labour intensive 
Withdrawal of • Relieves work load • Bad productivity 
services • Fits long range analytical work • Unacceptable for customer 
Duplicate site • Company security standards • Very expensive 
• Under management control • More sites to manage and 
• Familiarity with work loads maintain 
.Test runs anytime 
Informal mutual 
- Little cost • No contractual arrangement 
aid -Good relationships between -Not reliable 
firms may be established 
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Table 3.2 - Continued 
Reciprocal 
- Little or no cost 
- Limited short-term 
agreement 
-Good for small to medium firms occupancy 
-Good relationships between 
- Unwelcome testing from 
firms may be established other firm 
- Security and location should 
be carefully consIdered 
Time broker 
-Good contractual arrangement 
- May be configuration 
- Inexpensive changes 
- Unwelcome testing from 
other firm 
- Security is not under control 
Co-operative cold 
-Good for large organisations 
- Difficult to form group of 
site 
- Under management control participant companies 
- Long-term strategy - No pre-testing 
- Can be leased to secondary -Not for critical applicatIons 
members 
Co-operative hot 
- Fast recovery -Expensive 
site 
- Allow pre-testing - High cost of management 
- Under management control and maintenance 
-Can be leased to secondary - Difficult to form group 
members participant companies 
Service bureau 
- Low cost until disaster - May be busy when needed 
- Service bureau staff support especially in major disasters 
- Telecommunications capabilities -Operations not under 
control 
- May be configuration 
changes 
- Security is not under control 
Hardware 
- Available pre-testing -Compatibility may change 
Vendors 
-Good relation with the vendor - Little experience in disaster 
recovery procedures 
- Security problems 
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Table 3.2 - Continued 
Commercial cold • Relatively inexpensive • Takes long time to get 
site 
• Under management control computer environment ready 
• Long-time occupancy • No pre-testing 
.No control of hardware 
shipment 
• Not for critical applications 
Commercial • Better equipped than cold sites • Relatively expensive 
warm site • Telecommunication capabilities • Not for critical applications 
• Not for large equipment 
Commercial bot • Immediate access • Expensive 
site • Short time to restart computer • Limited short-time 
environment occupancy 
• Pre-setting can be done • Not under management 
control 
• Security is not under control 
Portable site • Relatively inexpensive • Space may not be available 
• No need to relocate staff • Takes long time to get 
• Long-time occupancy computer environment ready 
• No pre-testing 
.No control of hardware 
shipment 
• Not for critical applications 
Mobile hot site • No need to relocate staff • Adjacent space may no be 
• Can be brought in a short notice available 
• Cheaper than fixed hot site • Limited number of hardware 
• Good solutions for small and • Limited number of staff at 
medium companies site 
• Usually only for small to 
medium companies 
Realtime recovery • Recovery at the actual point of • Very expensive 
failure • Not available in every 
.Good solution for companies country 
with very vital applications 
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3.8 Comparison between Strategies 
In the preVIous sections, all recovery strategies were described, with the advantages 
and disadvantages in each case to provide a full picture of the range of possible 
options. As an additional step towards the aim of this research, a full comparison 
among the strategies has also been carried out across the full spectrum of the disaster 
recovery strategy selection process. The comparison includes several issues which 
must be considered when a company comes to choose between the available recovery 
strategy options. These issues are divided into three categories: 1) availability, 2) 
operation; and 3) capacity and cost. 
3.8.1 Availability 
Table 3.3, Recovery Strategy Options - Availability, shows that only sites internally 
managed or controlled can be counted on for immediate availability. There is no time 
limit for utilising these strategies. They can be used as long as it takes until the 
original site is ready. Also, internal strategies are available for testing at any time and 
as many times as desired. Several commercial sites and co-operative sites can be made 
available within 24 hours. Any of the strategies that require adjusting or movement of 
equipment will naturally take several days. Some of the commercial sites and mutual 
aid sites usually have a time limit on the duration of using the site. 
The testing availability varies from one strategy to another As stated before, internal 
strategies have the best testing availability. However, there are also other strategies 
which provide good testing availability. In fact, many commercial sites will not 
continue contractual arrangements unless testing has been performed (Amell, 1990). 
There are some options which have poor testing availability, such as hardware vendor 
strategy, or others where tests can not be performed, such as portable and cold sites. 
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Table 3.3 - Recovery Strategy Options - Availability 
Recovery Strategy Availability for Usage Testing 
use duration availability 
Withdrawal of service 6 hrs or less Long Good 
Duplicate site 6 hrs or less Long Good 
Reciprocal agreement 24 hrs Short Poor 
Time broker 2 days Short Poor 
Co-operative cold site More than 7 days Long No test 
Co-operative hot site 24 hours Short Good 
Service bureau 24 hrs Short Good 
Hardware vendor 3 days Short Poor 
Commercial cold site 7 days or more Long No test 
Warm site 2 days or more Long Fair 
Commercial hot site 24 hrs or more Short Good 
Mobile hot site 24 hrs or more Short Fair 
Portable site 7 days or more Long No test 
Realtime recovery 6 hrs or less Short Good 
3.8.2 Operational 
Table 3.4, Recovery Strategies Options - Operational, shows that those strategies that 
are managed internally have the full measure of management control and security 
guaranteed. This does not mean that other strategies, such as the commercial type, 
may not have good security and control. In fact, because of competition, their actual 
controls might be superior to internal controls. However, they are not under the 
subscriber management's control. On the contrary, mutual aid strategies usually have 
the least security and management control since the alternative computer centre is 
controlled and managed by non-specialised and non-profit making organisation 
(Baylus, 1991; Arnell, 1990). 
The scope of modifying hardware and operating systems is usually limited in 
commercial and mutual aid strategies. This is because there are other subscribers who 
are using the same equipment and software. Any type of modification on equipment 
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or software, however, can be allowed in co-operative strategies In strategies which 
are selected for long term recovery, such as cold site, the subscriber has the choice to 
install whatever equipment he needs. 
Full service support is available in many commercial strategies. There are other 
commercial strategies which limit their service supports, such as service bureaux and 
hardware vendors. This is because they are not fully dedicated to the disaster recovery 
business (Amell 1990). Because of the limited recovery manpower that is associated 
with mutual aid agreements, it is not possible to provide service support for the 
recovery activities. Similarly, in the co-operative strategies group, external recovery 
personnel support is not available unless the personnel assigned to the co-operative 
site are well-trained to overcome any recovery problems. Finally, the service support 
issue is not a problem with internal strategy options. 
Table 3.4 - Recovery Strategy Options - Operational 
Recovery Strategy Security Control by Ability to Service 
own stafT modify support 
SWIHW 
Withdrawal of service Very good Strong No Yes 
Duplicate site Very good Strong Yes Yes 
Reciprocal agreement Poor Fair No No 
Time broker Poor Weak No No 
Co-operative cold site Good Good Yes No 
Co-operative hot site Good Good Yes No 
Service bureau Poor Weak No Limited 
Hardware vendor Poor Weak No Limited 
Cold site Good Good Yes Yes 
Warm site Good Good Little Yes 
Hot site Good Good Little Yes 
Mobile hot site Good Good Little Yes 
Portable site Good Good Yes Yes 
Realtime recovery Good Good Little Yes 
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3.8.3 Physical Capacity and Cost 
They are other criteria that should be considered when selecting a recovery strategy, 
including physical capacity and associated costs. Large organisations usually need 
larger recovery work areas for their computer centre staff Co-operative strategies 
and some commercial strategies usually have sufficient work space to accommodate 
staff from the affected site. On the other hand, mutual aid agreements and small 
recovery strategies, such as the mobile hot site, offer very limited working space. 
Table 3.5 shows the physical capacity offered by each strategy. 
Another important factor is cost, which not only varies between strategies but also 
between vendors offering the same recovery strategy. The present research, however, 
only analyses and compares costs between strategies. It is not one of the objectives to 
analyse price variation among vendors, although this could be recommended as a 
possibility for future research. 
There are three basic costs associated with adopting a recovery strategy. The first two 
costs are pre-disaster expenses; the third is a post-disaster expense (Toigo, 1989; 
Arnell, 1990). 
• Initial cost. The cost of initial set-up, which includes membership, 
construction, additional equipment and additional software 
• Ongoing cost. The cost of maintaining and operating the facility, including 
rent, ongoing backup operations, and additional testing. 
• Activation cost (also called usage cost). This involves the actual use of the 
facilities, including disaster notification, service support, and overtime. 
Table 3.5 gives a general indication of the levels of cost that might be expected for all 
recovery strategy options. It is clear that the initial cost of building an additional 
duplicate site for a company is very high, whereas ongoing and activation costs are 
low because the site is under the company's management. Similarly, the initial cost of 
having a co-operative site is high and the ongoing and activation costs are relatively 
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low because the expenses are distributed among several members. In commercial hot 
sites, all types of cost are high On the other hand, mutual agreement options have 
low costs because they are based on using each other's facilities 
It is important; however, to say that costs alone should not determine the choice of a 
recovery method. As has been stated before, the crucial consideration is to ensure the 
continuation of critical processing and to provide the time necessary to recover from 
an adverse incident (Arnell, 1990; Baylus, 1991). 
Table 3.5 - Recovery Strategy Options - Physical Capacity and Cost 
Recovery Strategy Physical Initial Ongoing Activation 
capacity cost Cost cost 
Withdrawal of service 
-
No cost No cost Low 
Duplicate site Good Very high Low Low 
Reciprocal agreement Limited No cost Low Low 
Time broker Limited Medium Low High 
Co-operative cold site Good Medium Low Low 
Co-operative hot site Good High Medium Low 
Service bureau Limited Medium Low High 
Hardware vendor Limited Low Low Medium 
Cold site Good Low Low Medium 
Warm site Good Medium Medium Medium 
Hot site Good High High High 
Mobile hot site Limited Medium Low High 
Portable site Limited Low Low Medium 
Realtime recovery Good Very high Very high High 
3.9 Prospective Recovery Strategies 
Since the computer-related recovery industry has only been around for a relatively 
short period of time, there are several recovery strategy options which are still at an 
early stage in the investigation of their feasibility. These strategies have only just been 
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introduced during the preparation of this dissertation. They are not yet fully 
recognised by disaster recovery experts, but may become potential recovery strategies 
in the near future. Therefore, they are not included in the selection process described 
in Chapter 5. These new strategies are explained in the following paragraphs. 
OmniCentric Hot Site 
The OmniCentric strategy is a new concept, and tenn, in the disaster recovery 
industry. It is a term created from two words with opposite meanings. According to 
Powel (1997), Omni means all, every thing, present in all places, having no limits. 
Centric means centre, having a centre, focused. Powel presents the OmniCentric 
architecture as a jigsaw puzzle. Omni represents the overall image of the jigsaw 
puzzle picture, and Centric represents the individual puzzle pieces. An example of an 
OmniCentric hot site might have the central data processing servers at a recovery site 
in city A. the system's operations and applications recovered at a site in city B, a large 
number of user departments recovered at sites in city C, and network servers and 
technical support at a recovery site in city D. The required recovery elements at the 
various recovery sites would be interconnected using a backbone network, as wen as 
dial up access. If one of the locations (Pieces) is affected, for example user 
departments in city C, then they can be reconnected back to the organisation's 
unaffected pieces to complete the whole corporate jigsaw puzzle (powel, 1997). 
The OmniCentric strategy deals with the organisation's locations as one entity. 
Therefore, integrity is assured when recovering between locations. Recovery can be 
achieved without revealing that the company has experienced a disaster. However, the 
strategy only fits organisations with multiple locations. Although the strategy looks 
promising for such organisations, issues such as security, reliability and full integrity 
need to be clarified in the near future. 
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Internet 
Because of the rapidly growing use of the World Wide Web, some companies are 
already offering services for backing up and restoring data and applications over the 
Internet. The idea is that an Internet Service Provider, either in the recovery business 
or in related areas, would accommodate some backup services through the World 
Wide Web to small businesses or PC type of application holders. Subscribers to these 
services would download the backup programs from a service provider's WWW site, 
and then register on-line. Once registered, users would specify a daily backup 
schedule, after which the service would begin perfonning the on-line backups 
automatically (Schreider, 1996). 
In the event of a disaster, users could restore their backup data over the Internet and 
download it at their recovery location. The cost of this type of strategy usually 
involves a reasonable monthly service fee based on the quantity of compressed bytes 
of data backed up. 
Although this type of recovery strategy appears financially attractive for some users, 
the service is not yet adequately recognised by disaster recovery experts. Moreover, 
there are several problems associated with the Internet. The sanctity of the data once 
it has been sent across the Internet, the threat of hackers accessing the company 
through the Internet, virus-attacks, legal issues, and communication issues are all 
potential problems that need to be further clarified and resolved (Schreider, 1996) 
Employees' Homes 
For organisations that have thousands of employees located in one area, finding a 
work area large enough to accommodate them in the event of a disaster is a major 
problem This issue was discussed at a nation-wide teleconference hosted by SunGard 
Recovery Services in 27 of May 1993, which brought together financial executives 
and disaster recovery experts to identify and discuss recovery issues. The participants 
expressed the hope that in the very near future a new recovery strategy would be 
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devised to overcome the problem of relocating employees during a disaster. They 
believe the future solution to the above-mentioned problem may be recovery from the 
homes of key personnel. Business can be resumed from the homes of staff using 
telecommuting or telecommunication facilities already built into certain employees' 
homes. Employees do not need to go their offices but they can be connected to the 
recovery site or to a large server in one of the employees' homes (Datapro report, 
1993). 
3.10 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, major recovery strategy options in the disaster recovery area were 
described, with their respective advantages and disadvantages outlined. Then a 
comparison between the various options was carried out. In the following chapter, a 
case study is carried out to show the importance of adopting recovery strategies and 
to identifY major problems facing IT managers regarding disaster recovery issues. 
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Chapter 4 
Case Study in DRPs 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters, several surveys were reported as showing the importance 
and the strong need for Disaster Recovery Plans (DRPs). Some of the data in those 
surveys, particularly that related to maximum allowable downtimes, which was carried 
out in 1979 by the University of Minnesota, are important to the design of the 
methodology and the prototype expert system produced by this research. However, 
most of these studies were done a long time ago. Since then substantial changes in 
computer technology have occurred and corporate dependency on computers has 
grown. Therefore, a new survey is required to produce up-to-date data on which to 
develop a methodology that would be realistic and acceptable to organisations today. 
This chapter explains the results attained from a study recently conducted in Kuwait. 
It looks at the disaster preparedness of Kuwaiti organisations before and after the 
Iraqi invasion disaster in August 1990. It explores many issues such as maximum 
allowable downtimes, the losses that organisations may face, recovery strategies, the 
necessity of testing, off-site backup strategy, and other related issues. Some of the 
material reported in this study, such as testing and off-site storage, may seem 
peripheral to the present research but they are included to present a global picture of 
disaster recovery plans. 
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4.2 Objectives of the Case Study 
On the dawn of the 2nd of August 1990 an international crisis started in the Middle 
East. More than 150,000 troops of the Iraqi regime crossed the border of the state of 
Kuwait toward its capital, Kuwait City. Never since the Second World War has a 
country invaded another independent state, a member of the United Nations, seeking 
to eliminate its very name and identity. 
The Iraqi occupation lasted more than seven months, applying day by day a firmer and 
more aggressive grip on the people, property and natural environment of Kuwait. 
During the occupation large scale destruction of the information system infrastructure 
occurred. Computer machines were taken to Iraq. Fires were set in many computer 
sites. 
The situation in Kuwait, before and after the invasion, provides a good opportunity to 
carry out an analysis of the organisational effects arising from the large scale 
destruction of the information system infrastructure. This study, therefore, looks at 
the disaster preparedness of Kuwaiti organisations before and after the invasion It 
examines the effectiveness of recovery planning when subjected to events far 
exceeding the normal range of anticipated norm scenarios. In summary, the main 
objectives of the study are to: 
1) reveal the Iraqi invasion's effects on organisations and the consequences of their 
not having disaster recovery plans; 
2) clarifY whether organisations learned from the invasion disaster and whether 
they now realise the importance of disaster recovery plans; 
3) identifY major problems facing IT managers regarding disaster recovery issues; 
4) establish maximum allowable downtimes for different categories of 
organisations by size; 
5) determine the most appropriate recovery strategies for organisations with 
different sizes and different degrees of dependency on computers; and 
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6) determine the optimum time-scale for providing each recovery strategy in hours, 
days or weeks. 
4.3 Methodology 
The method used to collect the necessary information is through distributing 
questionnaires and conducting follow-up interviews. The questionnaire is one of 
several data collection tools that can be used for research. It is perhaps the most 
popular of all such tools employed in statistical work (Wilson and McClean, 1994) 
As with any other tool, the questionnaire technique has some advantages and 
disadvantages. According to Wilson and McClean (1994), the advantages are that it 
• Provides a useful method of obtaining information in a structured format; 
• Can be administered without the direct support of an interviewer; and 
• The responses to questions may be sought in a particular format to facilitate 
pre-determined analysis techniques. 
The disadvantages are that it: 
• Requires a lot of time to design and develop; 
• Suffers from the "form filling" syndrome, especially if administered by post; 
and 
• Has limited flexibility in terms of response format. 
In selecting the country in which to undertake the study, the only available choices to 
the researcher were Kuwait and UK. Kuwait is thought to be more useful than the UK 
for the following reasons: 
• Kuwait has just come out of the Iraqi invasion disaster, and therefore it is 
certain that all organisations in Kuwait will have taken stock of that experience; 
in the UK there is no such assurance. 
• Follow-up interviews can be done more easily in Kuwait because of the small 
size of the country and close geographical proximity between the relevant 
66 
organisations, whereas in the UK a satisfactory sample of follow-up interviews 
would be virtually impossible to conduct in the available time. 
• Questionnaires can be distributed and collected by hand in Kuwait, allowing 
face-to-face explanations in any cases of misunderstanding. This would increase 
the return rate of respondents. To apply this method in the UK would require a 
great deal of time, effort and expense. 
• The researcher's native language is that spoken in Kuwait, thus facilitating 
better communication than would be achieved in the UK. 
• The researcher's well-established links with IT managers in Kuwait can lead to a 
fuller co-operation with the study than could be expected from their 
counterparts in the UK. 
4.4 Content and Distribution 
A literature review shows that there has not been adequate research into the disaster 
recovery implications for Kuwait of the Second Gulf War. Because of the magnitude 
of the destruction and the large number of organisations which experienced the 
catastrophe in one form or another, there is a great opportunity to capture and analyse 
these experiences. The selection of relevant organisations was accomplished by 
reference to a variety of sources. One major source was a list provided by the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry in Kuwait. The Business Phone Directory and the 
1996 INFO Exhibition, which was held in April 1996 in Kuwait, served as secondary 
sources for locating additional organisations. Kuwait is a very small country and the 
number of organisations with an organised computer environment is not large. 
However, the researcher aimed for a target sample of 100 respondents. Accordingly, 
140 questionnaires were distributed to different types and sizes of organisation. 
Fortunately, the responses exceeded the target number by II. The residue of non-
respondents are unlikely to have any effect on the final conclusion of this study 
because most of them are considered to have a low dependence on computers. 
The questionnaires were distributed by hand to many organisations in Kuwait. They 
were passed to carefully selected respondents, either computer managers or disaster 
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recovery co-ordinators - if available. Follow-up interviews were conducted with most 
respondents to explain the objectives and to provide further clarification, if needed 
Then the completed questionnaires were either handed to the researcher during the 
meetings or returned by post, using self-addressed and postage-paid envelopes which 
were provided by the researcher. The latter method was used in case the respondent 
did not desire his or her organisation to be recognised by the researcher. Anonymity 
was guaranteed for responding organisations 
The questionnaire contained 29 questions. It was divided into three parts to 
determine: 1) the general characteristics of the organisation; 2) the recovery strategies 
employed; and 3) the off-site storage backup strategies installed. 
From the 140 questionnaires distributed in February 1996, a total of III usable 
responses were received after 12 weeks, representing a return rate of 79.3%. This 
good rate is at least partly due to the methodology of distributing the questionnaires 
and to the researcher's personal contacts with some of the respondents. Most 
respondents were keen to be helpful because, given their own experience of the 
Second Gulf War, they thOUght the subject was very important 
The organisations in the sample vary in size, degree of dependency on computers, the 
processing type they adopt, and the type of businesses they conduct. The study sought 
to cover a wide range and achieve a fair balance among different types of 
organisation. The four key characteristics among the obtained sample can bee seen in 
Figures 4.1 through 4.4. 
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Figure 4.1- Proportions of Business Activities by Organisation Category 
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Figure 4.2 - Percentage Size of Organisations 
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Figure 4.4 - Organisations by Processing Type 
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4.5 DRPs before the Invasion 
Figure 4.5 shows that only 25% of organisations had Disaster Recovery Plans (DRPs) 
before the invasion. Nevertheless, only 68% of those which had DRPs had actually 
activated them either partially or fully. The rest did not operate their plans because 
roads were blocked and they could not reach their organisations due to the fast pace 
of the military occupation of the country. 
Figure 4.5 - DRPs Availability before the Invasion 
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The high percentage, 66%, of organisations which did not have DRPs reflects the fact 
that many of them had not appreciated the importance of recovery plans Most of 
them admitted that they lacked the knowledge of the importance ofDRPs and never 
thought a disaster would strike them. Others understood this importance but did not 
make the time and effort to establish a DRP. 
Even then, most of the organisations which had activated their plans had only saved 
some of their vital data, critical applications and documents. One of the respondents 
said that even though his organisation had a DRP, they had not tested it for more than 
a year. So by the time they had grasped the gravity of the situation, it was too late to 
enter the computer floor. However, they managed to locate one of the employees who 
had worked there for several days during the invasion who smuggled out some of the 
tapes, hidden under his clothing. 
Another disaster recovery co-ordinator said that because of the lack of testing, it took 
him several hours to call the right people and meet at the site to collect the backup 
media. Luckily, the building was not yet occupied and the weekly routine backup was 
performed just the night before the day of the invasion. (The il1llasion happened at the 
weekend). 
However, there are a few organisations such as the Public Authority for Civil 
Information and the Public Institution for Social Security, which saved all their data, 
applications and documents. In fact, the latter organisation recovered all its resources, 
except fixtures like large hardware, because their recovery plans were well tested. The 
testing procedures were done regularly in these organisations because the nature of 
the data is very important to the government and to the individual citizens whose 
personal details are held. Some of these organisations ran their applications and 
continued to carry out part of their activities in neighbouring countries or in the UK. 
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4.6 Organisational Losses 
According to Dr. Adel Assem, the Director General for the Public Authority for 
Compensations Resulting from the Iraqi Invasion, which was established by the 
United Nations, the losses for private organisations in Kuwait totalled approximately 
$35.6 billion while the total losses for Kuwaiti Government institutions was around 
$69 billion. These figures do not cover personal losses for individuals, such as death, 
injuries, damage to homes, automobiles, furniture, etc. (Al-Watan, 1996) All the 
losses resulted either from stolen and damaged property or from disruption to 
business. All those who lost their data, information and applications, had to restart 
from scratch. Acquiring the hardware and software was not too much trouble, but 
redeveloping applications and capturing data again proved an unwelcome and 
demanding experience. Usually, employees are not motivated to do the same work 
again. 
Losses resulting from the Iraqi invasion with respect to computer centres (Figure 46) 
vary from one sector to another. The computer centres in government organisations, 
for example, were completely damaged. Computers (large, mini and PCs) were 
disassembled under the supervision of specialists and carefully shipped to Baghdad. 
Connection wires, air-conditioning and communication equipment were dismantled 
and also transferred. The damage sustained by the government institutions often 
entailed complete loss, resulting from the transfer of the contents to Iraq or from the 
destruction of the buildings and the remainder of their contents in order to render 
them useless in future, as happened to the Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research 
(Centre for Research and Studies on Kuwait, 1994). 
The education sector also suffered from the aggression. Schools and other educational 
institutions were used for accommodating the troops. Losses here extended beyond 
the computer centres. The laboratories, research equipment and the furniture of 
lecture halls were also dismantled and transferred to Baghdad. UNESCO Mission 
Report to the UN indicated that Kuwait University lost no less than 95% of its 
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computer facilities and databases (UNESCO, 1991; Centre for Research and Studies 
on Kuwait, 1994). 
However, the private sector, especially banking organisations, did not suffer as badly 
as government organisations regarding equipment destruction. There was some 
damage to equipment and the loss of documents in some branches, but most of their 
main computer centres were not damaged. Nevertheless, they experienced major 
losses such as discontinuity of revenues and the failure of a significant proportion of 
their skilled personnel to return after the Liberation. 
Figure 4.6 - Organisational losses Due to the Invasion 
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The results show that many organisations suffered mostly from the loss of revenue, 
hardware, skilled personnel and software. The loss of revenue was most serious 
because of the long period during which the businesses were unable to function. The 
occupation lasted for about 7 months. However, clearing the remaining troops from 
the country, restoring electricity and communication lines, and allowing citizens who 
had fled the invasion to return to the country took a further three months. 
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The loss of skilled personnel came third in importance to organisations This is not 
surprising because many Palestinians, Jordanians, and some other nationalities, in 
addition to Iraqis, were either deported or not allowed to enter the country after the 
Liberation because their countries had supported the Iraqi aggression In addition, 
many skilled personnel from other nationalities did not return because they had found 
employment with other organisations world-wide during the occupation Kuwait's 
population in 1990, before the invasion, was a little more than two million In the 
1995 census, it was just over 1.5 million. The loss of approximately one quarter of the 
population is devastating for a country as small as Kuwait. 
4.7 DRPs Status Now 
Did the organisations learn from the war disaster? Figure 4.7 shows that some 
Kuwaiti organisations recognised the importance of disaster recovery plans. This was 
clear when comparing the number of organisations which had DRPs before the 
invasion (25%) with those which now have approved DRPs (49"10) or waiting for 
approval by top management (29%). But why still waiting for approval? One of the IT 
managers in a medium-sized financial institution replied: 'it is hard to convince top 
management, especially when our organisation came out from the invasion disaster 
without any equipment damages. ' 
Figure 4.7 - Availability of DRPs in 1996 
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In spite of the magnitude of the disaster, the results show that there are some 
organisations in Kuwait (22%) still neglecting to employ DRPs. The reasons are quite 
similar to the types of excuses used in every co. Lack of budget, as expected, was the 
most frequent excuse advanced because the whole country is operating under extreme 
financial stringency due to the huge losses resulting from the invasion. However, lack 
of knowledge of the importance of recovery plans came in third place - surprisingly, in 
a country just emerging from such a major disaster. This was perhaps because the 
sample included several organisations which were only established after liberation and 
several others are private organisations which were not affected much by the invasion 
Figure 4.8 produces a breakdown of the excuses, with percentages, for not having an 
approved DRP. 
Figure 4.8 - Excuses for not having Approved DRPs 
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4.7.1 Maximum Allowable Downtime 
Maximum Allowable Downtime (MAD) is the period for which an organisation can 
be maintained without computer services, and when computer backups must be 
provided for them. Other names are Response Time or 'Drop Dead Time'. It is 
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important that organisations identify their various resources and define a MAD for 
each one. Then these resources are prioritised in terms of criticality to indicate which 
should be recovered first, second, third, etc. Depending on the maximum allowable 
downtimes, it is possible to choose an appropriate recovery strategy (AmeU, 1990). 
The utilisation of computers is not new in Kuwait. It started slowly in the 1970s, but 
expanded fast in the late 1980s. Because of the invasion many organisations lost their 
information systems infrastructure, so they had to rebuild their computer environment 
again. This rebuilding gave them the chance to get rid of the old systems and adopt 
the most up-to-date technology in the world. This was especially true when many 
western organisations came to the country after the liberation to offer technology 
services and products. Therefore most organisations in Kuwait now depend heavily on 
computer services to conduct their operations and make decisions 
Figure 4.9 gives an indication of the extent to which organisations are computer 
dependent by illustrating the MADs for several organisational categories in Kuwait. It 
was found that financial organisations have the lowest MAD (1.82 days) and 
manufacturing organisations have the highest MAD (2.94 days). The average among 
all organisations, regardless of size, is 2.43 days. 
However, when organisations are categorised by size, it is found that as the size of the 
organisation gets larger, the MAD gets lower. This can be seen in Figure 4.10 for the 
financial sector category. 
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Figure 4.9 - Maximum Allowable Downtime by Organisation Category 
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Figure 4.10 - Maximum Allowable Downtime by Size for Financial 
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Comparing these findings with the University of Minnesota survey, mentioned in 
Chapter 2 in Figure 2.2, the variation in the results is understandable. For example, it 
is reasonable that organisations now should have lower MADs than in 1978 because 
firms nowadays depend more heavily on computers in every aspect of their business 
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In addition, back in 1978, only medium to large organisations could afford to have 
large computer processors. The use of personal computers started to spread widely in 
the 1980s Since then many smaller organisations have come to rely on computerised 
systems to conduct their business. For example, most large financial organisations 
which used computer processors in 1978, had a MAD of 2 days. Since then, as the 
finance sector's dependency on computers has grown, this study shows that the MAD 
is now less than 24 hours for giant financial organisations. 
4.7.2 Recovery Strategy 
A recovery strategy defines the interim ability to process data while a full recovery of 
the primary computer site is underway (Arnell, 1990). That is, it is the selection of an 
alternative recovery site for running the business until the original site is ready once 
more. Since some organisations cannot afford to be without computer services for as 
long as one or two days, they must have an alternative site to run their critical 
operations if the original computer site is subject to a disaster. 
There are not too many disaster recovery vendors in Kuwait because the country is 
small and the disaster recovery market is still in its infancy. Some alternate sites are in 
neighbouring Gulf countries (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAB). Some organisations have 
branches, or are themselves branches of organisations, in these countries. When 
organisations are asked what type of alternative site they have adopted or will adopt, 
they responded as shown in Figure 4.11. 
The results show that the hot site strategy is the preferred strategy for financial 
organisations. This is understandable in view of the critical nature of their businesses. 
The preference for hot sites by financial organisations is virtually true in every 
country. In fact, over 65 percent of all hot site providers in the USA involved financial 
organisations (Schreider, 1995). The preferences of other types of organisations are 
more variable but the hot site is the commonly preferred strategy for all categories 
78 
Figure 4.11 - Preferred Recovery Strategies by Organisation Category 
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Categorising organisations by size, Figure 4.12, shows that hot site and duplicate site 
strategies are preferred by large and giant organisations. This is understandable 
because these organisations can afford the high cost of these types of strategy. 
However, small organisations prefer either mutual aid strategies or other less costly 
strategies such as mobile and portable sites, hardware vendor, or just manual 
procedures. 
These results conform to the findings of a survey undertaken by Ofl-COR 
Information Management, Inc in 1986 called 'Computers in Banking Survey' (Toigo, 
1989). Both conformed that the size of the organisation is an important factor in 
selecting a recovery strategy. Both studies showed that larger organisations prefer the 
hot site strategy for the recovery of their businesses. Small to medium size businesses 
prefer the mutual assistance strategy, along with other strategies such as mobile and 
portable sites. The interesting difference, however, between the 1986 survey and the 
Kuwaiti survey is that in 1986 many large banks were adopting the mutual assistance 
strategy while in this survey it is clear that large organisations no longer favour this 
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recovery option. This is understandable for many reasons, such as the declining cost 
of hot sites, the testing problems accompanying mutual assistance agreements and the 
fact that many disaster recovery experts do not recommend this option for large 
organisations, unless other options are unavailable (Hyde, 1993). 
Figure 4.12 - Recovery Strategies by Organisation Size 
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Even the best laid plans never work out during an actual disaster as one thinks they 
will. It is impossible to determine if a plan is really capable of recovering the business 
until it is tested. It is therefore important to have continual testing and evaluation of 
plans. Experts strongly recommend that DRPs must be tested at least every six 
months (Baylus, 1991), 
The Kuwaiti study also showed that even if organisations recognise the importance of 
having disaster recovery plans, they still lack the commitment to test these plans more 
often. As shown in Figure 4.13, it was found that from the 49% of organisations 
which have DRPs, 47% did not test their disaster recovery plans because of budget 
and time constraints and 35% tested their DRPs only once a year. Only 18% of 
organisations tested their plans more than once yearly. This is a very low percentage, 
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bearing in mind that disaster recovery experts recommend that an effective plan 
should be tested at least twice a year. However a survey, undertaken on UK 
organisations in January 1993 by the University of Loughborough in association with 
the Computing Services Association and the National Computing Centre, showed that 
only 22% of UK organisations have a viable recovery plan, indicating that a 
complacent attitude towards testing is almost a universal phenomenon (Hearnden, 
1993). 
Figure 4.13 - Testing Among Available DRPs 
Three times 
or more a 
year 
Twice a year 7% 
11% 
--
. ;. ;. 
4.8 Off-Site Backups Storage 
Untested 
plans 
47% 
Many DRP experts believe that effective off-site storage of critical resources is 
certainly one of the most important components of any effective and successful 
disaster recovery plan. Also, a plan may be in perfect condition, having been securely 
stored in a fireproof safe, but will still be useless if the fireproof safe is buried beneath 
the rubble. To guarantee that off-site backups and source documents are not 
consumed in the same disaster, thus rendering production systems unusable, these 
items should be stored at a safe location. 
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The study showed that 16% of the organisations do not backup their applications and 
data. This is because some of them did not depend heavily on computers but in other 
cases it was just bad management. It also showed that many organisations in Kuwait 
(68%) were storing their backups in the same computer building Some of them say 
that they do this because they have a fireproof safe in the basement of the building 
This is not a safe decision because in case of a disaster, an organisation cannot reach 
its backups because the area is usually sealed off and no one is allowed inside until the 
building is investigated and declared safe. This might take several days. In this 
situation an organisation cannot operate its alternative recovery site if the critical 
applications, data, and documents are not available. However, in addition to storing in 
the same building, some of these organisations were storing other copies of their 
backups in separate buildings (37%) and outside the country (14%). 
Organisations which store their backups outside Kuwait started doing that just after 
the invasion. They learnt from the invasion's experience and still fear the threat of the 
near neighbour, especially after the October 1994 Iraqi army build-up on the Kuwaiti-
Iraqi border. Organisations adopting this strategy are those which can afford the cost 
of so doing. They are usually government and multinational organisations. Many, the 
so called local organisations, store their backups inside the country and do not have 
any copies outside. They believe that if the country is occupied, the outside backups 
will not be of any practical use because they could not run their businesses from 
abroad. 
The study also shows that many organisations (65%) are considering the importance 
of their critical applications and data by backing up their work daily. However, as 
Figure 4.14 demonstrates, 13% and 22% only do their backups every other day and 
weekly, respectively. 
Figure 4.14 - Backups of Critical Systems 
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Having outdated or unreadable backups is as bad as not having backups at all. No 
matter how much detail is provided on the activities, unless tests are perfonned to 
determine their usability, the backups will often not work, contain rubbish, or just not 
be up-to-date. 
The study shows, Figure 4.15, that only 27% of organisations are testing the 
readability of their backups three times or more a year. Disappointingly, 28% of 
organisations are not checking backup readability at all This is a high percentage and 
these organisations could face an unpleasant situation, if and when a disaster strikes 
and the backup media is needed for recovery. 
Figure 4.15 - Tests of Backups Per Year to Ensure Readability 
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4.9 Summary and Findings 
The study obtained data for III organisations in Kuwait. It covered a wide spectrum 
of different sizes and types of organisation. It covered organisations which heavily 
depend on computers as well as those which do not. It highlights, for the first time, 
the scale of the destruction inflicted by the Iraqi invasion disaster with respect to 
computer centre losses. It shows the consequences and losses of computer centres 
that come from large scale human-made disasters such as wars. It also found that 
government organisations, rather than private organisations, tended to be the main 
targets for Iraqi destruction. 
The study shows that the awareness of the importance ofDRPs is rising in Kuwait, 
particularly after the distress that most organisations experienced from the invasion. 
This was clear when comparing the number of organisations which had DRPs before 
the invasion (28%) with those which now have approved DRPs (49%) or are in the 
process of finalising one (29%). However, even though organisations recognise the 
importance of disaster recovery plans, they still do not recognise the importance of 
testing these plans more often. 
The study also shows that although some IT managers recognise the need for 
adopting DRPs, it appears that they do not have a methodology to follow for the 
recovery strategy selection process. IT managers have selected their alternative 
recovery strategies based on outside recommendations or simply on similar projects 
performed for comparable businesses. This approach is not efficient because 
requirements differ from one organisation to another. The methodology presented late 
in this research can, in the researcher's opinion, provide a solution to this problem 
Another finding is that most of the respondents are grappling with a common 
question: how much should the company be spending on the DRP? This appears to 
cause a good deal of concern and needs further investigation. Some IT managers 
stated that they would greatly appreciate efforts to provide a solution to the above 
question. 
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In addition to the specific findings mentioned above, the results of this study can 
contribute significantly to the development of a methodology for recovery strategy 
selection, introduced in the following chapter, and of a prototype expert system, 
introduced in Chapter 7, by constructing the following tables: 
• Table 5.4 - Recovery strategies selection by size and degree of dependency 
• Table 5.10 - Recovery time among recovery strategies. 
• Table 7.1 - Examples of time intervals for different organisation categories 
Finally, it is hoped that the study increases awareness among organisations, and not 
just computer centre managers in respect to disaster recovery plans. Also, its very 
recent findings should strengthen the claims made late that the methodology and 
prototype expert system are realistic and acceptable approaches worthy of serious 
consideration by organisations in this field. 
Chapter 5 
The Methodology for Selecting A Recovery 
Strategy 
5.1 Introduction 
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Much of the work published in the disaster recovery area has dealt with the need for 
disaster recovery planning, how to develop and implement a recovery plan, effects of 
actual disasters, and the consequences of not having a plan. Moreover, most of the 
recovery plans which have already been developed deal with issues such as 
management support, choosing the recovery team, risk analysis, emergency 
procedures, testing and maintenance (Jackson, 1994; Robinson, 1993; Brown, 1993, 
Orr, 1988). A literature review also shows that these analyses only point to specific 
features of the various recovery strategies without recommending the most suitable 
one. The full implications of selecting the most suitable recovery strategy have not 
been addressed adequately in the literature. 
The aim of this research therefore is to develop a methodology and a computerised 
system that fully addresses the issue of selecting an appropriate recovery strategy. The 
study hopefully will help IT managers and disaster recovery co-ordinators to estimate 
the optimal investment required and to recommend one or more recovery strategies 
for a particular organisation. The solution consists of two stages: 1) development of a 
structured methodology for the recovery strategy selection process; and 2) 
development and implementation of a computerised system to make use of the 
structured methodology from (1). The methodology is explained in this chapter 
whereas the computerised system is discussed in Chapter 7. 
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5.2 The Framework of the Methodology 
The framework of the methodology is displayed in Figure 5. 1, Recovery Strategy 
Selection Framework. It explains how the process of selecting the appropriate 
recovery strategy is undertaken. The methodology consists of five phases that provide 
a step-by-step approach to ensure that the entire recovery strategy selection process is 
covered. The phases are: Threats Assessment, Business Impact Assessment, Recovery 
Strategy Analysis, Cost Analysis, and Recommendations. The following paragraphs 
briefly describe these phases; then each phase is explained in more detail in the 
following sections. 
The methodology will aid IT managers to identify potential disasters that are 
threatening their companies. A new approach for classifying threats is presented. The 
threats are classified in such a way that they can contribute more usefully in the 
recovery strategy selection process. This analysis is done in the first phase and is 
called Threats Assessment Phase. 
Once the threats assessment has been finalised, the second phase, Business Impact 
Assessment, is presented. In this phase, computerised systems and applications are 
identified and then prioritised in terms of criticality to the organisation. More attention 
is given to those that are deemed critical in terms of their importance to the survival 
of the organisation after a disaster. Then, the overall maximum allowable downtime 
for which an organisation can tolerate the failure of its computer systems is calculated. 
The key organisational requirements are also identified in this phase. 
The IT manager, the disaster recovery co-ordinator/team or whoever is in charge has 
the responsibility for analysing and selecting the most suitable and efficient recovery 
strategy. This strategy must fit the true recovery requirements of the organisation. A 
number of factors affect the choice of recovery strategy. Some of these factors are 
related to the organisation itself Others relate to the characteristics of different 
recovery strategies. The third phase, Recovery Strategy Selection, explains these 
factors and shows how the recovery strategy selection process is undertaken. 
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Figure 6.1 - Recovery Strategy Selection Framework 
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Disaster recovery experts state that the cost analysis of accommodating a recovery 
strategy must only be used for budget purposes, not to make a decision on whether to 
adopt a recovery strategy or not. Disaster recovery plans should not be evaluated on 
the basis of cost-effectiveness (Robinson, 1993; Baylus, 1991). The present research, 
however, does not ignore the fact that management needs some indication of how 
much they need to spend on a disaster recovery. It provides IT directors with a 
method for calculating the investment required for a disaster recovery strategy. This is 
carried out in the fourth phase. 
In the final phase, a computerised system is developed to provide recommendations 
based on several inputs from the user. The recommendations cover the following 
three aspects: 
1) determining maximum allowable downtimes for organisations; 
2) calculating the investment required to adopt a recovery strategy; and 
3) providing recommendations in terms of selecting the most suitable recovery 
strategy. 
5.3 Threats Assessment Phase 
The first step of the methodology is to identify what threats exist to normal 
information processing activities. This is an extensive and difficult phase, fraught with 
uncertainty and the need to apply judgement (Orr, 1988). However, no reasonable 
recovery planning can be done without reaching agreement within the organisation as 
to what types of threat could realistically affect the operation, and what are the most 
probable disaster occurrences to expect. This step is fundamental in deciding upon the 
types of preventive measurement that should be installed or recovery strategies that 
should be selected (Arnell, 1990; Baylus, 1991; Toigo, 1989). 
There are many threats that can have serious consequences on computer centre 
operations. There are various schemes in the literature for classifying threats. One 
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scheme divides threats by causal origin, either natural or man-made. Another division 
is by looking at the phenomena such as water, fire, power failure, mechanical 
breakdown, etc. (Toigo, 1989). According to Parker (1981) and Carroll (1984), 
threats may also be divided into intentional, accidental, and natural A fourth division 
is to distinguish between threats according to their effects on computers those 
affecting software and data are called logical, whilst threats affecting hardware are 
called physical (Elbra, 1992; Danish, 1994). 
The above-mentioned classifications, however, do not contribute adequately to the 
decision-making process of selecting the most suitable recovery strategy. They do not 
assist in deciding what types of recovery services should be adopted in order to 
recover and save the business after a disaster. Rather, they help in installing 
safeguards to protect existing assets against probable threats (Arnell, 1990; Danish, 
1994). These safeguards are installed either inside or outside the computer centre to 
reduce the risk of a threat occurring (Orr, 1988). For example, in the causal origin 
classification mentioned above, if a natural disaster such as a flood is anticipated, a 
countenneasure may be taken such as erecting barriers. Another example is that if 
terrorist activity is expected in a certain area, then a suitable countenneasure would be 
to deploy additional security officers. Classifying threats by phenomena can also 
contribute to installing proper safeguards. For example, a sensitive fire detector may 
be installed in every room in the computer centre to detect fires as early as possible. 
However, if a company wants to invest not only in prevention but also in recovery, 
these classifications are of no assistance in deciding the type, recovery time and 
location of a recovery strategy required for business continuation. The bottom line is 
that the above-mentioned types of classification are helpful in making decisions about 
suitable preventive measurements but not in actually selecting the recovery strategies. 
Therefore, it is important that threats should be classified in such a way that the 
system of classification itself contributes significantly to the recovery strategy 
selection process. 
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In this research, a new approach named "Threats Magnitude Classification" (n1C ). 
Figure 5.2, is presented to assist in the selection process. The severity and longevity 
of the disaster will determine, in addition to other factors, the proper recovery 
strategy, or combination of two strategies, to be adopted (Arnell, 1990). For example, 
for massive disasters, a short-tenn strategy could be selected that would provide the 
temporary use of a service bureau, while a long-tenn strategy, cold site, is outfitted 
with hardware. 
Threats are categorised in the new approach according to the size of an area that they 
are expected to damage. For example, some organisations are more concerned with 
regional threats such as earthquakes, hurricanes, and major floods Others are 
concerned with threats that affect only the computer centre premises, such as building 
fires and terrorist activities. Others may feel that they have preventive measurement 
for the more likely disasters but still feel that they must prepare for recovery because 
so many disasters are unpredictable and uncontrollable. 
Figure 5.2 - Threats Magnitude Classification (TMC) Approach 
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In the Threats Magnitude Classification (TMC) approach, threats are classified into 
four types according to the size of damaged area that the threat may cover 
Descriptions and examples of the four types are illustrated in Table 5.1. The objective 
of this new classification is to assist in determining the most suitable recovery strategy 
by looking at the following issues: 
• Whether a short or long term recovery strategy is required. For example, 
equipment breakdowns that need to be repaired or replaced might only require 
short-term strategy, whereas building fires require both short and long-term 
recovery strategies. 
• The physical capacity of the alternative site. For example, in threats damaging 
only the computer room, a large work area is not needed for personnel because 
their offices are not affected and they can be readily connected, if necessary, 
through communications lines to the alternative site. On the other hand, in 
regional threats, sufficient space in the alternative site is essential so that key staff 
can process and recover critical functions. 
• The availability of additional personnel provided by the alternative site's vendor. 
In major disasters where a wide area is affected, employees are pre-occupied for 
days or even weeks with the safety of their homes and families rather than 
recovering the business of their employers. For organisations expecting these 
threats, additional assistance from external staff is necessary to run the business 
during that time. 
• The location of the recovery site. If a regional threat is expected, there is no point 
in having a recovery site near the original site because both sites may be affected 
by the same disaster. In the case of computer room or equipment failure threats, a 
mobile site parked in an open area adjacent to the firm might be suitable. 
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Table 5.1 - Types and Examples of Threats in the TMC Approach 
Threat Type Description Examples 
Type I Threats that affect countries, Hurricanes, major floods, wars 
Regional regions, cities. tornadoes, earthquakes 
TypeD Threats that affect smaller Building fires, major terrorist 
IT Centre area such as buildings in a activity, falling aircraft, minor 
building street, computer centre. floods. 
Includes IS offices, computer 
room, equipment. 
TypeID Threats that affect only the Minor fires, burst pipes, heat, 
Computer computer room or floor. humidity, smoke. 
room Includes floor, equipment, 
communications, processors 
air conditions, etc. 
Type IV Threats related to equipment Mainframe failure, sabotage, 
Equipment failures. Hardware, software, software failure, hacker, theft, 
failure interface, etc. communication failure 
The distinction between types of threats may be easy and straightforward for some 
organisations, but it might be difficult and unclear for others. For instance, for 
organisations that are located in an area that is exposed to weU-known threats the 
identification of threat type may be very clear. Examples of this include earthquakes in 
the West Coast of USA; hurricanes on the East Coast of USA; or IRA bombing in 
major cities in the UK. However, for other organisations the identification may not be 
easy. To ensure that the type of threat is correctly identified, the information coUected 
should include, but not be limited to answers to the following questions: 
• Is the organisation located in an area that is exposed to a natural disaster? major 
river. earthquake fault. 
• Is the organisation in or near a building that has the potential for being attacked 
by a terrorist? federal building. embassy. 
• Is the organisation near a takeoff or landing runway of an airport? 
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• Is the organisation located in or near a country that is considered to be politically 
and militarily unstable? 
• In general, what threats are expected? e.g. fire, .flood. hurricane, mtrosion, 
earthquake. 
• What is the area that would be affected? e.g. country, city, street, building, .floor, 
offices. 
• What resources are affected? e.g. hardware, software, communicatIOn lines, 
WAN, LAN. data, documents. 
• Will all organisation sites be affected? e.g. main office, branches, computer 
centre. 
• How much will the computer centre be affected? e.g. fully, partially, or not 
affected 
• Are there any preventative measurements installed to eliminate or reduce the 
expected threat(s}, and, if so, which one from the four threat types they can 
prevent? e.g. .flood barriers, additional security around the bUilding, water 
detectors, Halon .flooding, mantrap. 
The Threats Assessment phase is extensive and not an easy task to perform. However, 
it is important that it should be done before proceeding to the following phase, 
Business Impact Assessment. 
5.4 Business Impact Assessment Phase 
Once the Threats Assessment phase has been finalised and the type of threat expected 
has been determined, the next step is to perform the Business Impact Assessment 
(BIA). The ultimate purpose of the Business Impact Assessment phase is to calculate 
the maximum allowable downtime for the organisation. Since aU systems are not 
equally important, the BIA should thoroughly and objectively examine aU of the 
organisation's resources, identifying and prioritising critical ones. The BIA is the 
foundation on which the overall recovery strategy selection rests (Wold, 1996). 'It is 
considered to be the cornerstone of the recovery plan' (Fisher, 1996). According to 
Robinson (1993) and Fisher (1996), the BIA serves several purposes: 
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• It identifies all resources in the organisation; 
• It helps to distinguish the resources which are critical to the survival ofthe 
business; 
• It determines the cost of downtime and the maximum allowable downtime for 
each resource; 
• It recognises possible exposures and liabilities to internal and external entities, 
such as unions and regulatory agencies; and 
• It determines whether there are intangible issues, such as public image and 
political embarrassment. 
The Business Impact Assessment process can be done using one of the well-known 
data collection methods: conducting interviews, distributing questionnaires or a 
combination of the two. An interview may be conducted with each department A 
form sheet containing several questions about each system that the department has 
will be reviewed with the department manager or with a senior member of staff who 
has been in the department long enough to be able to answer all the questions. 
Alternatively, a questionnaire may be sent to every department of a specific system or 
application to identify the extent of its usage in the performance of normal work 
(Toigo, 1989; Fisher, 1996). 
The reasons for collecting the data and information are to: 
1. identify each resource that needs to be recovered; 
2. prioritise the identified resources in terms of criticality; and 
3. determine the downtime cost for the denial of these critical resources. 
If the organisation is too large with multiple locations domestically and 
internationally, the BIA process will certainly be a huge task. To solve this dilemma, 
several teams are assigned to do the job. Each team may take on particular functions 
or locations. This automatically narrows the process of interviewing critical 
departments and individuals (Fisher, 1996; Wold, 1996). 
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5.4.1 Resource Identification 
The collection of data should include a comprehensive list of computer and 
telecommunications hardware a complete inventory of applications and systems 
software. All resources must be identified individually and in detail before any 
priorities are set and an assessment made for the recovery strategy selection. This 
identification helps the company to look for any resource that is critical and might be 
forgotten because it is not operated regularly. Such a resource is customised 
operating system software. 
As mentioned earlier, the ultimate goal of the Business Impact Assessment phase is to 
determine the actual maximum allowable downtime for the critical resources. 
Therefore, questions should be constructed carefully to achieve this goal Direct 
questions such as "Is your application critical?" should not be asked. All departments 
like to believe the work they do or the systems they use are critical. It is human nature 
to want to be needed. However, if the questions ask not how critical a systems is, but 
rather what steps a department would take to perform the same function if the system 
was unavailable, then subjective views about criticality becomes less problematic for 
the assessment. Many disaster recovery co-ordinators who have used these types of 
question have discovered that departments will provide a surprisingly fair assessment 
of their system's criticality (Toigo, 1989). 
There are several questionnaires and form sheets presented in related literature which 
can assist in capturing the required data. Some of the questions that can be asked 
should include, but not be limited to: 
• What does the interviewee's department do? 
• What software and hardware do you need to run your department? 
• What would happen if these software and hardware were not available to you? 
• Can the department perform the job manually if the computer is not in service? 
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• Does the department use any critical specially-tailored equipment or software') 
• To what degree can the department tolerate the interruption of the application,) 
• What is the financial loss for several time intervals? (For example: 6 hours, 12 
hours, a day, two days, one week, etc.) 
• What is the minimum staff and floor space needed to continue operations at 
another facility? 
• What communication devices would be necessary to continue operations') (i.e 
telephone, facsimile, switchboards) 
• What are the revenue producing functions of your organisation? 
The scope of the recovery should be limited to those systems which are deemed 
critical in terms of importance to the commercial survival of the business. One of the 
significant steps of the recovery process will be identifYing and prioritising these 
critical data and applications 
5.4.2 Resource Prioritlsation 
After identifying all the resources in the organisation, the resources are then 
prioritised in terms of criticality and which should be recovered first, second, third, etc 
(Jackson, 1994). The continuation of a large percentage of the information systems 
operations at the alternative recovery site immediately after a disruption is rarely 
logistically, technically, or economically feasible. The resources that an organisation 
has are not all of equal importance. Attention should be focused on time critical 
resources requiring recovery as soon as possible while placing non-time critical 
resources at a lower priority for recovery (Toigo, 1989; Baylus, 1991; Jackson, 1994; 
Fisher, 1996; Wold, 1996). 
Systems criticality can be measured in several ways. It may be measured by degree of 
tolerance. Tolerance is defined as the ability to cope with system interruption 
Tolerance may be expressed in many ways. It may be commonly expressed as a 
monetary value: the loss of revenue to the company from system outages of specific 
duration. If there is a very low tolerance within the company to the loss of a system or 
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to the interruption of an application, this low tolerance is expressed as a high money 
value or cost. If, on the other hand, the company can tolerate to a significant extent 
the loss or interruption of an application, this high tolerance is expressed as a low 
money value or cost. Applications whose losses would entail substantial costs for the 
organisation are termed critical. Conversely, high tolerance applications are referred 
to as noncritical (Toigo, 1989). 
Tolerance may also be based upon the length of time that the system or application is 
unavailable for use, or upon the time of the day or month an outage occurs (Toigo, 
1989). For example, the general ledger is not considered critical until the end of an 
accounting period, specifically a quarter. However, the Business Impact Assessment 
process assumes that an outage will always occur at the worst possible time. 
After gathering information about each system, then they are divided into three 
categories: critical, semi critical, and noncritical (see Figure 5.3). The definitions of the 
three categories are stated below: 
• Critical: A disruption of service of these systems would seriously 
jeopardise the operation of the organisation (usually one day). Their 
tolerance to interruption is very low and the cost of interruption is very 
high. 
• Semicritical: Systems and applications for which suspensIOn can be 
tolerated for a short period of time (usually a week). They have higher 
tolerance and lower cost than critical systems. 
• Noncritical: Systems that may be interrupted for an extended period of 
time, at little or no cost to the organisation. 
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Figure 5.3 - Criticality in Respect to Tolerance and Cost 
High Noncritical 
Tolerance Medium Semicritical 
Low 
Critical 
Low Medium High 
Cost of Interruption 
Since the aim of this project is to assist IT managers, or others having the same 
responsibility, in selecting a recovery strategy to save the business from great loss or 
even the cessation of trading, it is important to concentrate only on systems and 
applications that are crucial for organisational survival. Management must carefully 
review the list of critical systems to ensure that only the really critical ones are 
included. This is because, based on these critical systems, the maximum allowable 
downtime can then be determined. 
&.4.3 Maximum Allowable Downtime 
The objective of this section is to determine how long an organisation can tolerate the 
interruption of its systems at a time of adverse incidents (maximum allowable 
downtime). The maximum allowable downtime contributes significantly in the choice 
of an appropriate recovery strategy (Arnell, 1990; Jackson, 1994). For example, 
organisations with lower maximum allowable downtimes, i. e. one day, should adopt 
the hot site recovery strategy option. On the other hand, organisations with higher 
maximum allowable downtimes, i. e. one week, should adopt the cold site recovery 
strategy option. In addition, the maximum allowable downtime is also needed as an 
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input for the model applied in this research for calculating the investment required on 
a recovery strategy, as will be explained in the Cost Analysis phase later in this 
chapter. 
The work done in the previous two sections (collecting data and infonnation for 
identifying and prioritising resources) is essential to arrive at the maximum allowable 
downtime estimate. Calculating the maximum allowable downtime is based on the 
cost of the computer downtime with respect to the organisational revenue For 
selected time intervals (e.g. 6 hours, 12 hours, one day, two days, etc.) the 
consequences of the denial of computer systems for each critical resource is 
estimated. Each loss or potential exposure is quantified and the cost effects are 
aggregated for each time interval. Then the aggregate cost is compared to the income 
for the first selected time interval. The maximum allowable downtime (one of the 
selected time intervals) is reached when the cost of downtime exceeds the revenue. 
This process will be explained more fully by an example when the prototype system is 
described in Chapter 7. 
Table 5.2, which shows the cost of downtime, is an example of how to collect the 
cost of downtime for each resource for a specific time interval. Assuming that the 
entire IT centre has been damaged (worst-case scenario), users are restricted from 
entering the damaged facilities, and the data and applications stored off-site can only 
recover the system to midnight of the previous day. The time interval in the table can 
be adjusted depending on the type and size of the company. For example, a giant-size 
financial organisation might begin with a small time interval e.g. 3 or 6 hours, whereas 
a small research centre might start with 2 or 3 days. 
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Table 5.2 - Cost of Downtime 
Time after disaster Downtime Cost of Resources Total Income 
res! res2 res3 res4 res5 Cost 
3 hours 
6 hours 
12 hours 
One day 
Two days 
One week 
At the end of this phase, Business Impact Assessment, the proposed system 
automatically computes the maximum allowable downtime for a particular 
organisation. However, there are some conservative top management who may want 
to change the maximum allowable downtime for one reason or another Top 
management looks at the organisation from a different prospective. Intangible issues 
such as political embarrassment, public image and media criticism are more important 
to them and may reduce the overall maximum allowable downtime for an 
organisation. Therefore, the developed computerised system will need to be flexible to 
allow for this type of change. 
5.5 Recovery Strategy Analysis Phase 
The process of selecting a recovery strategy is carried out after the Threats 
Assessment and the Business Impact Assessment phases have been accomplished, the 
critical systems have been identified and the maximum allowable downtime for the 
organisation has been approved. 
The aim of this research is to assist in selecting an appropriate recovery strategy for 
organisations. The Information Technology (IT) manager, the disaster recovery co-
ordinator/team or whoever is in charge has the responsibility for analysing and 
selecting the most suitable and efficient recovery strategy. The recovery strategy must 
fit the true recovery requirements of the organisation and the maximum allowable 
101 
downtime necessary to recover from an adverse incident Available recovery 
strategies, with their respective advantages, disadvantages and a comparison between 
them were listed and explained in Chapter 3. The approach for selecting the most 
appropriate recovery strategy is described in this phase. 
There are a number of factors that influence the decision to select a particular 
recovery strategy. Some of them are related to the organisation itself Others are 
related to the characteristics associated with the recovery strategy. The decision is 
based on the following: 
I) organisational characteristics (size of organisation, degree of dependency on 
computer and maximum allowable downtime); 
2) organisational requirements and recovery services required (outside personnel 
support, work area, special-tailored platform, security, usage duration); and 
3) recovery strategy's characteristics (discussed in Chapter 3) 
5.5.1 Organisational Characteristics 
There are three major organisational characteristics that are highly significant in the 
selection process: I) size of the organisation; 2) level of degree of dependency on 
computers; and 3) maximum allowable downtime. The latter was explained earlier in 
section 5.4.3. The first two are explained in the following two sections. 
5.5.1.1 Size of the Organisation 
The larger the organisation, the larger and more complex its computer centre and the 
more complex and advanced the strategy it needs. Recovery requirements for large 
organisations are not the same as those for smaller organisations. For instance, for 
giant organisations, the alternative site should be capable of providing space not only 
to perform computer operations, but also for computer centre personnel who need to 
be there to run the complex data processing (Arnell, 1990; Toigo, 1989) On the other 
hand, small organisations usually need to run few systems and only one or two of their 
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key personnel need to be at the alternative site. Moreover, Epich and Persson (1994) 
state that the selection of a recovery strategy depends largely on the size of the 
company (number of hardware, software, number of original sites in the company, 
staff). 
Classifying organisations by size is not an obvious approach from any theoretical 
literature. Sizes conceivably vary across industries and even across countries. 
Organisations may be divided either according to their turnover, value of assets, or 
number of employees. However, because of inflation and the fast pace of corporate 
development, classifications according to turnover or value of assets may change 
every ten years or less. A company with a turnover of £ 1. 5 million was considered to 
be medium size ten years ago, now it is classified as a small finn (Shafto, 1991). 
Classification according to the number of employees also varies from one industry to 
another. For example, in the manufacturing sector, a company with 200 employees is 
classified as small whereas in other sectors it is regarded as a medium size company 
(Storey, 1988; Acs & Audretsch, 1993; Harrison, 1994). 
Nevertheless, in the real world organisations are nonnally divided into four sizes 
giant, large, medium, and small (Shafto, 1991; Storey, 1988). Most organisations 
usually define themselves according to this classification or at least·they know to 
which category they belong. The objective of this research is not to guide 
organisations on how to classifY themselves. Therefore, the above classification is 
applied in the present research and it is assumed that organisations know into which 
category they would fall. 
Size can also determine the type of recovery strategy (internal, co-operative, mutual 
agreement and commercial) the organisation should adopt. For example, giant 
organisations can afford the cost of handling their own duplicate site or sharing a co-
operative site with other companies where the cost of operating the site is distributed 
between them. On the other hand, small finns adopt mutual agreement or manual 
procedures and few would choose commercial recovery strategies as an alternative. 
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Table 5 3 shows the types of recovery strategy in relation to the size of organisation 
(The types were explained in Chapter 3, Table 3.1) 
Table 5.3 - Types of Recovery Strategy in Relation to Size 
Size of organisation Type of recovery strategy 
Giant Internal, co-operative, commercial. 
Large Co-operative, commercial. 
Medium Commercial, mutual agreement. 
Small Commercial, mutual agreement, manual. 
5.5.1.2 Degree of Dependency 
The second organisational characteristic that influences the selection decision is the 
degree of dependency on computers. Organisations vary in their level of dependency 
on computers. Organisations that are highly dependent on computers in their daily 
operations, such as financial institutions cannot sustain the denial of computers for a 
long period of time. On the other hand, some work can be postponed, such as certain 
types of research and development tasks, until the computer system is up again 
(Baylus, 1991). An organisation can be categorised to be highly dependent on 
computer by looking at its maximum allowable downtime. Arnell (1990) stated that 
organisations with maximum allowable downtimes ranging from 1 to 5 days are 
considered to be highly dependent. Organisations with a medium level of dependency 
usually have maximum allowable downtimes ranging from 6 to 30 days. Organisations 
which have maximum allowable downtimes greater than 30 days are considered to be 
a low dependent (Arnell, 1990). 
The levels of dependency in this research follow Arnell's classification. Organisations 
are divided into three levels high, medium, and low. This division helps to determine 
which group of recovery strategies is appropriate for each level of dependency within 
different categories of size. 
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Table S.4, showing the Group Selection Based on Size and Degree of Dependency, 
illustrates how groups of recovery strategy options are in respect to size and degree 
of dependency. For each size category and degree of dependency, a group of recovery 
strategies may be recommended. The recommendations made here are based on 
information gathered from the literature, related surveys and the recent case study of 
organisations in Kuwait (see Chapter 4) Organisations are classified by 4 sizes (giant, 
large. medium. low). Then within each size, organisations are further divided into 
three categories according to their degree of dependency on computers (high. 
medium. low). 
Table 5.4 - Group Selection Based on Size and Degree of Dependency 
Size Degree of 
Dependency 
Giant High 
Medium 
Low 
Large High 
Medium 
Low 
Medium High 
Medium 
Low 
Recovery Strategy Selection 
Duplicate site, realtime recovery, commercial hot site 
Warm site, co-operative cold site, commercial cold 
site, portable site. 
Withdrawal of service, manual procedure. 
Realtime recovery, commercial hot site, service 
bureau, mobile hot site, co-operative hot site. 
Warm site, hardware vendor, co-operative cold site, 
commercial cold site, portable site. 
Withdrawal of service, manual procedure. 
Realtime recovery, commercial hot site, mobile hot 
site, time broker, sefYlce bureau, reciprocal 
agreement. 
Hardware vendor, portable site, withdrawal of 
service. 
Withdrawal of service, manual procedure, null 
strategy. 
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Table 5.4 - Continued 
Small High Mobile hot site, warm site, reciprocal agreement, time 
broker, hardware vendor 
Medium Withdrawal of service, manual procedure 
Low Manual procedure, null strategy. 
However, in order to select the most suitable recovery strategy within a suggested 
group, other important information must be obtained. This information is related to 
the types and levels of recovery services required by organisations and the recovery 
strategy's characteristics. 
5.5.2 Organisation's Recovery Requirements 
Organisational requirements usually influence the recovery strategy selection process. 
The decision cannot be taken until all the organisation's requirements are fully 
identified. There are some requirements which can be instantly identified such as 
security, recovery time, and specially-tailored hardware or software employed by the 
organisation. There are others which cannot be fully appraised and understood until 
the Threats Assessment phase is completed and the threats type is identified. Such 
services are allowable length of time to utilise the alternative site, external personnel 
support, work area, and the location of the alternative site. 
The Threats Magnitude Classification (TMC) approach which was developed in this 
research and explained earlier in the Threat Assessment phase contributes a great deal 
to decisions about which recovery services are required. Each threat type is associated 
with specific recovery services that are needed only when this particular type is 
anticipated. Table 5.5 illustrates the recovery services needed for each threat type. 
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Table 5.5 - Recovery Services Associated with Threat Types 
Threat Type Recovery Services 
Regional Personnel support, work area, replacement ofHW&SW , 
short-term recovery, long-term recovery, remote location 
Building Work area, replacement ofHW&SW, short-term recovery, 
long-term recovery, within the city area. 
Floor Replacement of HW&SW, short-term recovery, adjacent 
location. 
Equipment failure Short-term recovery, adjacent location. 
As explained In Chapter 3, Recovery strategies vary in the level of recovery services 
they provide. Identifying the required level of a particular recovery service assists in 
determining the exact recovery strategy that suits an organisation The tables that are 
explained in the following paragraphs are a rearrangement of the tables presented in 
Chapter 3. The reason for this rearrangement is to facilitate the process of identifying 
the required level of a particular recovery service. The tables classifY recovery 
strategies depending on the recovery service they provide The proposed expert 
system, which is developed by the present research, employs a series of linguistic 
values (for example high, medium, low) to capture the exact level of recovery service 
required by organisations. Based on the user responses, the system recommends the 
most suitable recovery strategy for a particular organisation. 
It may be worth mentioning here that it is not an objective of this research to help IT 
managers in deciding which vendor to select for recovery services. Vendors differ, 
within each recovery strategy, depending on many parameters such as: hardware and 
software compatibility; reputation; communications facilities; reliability and supplies 
While a comparison between vendors within each recovery strategy is not a focus for 
this research, it can be recommended as a possible area for future study. 
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External Personnel Support 
External personnel assistance is required by some organisations, especially those 
which are exposed to major disasters. Many organisations tend to believe that their 
own staff will always be available after a disaster. This may be true in minor disasters 
but it is not the case in regional disasters. In major disasters, such as earthquakes or 
wars, employees are more concerned with their own and their family's safety rather 
than their company's welfare (Baylus, 1991). Companies which are exposed to major 
disasters should carefully consider the availability of outside help from a recovery 
vendor. These services may include the provision of experienced telecommunications 
specialists, system programmers, customer support representatives, and recovery 
operations specialists. The extent of such assistance varies significantly among 
recovery strategies. There are strategies which provide full personnel support. Others 
provide partial support or do not provide any support at all. Table 5.6 shows the 
levels of personnel support that are provided by recovery strategies (Hyde, 1993) 
Table 5.6 - Personnel Support Levels among Recovery Strategies 
Personnel Support Recovery Strategies 
Full Duplicate site, commercial hot site, warm site, mobile 
hot site, realtime recovery. 
Partial Service bureau, hardware vendor, commercial cold 
site, portable site. 
Not available Reciprocal agreement, time broker, co-operative hot 
site, co-operative cold site. 
Work Area 
It is important for some organisations that there is a sufficient workspace at the 
alternative site to accommodate staff from the affected site. This requirement depends 
on the size and the complexity of the computer centre. The larger and more complex 
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the computer centre, the more space is needed for working staff. Some organisations 
may require space not only to perfonn computer operations but for office and 
administrative functions (Arnell, 1991). However, there are other organisations which 
only need a few key personnel to be at the alternative site. Table 5.7 shows the levels 
of work area available among recovery strategies. 
Table 5.7 - Work Area Levels among Recovery Strategies 
Work Area Recovery Strategies 
Sufficient Duplicate site, commercial hot site, warm site, commercial cold 
site, realtime recovery, co-operative hot site, co-operative cold 
site. 
Limited Service bureau, hardware vendor, portable site, reciprocal 
agreement, time broker, mobile hot site. 
Security 
Recovery sites have different levels of security, both logical and physical. There are 
some organisations that have to satisfy a very high security level. These include: 
sensitive military installations, air-transportation command and control centres, air 
traffic control centres, government electronic mail centres, etc. For these 
organisations, it may be economically feasible to set up an entire alternative site in a 
geographical location far enough away not to be subject to the same disaster (Arnell, 
1990). Some organisations perfonn activities requiring a lower security level. If the 
security issue is a very important requirement, a company should not consider the 
mutual or co-operative strategies. It is virtually impossible to protect the integrity of 
data in a mixed processing environment (Arnell, 1990; Hyde, 1983). Table 5.8 shows 
security levels among the recovery strategy options. 
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Table 5.8 - Security Levels among Recovery Strategies 
Security Recovery Strategies 
Very high Duplicate site, co-operative hot site, co-operative cold site 
High Realtime recovery, commercial hot site, warm site, commercial 
cold site, mobile hot site, portable site. 
Medium Service bureau, hardware vendor, reciprocal agreement, time 
broker. 
Special-Tailored Platforms 
Often, IT managers involved in designing and implementing an open system type data 
centre and in-house developed software require an alternative site that can help them 
manage their special-tailored platforms. This is not a problem if a company subscribes 
to an open shell site, such as a cold or portable site, where equipment can be shipped 
after the disaster episode has settled down. However, the only sure means of ensuring 
an equipped site that handles this type of request is to have a duplicate centre. 
Currently, there are no commercial vendors that are capable of handling full 
multivendor recoveries. There are some commercial strategies which can partially 
handle this request but, according to Robinson (1993), these are not without some 
disadvantages: 
• They may increase the price of a commercial site considerably. 
• Vendors may not have the knowledgeable personnel skilled in the various 
systems. 
• They may lack the capability to handle various types of telecommunications 
needs. 
The remammg strategies, co-operative, mutual agreements and some commercial 
ones, have neither the capacity nor the ability to meet this type of request. Table 5.9 
shows the levels of the ability to change the platforms among recovery strategies 
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Table 5.9 - Ability to Modify Platform among Recovery Strategies 
Modify Recovery Strategies 
hardware/software 
Good Duplicate site, co-operative hot site, co-operative cold 
site, commercial cold site, portable site. 
Limited Realtime recovery, commercial hot site, warm, mobile. 
None Service bureau, hardware vendor, reciprocal 
agreement, time broker. 
Recovery Time 
The ability to provide fast recovery services varies among recovery strategies The 
decision as to which of the strategies to select depends on the organisation's 
maximum allowable downtime, as calculated in the Business Impact Assessment 
phase. Table 5.10, showing the recovery time for various recovery strategies, shows 
that the duplicate site option, which is internally managed and controlled, can be 
available immediately. The other option is realtime recovery which is a new concept 
and just introduced recently. Although the latter option is very expensive, its cost is 
expected to decrease as the technology progresses (Hyde, 1993). A number of other 
strategies can offer recovery within one to two days. Any other options that require 
the moving of equipment will naturally take several days. 
Table 5.10 - Recovery Time for Various Recovery Strategies 
Recovery Time (MAD) Recovery Strategies 
Immediate Duplicate site, realtime recovery. 
One to two days Commercial hot site, co-operative hot site, time broker, 
service bureau, reciprocal agreement, mobile hot site. 
3 days or more Warm site, hardware vendor, co-operative cold site, 
commercial cold site, portable site. 
III 
Location 
To avoid a situation where the same disaster strikes both the company and the 
alternative site (Threat Type I), many companies look for alternative sites at a distant 
location. Some companies have learned the need for this separation the hard way One 
Mexico City company maintained its hot site in the same city prior to the earthquake 
there, and both the company's and the hot site's computer systems were destroyed 
(Hyde, 1993). Similarly, many disaster recovery vendors have established sites in and 
around London, UK. In the wake of the IRA bombing campaign, organisations need 
to ensure that their alternative sites are not in areas which are also vulnerable either 
from the effects of bomb damage or in accessibility by recovery personnel (Hyde, 
1993). If a threat of Type III or IV is anticipated, then the alternative site may be 
within the same street. Therefore, determining the type of threat is a very significant 
factor in deciding upon the location of the recovery site. Table 5.11 suggests, 
according to the threat type, where to locate the alternative site. 
Table 5.11 - Location and Restoration Period 
Threat Location Restoration period Type of time-strategy 
Type after the disaster required 
Regional Remote Long time (months, Combination of strategies 
years) 
Building Within the city Long time (months) Combination of strategies 
Floor Adjacent Medium (weeks) Short-term strategy 
Equipment Adjacent Short (days) Short-term strategy 
failure 
Usage Duration 
Recognising the type of threat to which a company may be exposed helps in deciding 
how long the alternative site is needed and if a combination of both short and long-
term strategies is necessary. Regional threats usually have a long aftermath (months or 
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years) and may therefore require a combination of strategies to be developed to 
provide the temporary use of service bureau or hot site (usually up to six weeks), 
while a shell site is outfitted with software and hardware equipment until the company 
rebuilds its own original site (Arnell, 1990) Table 5.11 also shows appropriate time-
strategy required for each type of threat. 
The allowable duration of utilising an alternative site varies between different recovery 
strategies. There are some recovery strategies which can be used for up to six or 
seven weeks and they are called short-term strategies. Others can be used as long as 
needed and they are called long-term strategies Table 5.12 shows examples of 
different strategies in each of these categories. 
Table 5.12 - Usage Duration between different Recovery Strategies 
Duration Recovery Strategies 
Short-term Realtime recovery, commercial hot site, co-operative 
hot site, service bureau, reciprocal agreement, mobile 
hot site, time broker, hardware vendor. 
Long-term Duplicate site, warm site, commercial cold site, 
portable site, co-operative cold site. 
It is obvious from the previous criteria and tables that selecting the most appropriate 
recovery strategy is not a straightforward decision, but rather an extremely complex 
exercise. Several factors and inputs have to be weighed and carefully considered. 
Therefore, an expert system which can handle this methodology is recommended to 
interact with the user to simplify the recovery strategy selection process. The system 
and the mechanism, which is used to decide between different recovery strategies, are 
introduced in Chapter 7. 
5.6 Cost AnalysiS Phase 
According to Arnell (1990), Baylus (1991) and most disaster recovery experts, the 
cost justification for adopting a recovery strategy can be a long and misleading 
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process. It thus should be avoided IT managers can skip this process and convince 
top management that a disaster recovery strategy is required for statutory reasons 
The pressure of government regulations has made disaster recovery arrangements 
virtually a mandatory requirement This indeed, enables the cost justification step to 
be skipped (Baylus, 1991). Various Acts ofParliarnent have been introduced in the 
UK which have ensured that advances in computer technology do not jeopardise the 
requirement for confidential data to be adequately protected (Kerby, 1990). In the 
USA the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act made disaster recovery a requirement. The 
scope of this Act extends to UK and European subsidiaries of US companies who 
operate outside the USA as well as UK and European companies operating in the 
USA. In many countries, the banking industry is currently the most rigorously 
controlled sector in terms of disaster recovery arrangements. An organisation's failure 
to comply with government regulations could expose it to negligence claims against 
the company, its directors, and its officers (Hyde, 1993; Baylus, 1991; Kerby, 1990; 
Arnell, 1990). 
Disaster recovery experts state that the cost analysis, if it can not be avoided, of fitting 
a recovery strategy must only be used for budget purposes, not to reach a decision on 
whether to adopt a recovery strategy or not. Therefore, disaster recovery plans should 
not be evaluated simply on the basis of cost-effectiveness (Robinson, 1993; Baylus, 
1991; Arnell, 1990). 
This research, however, will not ignore the fact that management needs to have some 
indication of how much they need to spend on a disaster recovery strategy. This 
research will try to provide an answer to a very common question usually posed by 
top management: Are we spending too much or too little on a recovery strategy? The 
literature shows that many IT directors usually justify the investment for adopting a 
recovery strategy by showing top management how much the company will lose on an 
hourly, or daily, basis if the computer systems go down (Mercorella, 1995; Baylus, 
1991). This is an excellent approach if one wants to convince the executives of the 
need for a recovery strategy. However, it does not provide an estimate of how much 
money is required to accommodate one. For example, one day's loss of their systems 
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for large financial companies may cost several million pounds, thereby justifying even 
the most expensive recovery strategy. 
To present IT management with an indication of how much they need to spend on a 
disaster recovery strategy, this research uses the second part of the model developed 
by Subhani. The Subhani model and reasons for preferring it over the ALE approach 
were explained in Chapter 2. 
The Subhani model introduces a function called 'Contingency Cost-Response Time' 
which will be used in this research. The contingency cost means the cost of a recovery 
strategy, and the response time means the Maximum Allowable Downtime. For 
consistency, we will stay with our naming convention for recovery strategy and 
maximum allowable downtime. The function states that the cost of a recovery strategy 
is inversely proportional to the MAD. According to Subhani (I 989), the relationship 
between the cost of a recovery strategy and the MAD can be expressed by: 
R= ROe -ot 
Where: 
R = Cost of a recovery strategy with a maximum allowable downtime of t days; 
RO = Cost of recovery strategy with instantaneous or zero MAD. In practice, such a 
strategy would be a duplicate site; 
n = Parameter measuring the intensity with which the recovery strategy cost declines 
with the maximum allowable downtime; 
= Maximum allowable downtime in days; and 
e = Exponential constant. 
Some additional data are needed from the disaster recovery market for the above-
mentioned function to calculate the investment required for a recovery strategy. The 
company will be asked by the proposed system to provide two maximum allowable 
downtime estimates, and two annual cost estimates for two types of disaster recovery 
strategy. The cost estimates are quoted from the recovery strategy industry. Since the 
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commercial hot site is the most expensive strategy, it is selected to be the upper 
bound. Similarly, the cold site strategy is selected to be the lower bound because it is 
the least expensive. At the final stage, the maximum allowable downtime (which is an 
output of the Business Impact Assessment phase) is substituted in the model to 
calculate the required investment for adopting a recovery strategy. An example is 
presented in Chapter 7 to illustrate the mechanism of the model and how the final 
result is reached. 
5.7 Recommendations Phase 
The development of a computerised system to assist IT managers in selecting the 
most appropriate recovery strategy is the end-product of this research. The 
computerised system performs some computations and rule-based decisions to 
provide some recommendations regarding the continuation of business activities after 
a disaster. The system, which is presented and explained in more detail in Chapter 7, 
will cover the following aspects 
• computation of Maximum Allowable Downtimes (MAD); 
• computation of the required investment for fitting a recovery strategy; and 
• recommending a disaster recovery strategy. 
The above computations and recommendations are based on the following criteria 
1) the type of threat that an organisation is exposed to; 
2) organisational characteristics (size, degree of dependency, type of business, 
revenue, cost of computer downtime); 
3) organisational requirements, where some of these requirements are deduced 
from the expected threat type (security, work area, platform modification, 
service support, usage duration, location); and 
4) data and information collected from the disaster recovery market. 
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To develop the required system that fits the requirements of the developed 
methodology, a full investigation of technologies that can support this effort is 
required. The investigation should include a comparison between available 
technologies and tools that may playa major role in developing the required solution 
The technology and tools which are selected must meet the methodology 
requirements introduced in this chapter. The process of selecting the most suitable 
technology and tool is described in the following chapter. 
5.8 Concluding Remarks 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the literature on disaster recovery and related 
areas shows that the complete process (investment, recovery time and alternative 
recovery site) of selecting the suitable recovery strategy has not been addressed 
adequately. Therefore, a structured methodology to address solutions to the selection 
recovery strategy problem was developed in this chapter. The developed methodology 
also provides a basis for the development and implementation of a structured 
prototype computerised system. The prototype system and the methodology serve the 
IT managers in the following ways: 
• Identify anticipated threats that might jeopardise the organisation. 
• Classify threats in a way that can contribute more effectively to the recovery 
strategy selection process by introducing the Threats Magnitude Classification 
approach. 
• Identify critical systems and applications that are crucial for a company to 
recover and resume its business. 
• Calculate the maximum allowable downtime. 
• Calculate the investment needed to adopt a recovery strategy. 
• Finally, recommend a recovery strategy, or combination of strategies, for 
organisations. 
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Chapter 6 
Expert Systems Technology 
6.1 Introduction 
The end-product of this research is to develop a computerised system that will assist 
IT managers in selecting an appropriate recovery strategy. The proposed system 
should do the following: (1) determine the Maximum Allowable Downtime; (2) 
compute the amount of investment required; and (3) recommend a recovery strategy 
Having developed the methodology (described in the previous chapter), the next step 
is to search for an implementation tool to deliver the required system. Therefore, a full 
investigation of the available technologies which can support this enterprise is 
necessary. Such an investigation should include a comparison between available 
technologies and then between the tools that are capable of playing a major role in 
developing the required solution. Both the technology and the tool must fit the 
methodology requirements introduced in the previous chapter. To achieve these 
objectives, the following issues need to be examined: 
• The functionality needed for the technology 
• Feasible technologies 
• Selecting the appropriate technology 
• Expert Systems structure and development life cycle 
• Languages and tools analysis 
• Selecting the suitable tool 
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6.2 The Requirements 
After identifying the problem and developing a methodology to provide a meaningful 
solution, the next step is to select the most suitable technology. The technology has to 
satisfy some functionality requirements. These requirements are explained in the 
following paragraphs. 
Store Knowledge 
A large amount of data and information related to the disaster recovery area needs to 
be stored in the system. This data and information are called facts. These facts relate 
to threat types, characteristics of recovery strategies, and services accompanying the 
recovery strategies. For example, there are several facts which are associated with 
each threat type, as indicated in Table 5.5. An important requirement of the 
technology to be selected is its capability of storing a large number of facts. 
Flexible for Modification 
The disaster recovery field is relatively new in comparison with other fields. It has 
only come into prominence in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. In fact, some big 
computer companies started to invest in IT disaster recovery to provide recovery 
solutions only a few years ago. For example, IDM entered the disaster recovery 
market in 1991 (mM report, 1993). Others are thinking of providing Internet 
recovery services within the year 1997 (Shreider, 1996). Therefore, a requirement of 
the selected technology is the flexibility for modification to accommodate additions or 
changes to the knowledge base. 
Reasoning Rule Decision 
As was seen in the previous chapter, the problem-solving approach employed to select 
a recovery strategy was presented in the form of condition-action pairs: IF this 
condition occurs THEN an action is recommended. For example, one rule says for a 
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company, that requires very high security requirement such as sensitive military 
installations, a duplicate site strategy is recommended This problem-solving method 
is called Rule-Based Decision. Therefore, the technology to be selected should utilise 
this type of approach. 
User-friendliness 
Since the system is going to be used mostly by IT managers who have other 
responsibilities and little or no experience in the disaster recovery area, it should, if it 
is to be efficient, be developed to be user-friendliness, incorporating explanation 
facilities. The technology to be selected, therefore, should run under Windows and 
provide an easy-to-use pull-down menu environment. It also should use the point-and-
click technique and a multiple choice method in order to reduce the effort of entering 
text. The technology should have the facility to provide explanations to steps or 
questions asked by the system. These and other similar facilities can save the user time 
and effort, thereby making the system understandable, effective and efficient in use. 
Prototype 
The design, development and coding rules and facts of a full system require a great 
deal of time from a project team. Its membership must include a disaster recovery 
expert who is knowledgeable about all the relevant rules, regulations, guidelines and 
methods of solving problems. It must also include a designer and a programmer to 
work closely with the expert to design and code the system. It is impossible for one 
person to produce a full system within the time scale assigned to this dissertation. A 
small-scale system (prototype) is, however, practicable in order to demonstrate how 
the final system will work. The technology selected to deliver the solution therefore 
should be capable of producing a prototype system during the development phase. 
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6.3 Feasible Technologies 
After specifying the functional requirements, an extensive investigation was carried 
out to find a suitable technology to implement a computerised system for the disaster 
recovery selection process. Since the arrival of the computer, solutions to problems 
are usually implemented using conventional systems technology Individual programs 
are developed to perform rapid calculations, access data, or perform modelling of 
complex processes. However, in the last decade or so, a new technology has been 
introduced to the field of computing science, called Artificial Intelligence (AI). Durkin 
(1994) defines artificial intelligence as a field oj study in computer science that 
pursues the goal ojmaking a computer reason in a manner similar to humans Then, 
a new development of special purpose computer programs, a subset of AI called 
Expert Systems (ES), was introduced. These are programs or systems that employ 
human knowledge captured in a computer to solve problems that ordinarily require 
human expertise (Turban, 1992) 
The above-mentioned two types of technology can be used for implementing the 
proposed system. To select the most appropriate one, they both need to be described 
and compared. The following paragraphs briefly describe the two candidate 
technologies: conventional systems and expert systems. Table 6.1 also summaries the 
main similarities and differences between the two possibilities. 
Conventional Systems 
In conventional systems technology, the computer is told how to solve the problem. It 
is given data and a step-by-step program that specifies how the data should be used to 
reach an answer. The conventional systems are based on an algorithm, which is a 
clearly defined sequential procedure, that produces a unique solution. They address 
problems where the information is complete and exact, such as database management 
systems or accounting programs. If data is faulty or missing, a conventional system 
cannot provide any results. The output that conventional systems produces must be 
correct or it has no meaning (Waterman, 1985). 
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During the development of a conventional system, the programmer receives the tasks 
from the designer and works largely alone, interacting with others only when 
difficulties arise or new directions are needed. The specifications defined during the 
design phase are assumed to be fixed and no changes are expected If changes do need 
to be made, the task is sent back to the designer for the required modification The 
user interaction is only with the analyst and perhaps the designer most of the time; 
there is no interaction between the programmer and the user (Durk.in, 1994). 
Conventional systems follow a three-step development process of design, code, and 
debug. The system is not deliverable until the programmer has completed all three 
phases. 
Table 6.1 - Comparison between Expert Systems and Conventional 
Systems 
Dimensions Expert Systems Conventional 
Processing Mainly symbolic Primarily computing 
Nature of input Can be incomplete Must be complete 
Search Heuristic (mostly) Algorithms 
Explanation Provided Usually not provided 
Major interest Knowledge Data and infonnation 
Nature of output Can be incomplete Must be correct 
Solution Unique solution May produce several solutions 
Maintenance and update Relatively easy Usually difficult 
Reasoning capability Yes No 
In summary, the conventional programmers' sphere of interest is limited to a set of 
data. Their focus is on the problem's data from which they try to find ways to process 
it to reach a unique solution (Durk.in, 1994). 
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Expert Systems 
Expert systems applications are developed in many fields to assist or replace an expert 
to solve a particular problem. Therefore, they are required to capture a great amount 
of knowledge about the area related to that particular problem. In expert systems, the 
computer is given knowledge about the subject area plus some inferencing (reasoning) 
capability. The expert system program determines the specific procedure for arriving 
at a solution. Expert systems are based on symbolic representation and manipulation 
A symbol is a letter, word, or number that is used to represent objects, processes, and 
their relationships. By using symbols, it is possible to create a knowledge base that 
states facts, concepts, and the relationships among them. This knowledge is captured 
by an expert in the subject area. Then various processes are used to manipulate the 
knowledge to generate advice or a recommendation for solving problems (Jackson, 
1990; Turban, 1992; Durkin, 1994). 
Expert systems address types of problem that are less structured than conventional 
systems. The information available may not be sufficient to arrive at an exact solution. 
However, an expert system may still arrive at some inexact reasonable solution. 
During the development of an expert system, the designer works closely with the 
expert throughout the project, endeavouring together to uncover the key points of 
knowledge. A little amount of knowledge is added to the system and tested to 
evaluate the solution. Therefore, a small prototype system can be built and presented 
to the expert at any stage to validate the problem-solving approach. Expert systems 
technology is explain more detail later in this chapter. 
No one can say that one particular technology is better than the other. The choice of 
the right technology depends upon the requirements of the problem and how it needs 
to be solved. However, based on the problem requirements, which have been 
addressed by this research, expert systems is thought to be the most suitable 
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technology. The reasons for selecting this technology are discussed m the next 
section 
6.4 The Reasons for Selecting Expert System 
The previous section explained the two types of technology that may be used to 
provide a solution to the problem introduced by this research. It also highlighted the 
major distinctions between them Looking at the characteristics of both types and the 
functional requirements of the problem, it was found that expert systems technology is 
more suitable for implementation for the following reasons. 
A Rule Based Technology is Needed 
Expert systems is a technology that commonly represents knowledge in the form of 
condition-action rules. Many sets of rules are stored in the knowledge base that 
describes how to solve a problem. The knowledge base can store as many rules as are 
required for a particular subject area. As was seen in Chapter 5, the developed 
methodology has many condition-action pairs. Therefore, expert systems technology 
is thought to be capable of producing a solution by drawing very extensively on the 
rule-based method. 
Revision is Required in the Future 
Since the field of disaster recovery strategy is a relatively new one, some new 
strategies have only just been introduced, such as realtime recovery; and others may 
be introduced in the near future (see Chapter 3). In fact, some Internet Service 
Providers are investigating the use of a new recovery strategy called Internet 
Recovery Strategy. They found that this type of recovery is, indeed, feasible and very 
soon the Internet will provide recovery activities (Shreider, 1995). This means that the 
technology to be selected must be flexible and have the ability to add more recovery 
strategies or modify existing ones in the future Expert systems technology has the 
ability to ensure this type of update. 
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Fast Decision Making is Required 
Expert systems technology deals with jobs that involve the processing of a large 
amount of complex rules and facts This can be done much more quickly than would 
be possible by a human expert. Indeed, an expert system can recommend a solution 
within a few minutes. It is therefore very suitable for the recovery strategy selection 
process. 
A Technology with an Explanation Feature 
The tangible product of this research is an expert system developed so as to assist IT 
managers in selecting an appropriate recovery strategy. IT managers have other 
responsibilities and cannot be expected to be experts in the field of disaster recovery 
strategy. Therefore, the system should act as an expert to provide explanations at each 
step or for each question it asks. At the end, the system will provide recommendations 
based on some facts about the organisation's requirements and recovery strategy 
characteristics and explain these facts. 
A Technology with a Prototype Feature 
Building a complete system takes a long time and requires more time than that 
available for this research. Therefore, due to the time constraint, it is essential to 
adopt a technology that has the ability to provide a prototype system. A significant 
advantage of expert systems technology is that it supports the development of a small-
scale system for presentation, when it is needed. This feature is important in this 
research because only a prototype system will be delivered at the end of this project. 
6.5 Expert System Structure 
The 1990s were declared the decade of the brain by the US Government. Along with 
other scientific issues such as biological and biochemical ones, artificial intelligence 
and its derivatives are to be a primary focus for research (Turban, 1992; Durkin, 
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1994). The expert system, a derivative from the artificial intelligence field, is another 
name for the term knowledge-based expert system. Efraim Turban, a specialist in 
expert systems technology from the California State University at Long Beach and 
one of the leading researchers in the technology, defines an expert system as follow: 
'It is a system that employs human knowledge captured In a computer to solve 
problems that ordinarily require human expertise. Well-designed systems imitate the 
reasoning processes experts use to solve specific problems. Such systems can be used 
by non-experts to improve their problem-solving capabilities' (Turban, 1992). 
A typical expert system is composed of four basic elements. These are shown in 
Figure 6.1. They are: knowledge base; inference engine; working memory, and user 
interface. The following paragraphs explain briefly the function of each element 
Figure 6.1 - Expert System Structure 
Knowledge Base I User Interface Inference Case Facts Engine Conclusion 
Working Memory J 
6.5.1 Knowledge Base 
The knowledge base is the part that holds the domain knowledge necessary for 
understanding and solving problems. It holds guidelines, regulations and rules that link 
a solution to a specific problem in a specific area. The knowledge and human skills 
within a narrow area are obtained from an expert and organised and coded in the 
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knowledge base, using one or more knowledge representation techniques These 
techniques are different from the procedures used in a conventional program (Turban, 
1992; Durkin, 1994). 
A number of effective techniques for representing knowledge in a knowledge base 
have been developed over the years. The most common techniques used in the 
development of an expert system are: logic; rule base; frames; and semantic networks 
6.5.2 Working Memory 
The working memory is another part of an expert system that contains the information 
and facts about a problem that is either supplied by the user or inferred by the system 
The system matches the facts entered in the working memory with knowledge 
contained in the knowledge base to infer new facts. The new facts are entered into the 
working memory and the matching process continues until a conclusion is reached, 
which is also entered into the working memory for future use, if necessary. 
Expert systems can also utilise information contained in external storage such as 
databases, spreadsheets and sensors. The system may load this information into the 
working memory at the beginning of the session or access it when it is needed during 
the consultation phase (Turban, 1992; Durkin, 1994). 
6.5.3 Inference Engine 
The inference engine is the control of the expert system. This element is a computer 
program that provides a methodology for reasoning about knowledge in the 
knowledge base and in the working memory in order to formulate a conclusion. It 
works with the facts contained in the working memory and rules and knowledge in the 
knowledge base to derive new information. It searches the rules for a match between 
their conditions and information in the working memory and applies the rule with the 
highest priority. 
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F or a rule-based system, two general methods of inferencing are used forward 
chaining and backward chaining. In forward chaining the inference engine analyses the 
problem by looking for the facts that match the IF condition of its IF/THEN rules 
When the IF part matches the information in the knowledge base, the rule fires and 
the THEN part of the rule is added to the knowledge base. The process continues 
until no matches exist between the IF part and the facts in the knowledge base This 
inference mechanism is also referred to as data-driven or data-directed. 
The other type, backward chaining, also called goal-driven or goal-directed, is used to 
prove a particular goal or hypothesis for specified data. The process starts with an 
initial goal and searches backwards through rules in the knowledge base from their 
THEN parts to their IF parts. The process ends when the inference mechanism 
reaches a conclusion which mayor may not exist in the knowledge base. 
6.6.4 User Interface 
User interface is another component of expert systems that manages the interaction 
and communication between the system and the user This interaction is conducted 
and carried out in a natural language style. A basic design requirement of the 
interaction is to ask questions. To obtain reliable information from the user, the 
designer needs to pay special attention to the question's design. The interface may be 
supplemented by menus, graphics and a special tailored screen. 
6.6 The Characteristics of Expert Systems 
Experts systems have many characteristics that distinguish their technology from 
conventional systems technology and human experts. In addition to the expert systems 
features which were explained in preceding paragraphs, the following are some of the 
major characteristics. 
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Knowledge and Control are Separates 
In expert systems, the knowledge base and inference engine (control) are separate 
modules. This separation eases the tasks of modifying and maintaining the system. 
The user can easily locate and change some particular piece of knowledge, or add new 
knowledge at any location within the knowledge base without reviewing the controL 
This is a feature that differs from conventional systems where knowledge and control 
are intermixed. In cases of a change in knowledge being required, the code (control) 
has to be reviewed and understood first (Waterman, 1986). 
Possesses Expert Knowledge 
Another characteristic of expert systems is that they capture and code the expertise of 
a human expert. This includes both knowledge and problem-solving skills. The facts, 
concepts and rules about a subject area are gathered from experts, regulations and 
literature and stored in the knowledge base (Durkin, 1994). 
Depth Expertise 
Expert systems, like human experts, are designed to solve problems within their 
narrow area of expertise. They have limited ability to solve problems beyond the 
subject area. By concentrating on one area the expert systems technology can achieve 
depth and capture a great amount of knowledge to be processed for solving problems. 
Permits Inexact Reasoning 
Expert systems technology supports applications that involve uncertain facts, rules or 
both. This occurs when the user cannot provide a definite answer or offers only 
incomplete information when prompted for a response. Expert systems technology 
treats incomplete answers with techniques that deal with uncertainty such as the 
certainty factors, the Bayesain method and the Dempster-Shafer theory (Turban, 
1995). 
129 
Flexibility 
Expert systems have an efficient and modular storage capability for handling rules. 
They provide users with an efficient mechanism to add, change, and delete 
knowledge. This is a very important characteristic because expert systems contain 
very large amounts of knowledge. 
Provides Explanations 
An expert system can give explicit and detailed reasons for the questions it asks (why) 
and reasons that lead to its recommendation (how) This increases the confidence that 
the right decision has been reached. It also makes each step of the system 
understandable. This is difficult to achieve if reliance is placed on human experts. A 
human expert may be too tired, unwilling for one reason or another, or simply unable 
to provide an explanation in every case. 
6.7 Expert System Development 
The development of an expert system is similar to the development of any other 
system. It passes through the system development life cycle phases project 
initialisation (which includes problem identification, assessment, alternatives, and 
managerial support), systems analysis and design, implementation, testing, and 
maintenance. However, the nature of the specific system determines which phases or 
tasks are to be performed, in which order, and to what depth. For example, a large 
scale expert system is developed according to a complex life cycle process, whereas a 
small scale system for end-users includes only a few tasks. 
According to Harmon and King (1985) and Turban (1992), most expert systems 
specialists observe the following steps when developing an expert system application: 
• Identify the problem. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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Identify the knowledge required to be included in the system The process is 
called knowledge acquisition 
Organise the knowledge by specifying what type of knowledge representation 
technique is suitable to solve a particular problem 
Select a tool and implicitly commit yourself to a particular consultation 
paradigm. 
Implement by developing a prototype of the system using a tool. This includes 
creating a knowledge base and testing it by running a number of tests 
• Expand, test, and revise the system until it does what the user wants it to do 
• Maintain, train and update as needed. 
The following sections describe briefly the major steps for developing an expert 
system. 
6.7.1 Knowledge Acquisition 
As mentioned earlier, expert systems are also known as knowledge based systems, 
and it is clear that they are only useful in so far as they contain knowledge. This 
knowledge needs to be extracted and obtained from several sources and transferred to 
the knowledge base, and sometimes to the inference engine. This process is called 
knowledge acquisition. It is usually done throughout the entire development process, 
and even afterwards when a new knowledge is recognised. 
Acquiring knowledge from the expert is a complex task for complex applications and 
it is well-known as the bottleneck for expert systems construction. For such complex 
applications, it is usual to have a knowledge engineer to assist the expert in making 
his knowledge explicit. The knowledge engineer interacts with the expert and helps 
him structure the problem area by interpreting and integrating human answers to 
questions (Turban, 1992; Durkin, 1994). However, in many smaller applications, 
experts can learn to use expert systems building tools and can engineer their own 
knowledge, as is the case in this project Most experts are motivated to do so as the 
system may ultimately help them in their work. More importantly, knowledge will 
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change, new knowledge will need to be added to the knowledge base, and old rules 
may be amended as ideas change All this points to the good sense of the expert 
continuing to be responsible for the updating of the expert system (Jackson, 1992) 
Human experts are not the only source of knowledge Other potential sources include 
textbooks, articles in journals, databases and special research reports. 
6.7.2 Knowledge Representation 
After acquiring knowledge from one or more of the above sources, the next step is to 
encode and organise it into the knowledge base. This is done by applying one of 
several knowledge representation techniques. The major techniques for representing 
knowledge, as mentioned before, are rule base, semantic networks, frames and logic. 
The prototype system developed by this research uses the rule base technique. A rule 
is an IF THEN structure that logically relates the condition contained in the IF part to 
an action contained in the THEN part. The rules are matched to the facts about a 
problem contained in the working memory by the inference engine. This technique is 
probably the closest to the way a human expert would solve a problem (Waterman, 
1986; Turban, 1992; Durkin, 1994). 
6.7.3 Implementation and Prototyplng 
After selecting the type of knowledge representation, the next step is to implement the 
expert system. Expert systems technology encourages the use of an incremental 
prototype approach in system implementation. Turban (1992) states that prototyping 
is crucial to the development of many expert systems. Therefore, most expert system 
projects begin the implementation effort by building a small prototype system to 
determine the structure of the knowledge base before devoting the substantial amount 
of time necessary to build more rules. Turban (1992), Waterman (1986), and Durkin 
(1994) recommend that, for example, in a rule-based system the prototype may 
include only fifty rules. This small number of rules is sufficient to produce 
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consultations of a limited nature. The prototype approach has the following 
advantages: 
1. It allows project developers to determine whether it is feasible to proceed with 
the full application using expert systems technology. 
2. It provides a means through which to examine the effectiveness of the 
knowledge representation and the development tool as a whole. 
3. It gives an idea of what the final application will do and what it will look like 
to the users. 
4. It gives an opportunity to impress management or system founders and gain 
their commitment and increase their support for the project. 
5. It allows the possibility of an early correction to the project direction, based 
on the feedback from management or potential users. 
6.8 Selecting the Tool 
Once the technology has been chosen, the next step is to select the proper 
programming language or tool to implement an expert system application. Although 
an expert system application can be built in any programming languages such as 
COBOL or FORTRAN, expert system developers prefer to use specific artificial 
intelligence programming languages and comprehensive integrated development 
packages. This preference is due to the fact that AI languages and tools are designed 
for symbolic processing i.e. for programming logical problems which involve 
knowledge. 
6.8.1 Languages and Tools for Building Expert Systems 
The following paragraphs illustrate briefly some AI languages and expert systems 
tools that are used for building expert system applications. 
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6.8.1.1 AI Languages 
There are two major languages that are used for programming and debugging 
procedures in expert systems. The two languages are LISP and PROLOG. Their 
major features are briefly described below. 
LISP 
LISP stands for List Processing language. It was developed by John McCarthy in 
1958 at MIT. Although it is an old programming language, many expert systems 
developers are still using it, particularly in the US. The basic data structure of LISP is 
the list; for example, an object can be presented as a list of words LISP is oriented 
toward symbolic computation; the programmer can assign codes to terms like 
'disaster' and 'flood'. Although such terms have no direct meaning in LISP, the LISP 
program can conveniently manipulate such symbols and relationships (Harmon and 
King, 1985; Turban, 1992; Jackson, 1992). 
PROLOG 
PROLOG (an acronym for PROgramming in LOGic) was initially developed by 
Colmerauer and Roussel at the University of Marseilles in 1975. The first efficient 
PROLOG compiler was developed at the University of Edinburgh. It is now the most 
popular expert system language in Europe and Japan (Harmon and King, 1985). 
PROLOG is structured in terms of objects and relationships between objects 
(predicates) Knowledge is expressed in the form off acts about the objects and rules, 
shOwing how new facts are inferred from other facts. Usually goal statements declare 
what the PROLOG program has to prove. In order to prove a goal statement, 
PROLOG applies a pattern matching search to the database. The search is guided by 
forward or backward chaining theorem-proving. 
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6.8.1.2 SHELLS 
Just as any word processor is a tool for producing a document, an expert system shell 
is a tool used for developing an expert system A typical shell consists of some form 
of knowledge representation technique and a ready-made inference mechanism 
Jackson (1992) classifies building-shells according to the knowledge representation 
techniques they use. The main categories include: 
• Inductive shells, which uses a number of established facts to draw some 
general conclusion. 
• Rule-based shells, where rules are entered in the form of IF THEN. 
• Hybrid shells, which combine rules and induction. 
6.8.1.3 Toolkits or Environments 
Toolkits are integrated expert system packages that are developed to support several 
different ways of knowledge representation and handling inferences. Unlike the shells, 
which contains only one knowledge representation technique, toolkits may use several 
techniques such as frames, rules, semantic networks, object-oriented programming, 
and different types of chaining (forward, backward, bi-directional). 
Toolkits permit a programming environment that allows complex specific systems to 
be built. They are more specialised than languages. Therefore, they can increase the 
productivity of expert system builders. Although toolkits require more programming 
skills than shells, they are more flexible. Because they were expensive in the past, they 
were mostly used for research rather than applications. However, as familiarity with 
expert systems technology has grown and the prices of hardware and software have 
fallen, they have become ideal vehicles for building expert system applications 
(Jackson. 1992). 
From the above descriptions of languages and tools, it becomes apparent that expert 
system toolkits are potentially the most suitable tool for building an expert system 
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application because of the functionality they offer, which matches the requirements of 
this research. 
6.8.2 Potential Tools and The Selection Determinants 
Although toolkits are clearly more appropriate for this project, the decision as to 
precisely which one should be selected as the most suitable one is not easy After 
extensive investigation, the following two toolkits were available to the researcher 
CLIPS and flex. Although they are both expert system toolkits, they have different 
features and characteristics. The following paragraphs briefly explain each toolkit, and 
elaborate upon some of the issues involved in selecting an expert system toolkit in 
general. 
CLIPS 
CLIPS is an expert system tool which stands for C Language Integrated Production 
System. It was designed at NASA Johnson Space Centre, using the C programming 
language. CLIPS provides support for rule-based, object-oriented and procedural 
programming. The procedural programming capabilities provided by CLIPS are 
similar to the capabilities found in languages such as C, Pascal and Ada CLIPS is 
syntactically very similar to LISP, which has been used mostly in USA The 
inferencing and knowledge representation capabilities provided by CLIPS's rule-based 
programming language are similar to those in other expert system tools. However, 
CLIPS only supports forward-chaining. Backward-chaining is not supported by 
CLIPS (Giarratano & Riley, 1994). 
CLIPS has been installed in a wide variety of computers, ranging from PCs to 
supercomputers It is available on Windows 3.1, Macintosh and MS-DOS 
environments. The tool is available through the Computer Software Management and 
Information Centre (COSMIC) in Georgia, USA, which is the distribution point for 
NASA software. A major advantage of CLIPS is that it can be downloaded free of 
charge from several sites on the Internet. However, technical support is not provided 
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To give an idea of how rules are written in CLIPS, the following example IS 
presented. (The same rule is presented later usingJlex) 
The pseudocode of an example rule is If the emergency is a fire then the response is 
to activate the sprinkler system. Converting this pseudocode to a rule in CLIPS gives 
(de/template emergency (slot type)) 
(de/template response (slot action)) 
(dejrule fire-emergency 
(emergency (type fire)) 
=> 
(assert (response (action activate sprinkler system)))) 
Flex 
Flex (Forward Logical Expert system) is an expert systems toolkit which was 
developed by a UK company called Logic Programming Associates in 1988 It is a 
powerful toolkit which supports frame-based reasoning with inheritance, rule-based 
and data-driven procedures fully integrated with a logic programming environment 
An important feature of Jlex is that it contains its own dedicated English-like 
Knowledge Specification Language (KSL). The KSL enables developers to write 
simple, concise and English-like statements about the expert's world and produce 
virtually self-documented knowledge-bases which can be easily understood and 
maintained by non-programmers. 
Flex has direct access to Prolog and has support for procedures written in C, C++ 
and Pascal languages. The Jlex toolkit can be used on its own or in conjunction with 
FLINT, which provides support for fuzzy logic inferencing. Prolog also provides the 
means to access compliant databases and facilities for communicating with other 
programming languages. Figure 6.2 presents theJlex environment and its interfaces 
137 
Figure 6.2 - The Flex Environment 
Flex 
FLINT 
Prolog++ PROLOG 
I 
~anguages ROMS 
C, C++, Pascal, etc .. Access, Oracle, etc .. 
The flex toolkit is available as a portable solution across a wide range of different 
hardware and operating platforms. It is available on Windows 3. 1, Macintosh and 
MS-DOS machines, and has been licensed to other Prolog providers on UNIX 
To give an idea of how rules are written in flex, the previous example using CLIPS is 
presented again, this time using the flex language. 
role fire_emergency 
if emergency is fire 
then activate the sprinkler system. 
Comparing the two languages, it is clear that the language used inflex is easy to 
construct and more understandable than CLIPS by computer and non-computer users 
However, a disadvantage of the .fkx toolkit is that, unlike CLIPS, it does not come 
free of charge. 
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In proceeding to identify which one of these two toolkits would be more appropriate, 
it was necessary to look at some check lists for selection. The follov.i.ng 
representative issues in software selection for expert system development have been 
identified by Turban (1992): 
• Can the tool be easily obtained and installed? (cost, compatibility) 
• How well is the tool supported by the vendor? (stability, reputation. technical 
staff, availability, accessibility) 
• How difficult will it be to expand? 
• What kind of knowledge representation schemes does the tool provide') (rules. 
frames, etc.) 
• How well do the knowledge representation schemes match the intended 
application? 
• Do the inference mechanisms provided match the problem? (forward-chaining 
and backward-chaining) 
• What is the track record of success of the package? 
• Is the tool capable of interfacing with other software and languages? 
• Can the language of the tool be easily understood and maintained after 
implementation by non-programmer users? 
6.8.3 Reasons for selecting Flex 
After a full examination of: 1) the features of the two possible toolkits,flex and 
CLIPS; and 2) the representative issues in software selection for expert system 
development identified by Turban, it was clear to the researcher that the flex toolkit is 
more suitable than CLIPS for the following reasons 
1. Since there is always a possible need for modification and the addition for new 
knowledge, the language used in flex, English-like Knowledge Specification 
Language (KSL), is clear and understandable for revision by non-programmers 
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2. CLIPS provides one inference mechanism only: forward-chaining. In contrast. 
flex provides both forward- and backward- chaining. 
3. The flex's vendor (LPA) is a British company which can be easily contacted by 
the researcher. Its main office is in London. In contrast, most CLIPS providers 
are to be found in the USA 
4. Technical support for the flex toolkit is available, when it is needed, but CLIPS 
support is not always available. 
5. flex has an efficient and effective user interface (explanation facility, graphical 
display, on-line help). 
6. Training sessions inflex are easily obtained from LPA and many other providers. 
7. Theflex toolkit was highly recommended by Dr. Tawfig Danish, a previous Ph.D 
student at the University, who developed a similar system usingflex 
8. The proposed system, Expert System for Disaster Recovery Strategy Selection, 
can be used as a continuation to the Knowledge-Based Decision Support System 
for Computer Disaster Prevention, delivered by Dr. Danish a few years ago using 
the flex toolkit. This is beneficial in terms of issues such as compatibility, training, 
technical support and maintenance. 
Additional flex toolkit features are presented and explained in more detail when the 
prototype system is described in the next chapter. 
6.9 Concluding Remarks 
After a full examination and analysis of the functionality requirements to support the 
methodology explained in Chapter 5 and the technologies, languages and tools that 
would be feasible to implement the proposed system, it became clear which 
technology and tool would be most suitable to deliver the solution. It was apparent 
that conventional languages and procedures had limitations which made them 
unsuitable for implementing the required system. For example, inference mechanisms 
and knowledge representation schemes require to be programmed and developed in 
conventional languages, whereas these mechanisms and schemes are already available 
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in expert systems technology. Therefore, expert systems technology was thought to 
be the most appropriate for meeting this project's requirements 
After comparing and analysing languages, shells, and toolkits, the jlex toolkit was 
found to be more suitable than CLIPS for the proposed system. The utilisation ofjlex 
and some of its additional features are explained when describing the prototype 
Expert System for Disaster Recovery Strategy Selection in the next chapter. 
Chapter 7 
A Prototype Expert System for Disaster 
Recovery Strategy Selection 
7.1 Introduction 
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The previous chapter explained expert systems technology, its features and how to 
develop an expert system. It was also clear that expert systems technology would 
meet the functionality requirements of the methodology developed in Chapter 5. 
Moreover, the flex toolkit was found to be the most suitable tool for developing the 
proposed prototype system. 
This chapter describes the proposed prototype system which is called: Expert System 
for Disaster Recovery Strategy Selection (ESDRSS). It consists of an overview of the 
proposed prototype system, its transactions, how the expert systems technology is 
applied, which knowledge representation technique is used and why. Then, the 
methods employed to acquire knowledge are stated and explained. Finally, the 
transactions and the mechanism of how they would work are explained in more detail. 
The contents of this chapter can be used as documentation for the proposed system. 
7.2 Overview of the Prototype ESDRSS 
The prototype ESDRSS is developed to assist IT managers, disaster recovery c0-
ordinators, disaster recovery consultants and others to perform some computations 
and reach some rule-based decisions regarding the continuation of business activities 
after a disaster. The development of the prototype ESDRSS was accomplished via 
two stages: 1) the development of a structured methodology for selecting a recovery 
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strategy (Chapter 5); and 2) the development and implementation of the prototype 
ESDRSS, based on the methodology from (1) above, using expert systems 
technology. This system, after expansion and several tests, can be used to be part of 
the master disaster recovery plan for any organisation. The prototype ESDRSS (see 
Figure 7. 1) consists of the following three major components (or transactions) 
• computation of Maximum Allowable Downtimes (MAD); 
• computation of the required investment for fitting a recovery strategy; and 
• recommending a disaster recovery strategy based on the organisation's 
requirements and the recovery strategy's characteristics, using a rule-based 
knowledge representation mechanism. 
The maximum allowable downtime (the output of the first transaction) is very 
significant because it is used as an input to the second transaction. It also assists in 
choosing the correct recovery time category in responding to one of the questions in 
the third transaction. The recommendation of a recovery strategy in the third 
transaction is, however, independent of the investment calculated in the second 
transaction. This is because the cost of a particular recovery strategy varies as 
between the many vendors, depending on the size and reputation of the provider, 
calibre of the consultant and the extent of the services provided. For example, the 
price of a hot site strategy ranges from $10,000 to $120,000 a month (Datashield 
Report, 1993; mM Report, 1993a; Schreider, 1995). 
Figure 7.1 - The Decision Structure in the Prototype ESDRSS 
Start 
ESDRSS 
Knowledge about threats,org. size, 
downtime cost, reveniu, etc. 
Maximum Allowable 
Downtime 
Computation 
No 
Knowledge about disaster recovery market 
and maximum aDowable downtime 
Investment 
Computation 
Yes 
---.... Result 
Knowledge about recovery requirements, available 
strategies, etc. 
Rule-based Mechanism .... __ """----
Decision 
Yes No 
,------t~... Stop~ 
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When designing the proposed system, it is important that it should be as explicit and 
understandable as possible without impairing the quality and efficiency of the contents 
and the results. This is an important goal because 
1. the system is delivered to IT directors have other responsibilities and have 
little or no experience in the disaster recovery area; 
2. it is also delivered to disaster recovery co-ordinators who are considered to 
have little or no programming experience; 
3. more information may need to be added in the future to maintain and 
enhance the knowledge base, as the field of disaster recovery expands; and 
4. in order to be user-friendly, the system employs the point-and-c1ick and 
multiple choice techniques to reduce the effort of entering text. 
To satisfy the above demands, the knowledge in the prototype ESDRSS is presented 
as production rules in the form of condition-action pairs. The rule representation 
technique is especially applicable when there is a need to recommend a course of 
action, as is the case for the present research's objectives, based on observable events. 
According to Turban (1992) and Durkin (1994), the rule technique has the following 
major advantages: 
• rules are easy to conceive, they are understandable because they are a natural 
form of knowledge; 
• inference and explanations are easily derived; 
• future modifications and maintenance are relatively easy for non-programmers, 
• uncertainty is easily combined with rules; 
• each rule is usually independent of others; and 
• it is possible with rules to get a prototype system running quickly for budget 
approval or because of time constraints. 
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7.3 Knowledge Acquisition 
Acquiring knowledge for any expert system application is not an easy task. Indeed, it 
is known as the bottleneck for expert system construction and continues to present 
many difficulties in developing an expert system. It takes time and requires several 
sources to feed a knowledge base. Sources for knowledge can be experts, books, 
reports, articles, regulations, guidelines, etc. Expert knowledge is, however, 
considered to be the primary source for most expert system projects 
Expert system developers have recommended that a prototype system should be 
created first, with relatively little knowledge inserted into the knowledge base, to test 
the feasibility of the project. Then, future additions to enhance the knowledge base 
can be incorporated at a later stage. Accordingly, due to the limited time scale for this 
project and to the proposal to develop only a prototype system, the researcher has 
limited the knowledge sources for the prototype ESDRSS to the following sources. 
Literature 
Some of the knowledge was extracted from specialised literature sources such as 
books, articles and reports in the disaster recovery area. Guidelines, case studies, 
actual experiences and research reports also fall into this category. The literature 
which was used is listed in full at the end of this dissertation. However, the following 
sources are thought by the researcher to have been the most useful: 
• Disaster Recovery Handbook by Chantico Publishing Company, 1991; 
• Handbook ofEtfective Disaster Recovery Planning by Alvin Amell, 1990; 
• IT Infrastructure Library Contingency Planning Module by IT Infrastructure 
Management Services, CCT A, 1989; 
• Writing Disaster Recovery Plans for Communications Networks and LANs by 
Leo Wrobel, 1993; 
• Contingency Planning by Information Systems Guide, 1989; and 
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• The Disaster Recovery Journal (DRJ) which specialises in the disaster recovery 
field. The DRJ is published quarterly and contains many articles, post-disaster 
outcomes, surveys and research reports. 
Seminars and Workshops 
There are many seminars and workshops world-wide in the field of disaster recoverv 
- ' 
business continuity, and contingency planning, such as the International Disaster 
Recovery Symposium and Exhibition which has taken place annually in the US since 
1989, The researcher had the opportunity to attend similar seminars and workshops 
on themes which are closely related to the content of this research. Some of the 
knowledge collected from those seminars contributed in the knowledge acquisition 
process, Some of the seminars and workshops attended by the researcher are listed 
below: 
• Developing Disaster recovery strategy for Banking & Financial Institutions in 
Dubai, 12 - 14 December 1995; 
• Crisis Management and Disaster Prevention, Bahrain, 19 - 21 April 1995; and 
• Backups and Recovery by mM in London, January 1992, 
Researcher's Experience 
After the Iraqi invasion in 1990, the researcher was appointed to take responsibility 
for collecting infonnation concerning the destructive effects of the invasion on the 
information systems environment in the organisation for which he works (the Kuwait 
Institute for Scientific Research), The data and information collected were duly 
presented to the Public Authority for Compensation, established by the United 
Nations. Moreover, he was a member of the team which perfonned fast-recovery 
activities for critical applications and long-tenn recovery for other departments of the 
Institute. He was also assigned to take full responsibility of backups and recovery 
activities in his department (System Development) for more than three years. Those 
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activities and responsibilities gave him experience and insights into the recovery area, 
on which he was able to draw in establishing the ESDRSS knowledge 
Surveys and Case Studies 
The results of several surveys and case studies in the disaster recovery field were 
collected and used to form part of the ESDRSS knowledge base. These include 
surveys carried out by the Disaster Recovery Journal and the Amedahl Executive 
Institute. In addition, the results of the fieldwork undertaken for this research, which 
covered large number of organisations in Kuwait, also proved very valuable for 
knowledge acquisition. Questionnaires were distributed to many disaster recovery co-
ordinators and IT managers, supplemented by one or more follow-up interviews The 
objectives, analysis and results of the fieldwork are presented and explained in 
Chapter 4. 
7.4 Computing Maximum Allowable Downtimes 
Since the aim of this project is to help in selecting a recovery strategy to save the 
business from great loss - or even being forced out of business - the main concern has 
been to concentrate only on these systems and applications that are crucial for 
organisational survival. As mentioned in Chapter 5, top management must carefully 
review the list of critical resources to ensure that only the truly critical ones are 
included. 
The goal of this transaction is to determine how long the organisation can tolerate the 
interruption of its critical resources at the time of an adverse incident (Maximum 
Allowable Downtime or MAD). The MAD contributes significantly to the decision-
making process for selecting the most appropriate recovery strategy and the amount 
of investment required to accommodate it (Arnell, 1990; Jackson, 1994). For 
example, organisations with a lower MAD (e.g. one day) would adopt the hot site 
strategy option, whereas organisations with a higher MAD (e.g. two weeks) would 
adopt the cold site strategy option. 
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The work done in the Business Impact Assessment phase of the methodology 
presented in Chapter 5 (collecting data and information for identifying and prioritising 
resources) is essential to arrive at the MAD estimation. Calculating the MAD is based 
on the cost of the denial of the computer centre and its resources with respect to the 
organisation's income. For several selected time intervals (e.g. 3 hours, 6 hours, 12 
hours, one day, two days, etc.), the consequences of the denial of computer systems 
for each critical resource is estimated (see Table 5.2, Cost of Downtime) Each loss or 
potential exposure is quantified and the cost effects are aggregated for each time 
interval. Then the aggregate cost is compared to the revenue from the first selected 
time interval. The MAD (one of the selected time intervals) is reached when the cost 
of downtime exceeds the revenue. 
The prototype ESDRSS starts by asking the user questions about his or her 
organisation such as: type of business; size of organisation; and average daily income. 
Then, the system proposes a particular time interval in response to the user's answers. 
Table 7.1 shows some examples of time intervals for different sizes and types of 
organisation. These time intervals have been derived from the fieldwork described in 
Chapter 4, surveys mentioned in Chapter 2 and other related materials. Then, the 
system asks the user to estimate the total consequences and downtime costs for all 
critical resources for the proposed time interval. The MAD is reached when the total 
downtime cost of all critical resources is equal or greater than the income for the 
specified time interval. If the total downtime cost is less than the income for that 
specified time interval, the system will double the time interval and ask the user to 
provide a new downtime cost for the doubled time interval. The process is performed 
again and again with a new downtime cost for each new time interval until it reaches 
the MAD (total time intervals). As already explained, the MAD is reached when the 
cost of downtime exceeds the income for the selected time interval. A special 
algorithm has been developed to calculate the MAD. This code can be found in 
Appendix A. An example of how the MAD is calculated is provided at Appendix B 
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Table 7.1 - Examples of Time Intervals for Some Types of Organisation 
Organisation type Giant Large Medium Small 
Financial 3 hrs 6 hrs 12 hrs One day 
Man ufacturing One day 2 days 5 days 7 days 
Government One day 2 days 5 days 7 days 
Computer services One day 2 days 3 days 4 days 
Retailing 6 hrs 12 hrs One day 2 days 
Telecommunication 3 hrs 6 hrs 12 hrs One day 
Education 2 days 3 days 5 days 7 days 
Healtb Care One day 3 days 5 days 7 days 
Insurance One day 2 days 3 days 5 days 
In summary, the objective of the first transaction of ESDRSS is to automatically 
compute the MAD for a given organisation. This calculated MAD is applied later in 
the other two transactions to calculate the required investment and to select the most 
appropriate recovery strategy. 
7.5 Computation of Investment 
As explained in Chapter 5, disaster recovery experts highly recommend that the cost 
analysis of introducing a recovery strategy must only be used for budget purposes, not 
to make a decision on whether to adopt a recovery strategy or not (Robinson, 1993; 
Saylus, 1991; Arnell, 1990). A recent survey by Price Waterhouse showed that 70% 
of all UK organisations which did not recover from a major disaster within 48 hours 
failed to continue their businesses (Allen, 1992). Therefore, disaster recover plans 
should not be evaluated on the basis of cost-effectiveness. 
The ESDRSS uses the second part of the mathematical model, Contingency Cost-
Response Time Function, to calculate the required investment (see Chapter 2, Section 
2.5.5). The Contingency Cost in the function means the cost of adopting a disaster 
recovery strategy, and response time means Maximum Allowable Downtime The 
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function states that the cost of a recovery strategy is inversely proportional to the 
MAD. According to Subhani (1989), the relationship between the cost of a recovef\' 
strategy and the MAD can be expressed by the following equation; introduced earlier 
in section 5.6: 
R = ROe -ot 
Where: 
R = Cost of a recovery strategy with a maximum allowable downtime of t days, 
RO = Cost of recovery strategy with instantaneous or zero MAD. In practice, such a 
strategy would be a duplicate site; 
n = Parameter measuring the intensity with which the recovery strategy cost declines 
with the maximum allowable downtime; 
= Maximum allowable downtime in days; and 
e = Exponential constant. 
To illustrate the working mechanism of the above-mentioned function and how to 
apply it to compute the required investment, the following example is provided 
The user is asked to provide the system with two MAD estimates, and two annual 
cost estimates for two types of disaster recovery strategy that exist in its region or 
country. For example, let us assume it is a giant company with a multi-million pounds 
revenue and it gives the following answers: the annual cost for recovering within a 
half-day by subscribing to a hot site strategy is £200,000; the annual cost for 
recovering within three days by subscribing to the same strategy is £80,000; the 
annual cost for recovering within a week by subscribing to a cold site strategy is 
£10,000; and the annual cost for recovering within two weeks by subscribing to the 
same strategy is £2,000. Assume that the actual MAD for this organisation, as 
calculated in the first transaction, is 1.5 days. 
From the above estimates the average recovery time, t, and the average annual cost, 
R. for the hot site strategy are: 1.75 days and £140000 respectively. The average 
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recovery time, t, and the average annual cost, R, for the cold site strategy are 10.5 
days and £6000 respectively. 
Hot site t = 1. 75 days, 
Cold site: t = 10.5 days, 
R = £140,000 
R = £6,000 
Then we need to calculate, the cost of a recovery strategy with instantaneous or zero 
MAD, RO, and the parameter of measuring the intensity, n. 
By taking the natural log of both sides of the "Contingency Cost-Response Time 
Function", o -nt R= R e , we get 
InR = In RO - n1... ............ Relation 1 
By substituting the values of t and R for both strategies (hot and cold) in relation 1, 
we obtain the following two equations: 
For hot site: 
For cold site: 
In (140,000) = In RO - 1.75n 
In (6,000) = In RO - 10.5n 
Solving the above two equations for two unknown variable RO and n, we find: 
RO = £262,859 and n = 0.35998 
Then we take the MAD which was calculated for the company from the first , 
transaction, 1.5 days for the purpose of this example, along with RO and n and 
substitute them in the Contingency Cost-Response Time Function to generate the 
investment required for a recovery strategy. 
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The optimal investment for having a recovery strategy is calculated by substituting I 5 
for t, 0.35998 for n , and 262,859 for RO in the Contingency Cost-Response Time 
Function R = RO e -nt 
R = 262 859 e -0.35998 • 1.5 
, 
After a simple mathematical calculation, we come to a final figure ofR = £ 153,183. 
In conclusion, a company with a MAD of 1. 5 days should invest £ 15 3,183 to 
accommodate a recovery strategy. However, as explained in Chapter 5 and mentioned 
again earlier in this chapter, this cost should not contribute to the decision of whether 
to adopt a recovery strategy or not. It should only be used for budget purposes. 
According to Subhani (1989), the above model was validated and approved by a panel 
of 24 disaster recovery experts. Then, the model was tested in a real-world situation 
It was applied to three companies which have already invested in recovery strategies. 
The model predicted the three cases fairly well (Subhani, 1989). As with any expert 
system application, information from the disaster recovery market needs to be 
collected before running the above function in ESDRSS. Such information, as shown 
in the above example, is the cost of two types of recovery strategy: hot site and cold 
site. These two strategies are chosen as reference points because: 
• it is easy to obtain annual cost answers for these two strategies; 
• the hot site strategy is known to be almost the most expensive whereas the cold 
site strategy is known to be the least expensive in commercial disaster recovery; 
and 
• these two strategies are available in almost every country or region. 
Although it is possible that the MAD, calculated in the first transaction, can be 
transferred directly to the Contingency Cost-Response Time Function in the second 
transaction without the intervention of the user, the researcher intentionally avoided 
153 
this approach. Rather, the system allows the user to modify the value of MAD and to 
input whatever value he wants. This is the case because there are some conservative 
top executives who may want to make changes to their maximum allowable 
downtimes for one reason or another. Top management views the organisation from a 
different perspective. Intangible issues such as political embarrassment, public image 
and media criticism may be important to top management and may reduce the overall 
MAD which would be tolerable for the organisation. The proposed expert system was 
therefore designed and implemented to have the flexibility needed to incorporate 
changes of this kind. 
7.6 Recommending A Recovery Strategy 
The third transaction of the ESDRSS involves the recovery strategy's 
recommendations. After computing the MAD and the investment needed, the next 
step is to recommend one or more recovery strategies. The output given by the first 
transaction, MAD, is extremely important in the third transaction so that an 
organisation may know its recovery time (see Table 5.10). The ability to provide 
recovery services with respect to response times varies among recovery strategies. 
The organisation's MAD is a major consideration in choosing an appropriate strategy. 
For example, organisations requiring immediate recovery (e.g. less than 1 hour) 
should own a duplicate site or subscribe to a disaster recovery vendor who provides a 
realtime recovery. On the other hand, an organisation with a high MAD (e.g. 10 days) 
value should (depending on other elements) subscribe to a commercial or co-operative 
cold site, or adopt another low time-response strategy. Some examples of how the 
decision is made are presented later in this chapter. 
The elements that guide the decision-making process for selecting the most suitable 
recovery strategy were explained in more detail in Chapter 5. It may be helpful if they 
are mentioned here again: 
• organisational characteristics (size of organisation, degree of dependency on 
computer technology and MAD); 
• 
• 
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organisational requirements and recovery services required (external personnel 
support, work area, special-tailored hardware or software (hw/sw) platform, 
security, usage duration, location); 
characteristics of recovery strategies that meet the organisational requirements; 
and 
• type of disaster that jeopardises the organisation. 
The approach used to select the most suitable recovery strategy was also explained in 
Chapter 5. As mentioned before, the problem-solving mechanism for selecting a 
recovery strategy which was developed by the methodology was presented in the 
form of condition-action pairs: IF this condition occurs, THEN an action is 
recommended. Clearly, a technology that handles this type of problem-solving 
approach is required. In Chapter 6, two types of technology, conventional and expert 
systems, were evaluated to determine which is more suitable for delivering the 
required solution. The expert systems approach was selected as the most suitable 
technology for implementation. After investigation, the LP Aflex toolkit was found to 
be the most suitable tool for implementation. The reasons for selecting expert systems 
and theflex toolkit were explained in the previous chapter. 
The flex toolkit employs the rule-based knowledge representation technique, which 
suits the problem-solving approach presented by the developed methodology. The 
following sections illustrate how this technique is utilised by the ESDRSS. In 
addition, the capability of the flex toolkit's mechanism for questions is explained and 
some examples of questions which are used in selecting a disaster recovery strategy 
are presented. Then,flex rules, forward-chaining inference engine and some examples 
of constructed rules used by the ESDRSS are described. 
7.6.1 Questions 
Most expert system applications involve some type of communication with the user. 
This communication may be illustrated in many ways, such as graphs, pictures or 
questions. However, asking questions and providing answers is the most convenient 
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method for interacting with the user in expert systems technology In theflex toolkit, 
this is achieved by invoking pre-defined questions These questions may involve 
making single and multiple choice menus and typing information at a keyboard 
The prototype ESDRSS starts by asking several questions related to the 
organisation's characteristics and requirements and the type of threat to which the 
organisation may be vulnerable. The questions are associated with size, degree of 
dependency on computers, work area required, external personnel support, available 
recovery strategies, threats, etc. A list of all the questions used by the ESDRSS can be 
found in Appendix B. To give a flavour of how the question mechanism is used in 
flex, some examples are listed below: 
Beginning with the size question, the question menu seen by the user is depicted in 
Figure 7.2. However, the actual structure of the question's coding is illustrated in 
Example (1). 
Example (1) 
question size 
'What is the size of the organisation?'; 
choose of sizes; 
becflllse size will help in deciding what MAD and recovery strategy 
are appropriate to the organisation. 
group sizes 
giant, large, medium, small . 
The first line in example 1 indicates the name of the question: size. Next, the actual 
question is posed, 'What is the size of the organisation? ' The question menu consists 
of two parts (see Figure 72). The top part is the question sentence The lower part 
contains a list of options provided by the system to choose from (choose one of sizes) 
The options (giant, large, medium, small) are grouped together in a function called 
groups;zes 
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Figure 7.2 - The Size Question Example 
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Moreover, flex provides a facility for attaching an explanation to questions. using the 
because clause. The explanation can either be some typed text to explain why a 
question has been asked and how to collect the required data, or it can be a name of a 
file to be browsed over. The explanation is presented whenever the user requests it 
(see the Explain button in Figure 7.2). 
Another question mechanism used by flex is through single field keyboard input. The 
data entered can be either a text item, a floating-point number, an integer, or a set of 
such items. As in the Example (2), the total_cost question, the user is requested to 
enter a number. 
Example (2) 
question total_cost 
'What is the total downtime cost for the critical resourcesfor the 
proposed time interval?'; 
input number; 
because The value of this input should be collected in the Business 
Impact Assessment Phase. 
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Constraints can be added to keyboard input questions by using keywords such that 
For instance, in Example (3) only yes or no responses are allowed. Otherwise a 
default, or customised, message will appear requesting the user to try again 
Example (3) 
question hot_ c~perative 
'Is there a possibility that your organisation can establish a co-
operative HOT site with other nearby organisations?'; 
input k such that yes_or_no_answer (k) . 
relation yes_or _no_answer ( yes) . 
relation yes_or _ no _answer ( no ) . 
Questions in jlex are invoked by typing ask whenever there is a request to ask a 
question. This can be part of the main program. Defining questions injlex is not a 
difficult task because jlex uses its own language. The language is called Knowledge 
Specification Language (KSL). This language clearly distinguishesjlex from other 
expert systems tools, especially when structuring rules. This is demonstrated in the 
next section. 
7.6.2 Rules and Inferenclng 
Rules are considered to be the life-blood of expert systems technology. Most 
applications implemented by expert systems technology use the rule-based technique 
very extensively (Turban, 1992). There are two approaches for controlling inferencing 
in the rule-based technique: forward-chaining and backward-chaining. Forward-
chaining is a data-driven approach. It starts from the available infonnation as it comes 
and then tries to draw conclusions from it. Backward-chaining is a goal-driven 
approach. It starts from an expectation of what will happen (hypothesis), and then 
seeks evidence that supports the expectation. Flex supports both approaches by using 
the IF THEN fonnat. The forward chaining rules are indicated injlex by the keyword 
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rule; and the backward-chaining rules are indicated by the keyword relation (Durkin, 
1994). 
It has been established from many expert systems applications that forward-chaining 
has proved itself very suitable to configuration problems. This occurs when it is not 
known what the final configuration will be, but it is known how to combine certain 
facts together according to some combining rules. Then, if the rules continue to be 
applied, everything is combined accordingly (Vasey, 1996). 
It has become apparent to the researcher that the forward-chaining approach is the 
more suitable inferencing mechanism for solving the present problem because, 
basically, there is no goal or hypothesis to be drawn nor evidence to be derived to 
support the goal or hypothesis (backward-chaining). Rather, it is a problem where 
many facts are known about an organisation, the threats to it, and the recovery 
strategy options, and a conclusion needs to be drawn, based on these available facts 
Facts and knowledge inJ1ex are organised in the knowledge base, separate from the 
control (inference engine), in the form of IF THEN rules. A rule is triggered when all 
of the antecedents of the implication are satisfied (i.e. when these antecedents are 
present in the memory.) An important feature ofJ1ex is that it does not have a limit to 
the number of rules. It can handles as many as several thousands rules. However, the 
ESDRSS contains only around sixty rules because it is only a prototype. The benefits 
of building a prototype system are explained in Chapter 6 under the heading 
Implementation and Prototyping. 
7.6.3 Weighting of Rules 
In rule-based systems there are always choice points where one rule is preferred to 
another. Attaching weights to rules is an option inJ1ex which can assist in making 
these preferences. The weight of a rule reflects its relative importance with respect to 
the other rules in the system. Whenever two or more rules are simultaneously 
applicable, their relative weights can be compared to decide which one to use. Most 
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weighting systems in flex are static, with each rule being assigned a specific score 
The more important the rule, the higher its score should be Furthennore,flex allows 
for dynamic weighting systems, whereby the score attached to a rule is not fixed when 
the rule is defined, but is dependent upon some changing infonnation This can be 
done by asking the user to input a value for each item, which means adding more 
questions. In the prototype ESDRSS, the static weighting system is used for 
simplicity and to avoid adding more questions The technique of weighting rules is 
explained in the following section, where examples of some rules are illustrated. 
Flex also allows the attachment of an optional explanation to rules. This is used to 
explain why a rule was triggered. The explanation can either be some text displayed 
on the screen or information obtained by the user being allowed to browse through a 
file. 
7.6.4 Examples of ESDRSS Rules 
In the following paragraphs, several rules are presented to illustrate how 
recommendations are executed. First, however, it is important to note that the 
researcher has introduced a specific method for naming rules. Some of the names, 
such as security, can be read and understood easily whereas others need to be 
explained further. For instance, gianChigh_build_l, means: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
the size of an organisation is giant; 
the degree of computer dependency is high; 
the anticipated threat type is buildmg; and 
number 1 means that there are more rules to be applied with the same three 
features listed above. 
Likewise, a rule with the name small high .JIoor_7 means that: 
• the size of the organisation is small; 
• 
• 
• 
the degree of computer dependency is high; 
the anticipated threat type is floor; and 
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number 7 means that there are more rules to be applied with the same three 
features. 
After explaining the naming method applied in the proposed system, the following are 
some examples of rules used in the ESDRSS and their descriptions. 
A) 
rule security_l 
if security Jequirement is 'very high' 
and degree is high 
and threat is regional 
then short _strategy becomes 'Duplicate Site' 
and long_strategy becomes 'The Duplicate Site should be used as a long term 
strategy' 
and location becomes remote 
score 100. 
The foregoing rule is called security_l which deals with the security issue There are 
some organisations that have to satisty a very high security level such as sensitive 
military installations, air-transportation command and control, air traffic control, 
government electronic mail centres, etc. For these organisations, it may be 
economically feasible to set up an entire alternative site in a geographically remote 
location in order to escape the same disaster. 
8) 
rule security_2 
if security Jequirement is 'very high' 
and degree is high 
and threat is bUilding 
then short_strategy becomes 'Duplicate Site' 
and long_strategy becomes 'The Duplicate Site should be used as 
a long term strategy' 
and location becomes 'within the city area' 
score 100. 
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The second rule, security_2, also deals with the same issue of security However, this 
rule recommends a solution to an organisation which would be exposed to threats 
covering only a smaller area; for example, a fire in the computer building or a bomb in 
a busy street. In this scenario, it is a Type II threat where the buildings or even the 
streets around the affected area may be evacuated (see Table 5.1). Therefore, the 
alternative site should be located several miles away from the original site but within 
the city area to facilitate employees' transportation and customer satisfaction. 
In the previous two rules; security _1 and security _2, a high weighting score is given 
to both rules because the security issue is a very high factor. Therefore it is given a 
score of 100 which means that these rules have priority over other rules. 
C) 
rule giant_high _ build_l 
if size is giant 
and degree is high 
and recovery_time is immediate 
and modification is yes 
and threat is building 
and personnel_support is no 
and hot _ co-operative is yes 
and cold _ co-operative is yes 
then short _strategy becomes 'Duplicate site or co-operative hot site with 
realtime recovery' 
and long_strategy becomes 'co-operative cold site' 
and location becomes 'within the city area' . 
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The rule, giIlnt_high_build_l, deals with organisations that have the following 
characteristics and requirements (or antecedents): 
=> Giant size 
=> High degree of dependency on computer 
=> Requires immediate recovery 
=> Requires special hw/sw installation arrangements 
=> Organisation is exposed to Type II threat; building 
=> Outside additional personnel support is not required 
=> Possibility that organisation can establish a co-operative cold site with other 
nearby organisations. 
In the above rule, the recommendations are given only if all of the above antecedents 
of the implication are satisfied. The short-term strategy is recommended to be either a 
duplicate site or a co-operative hot site with a real time recovery because immediate 
recovery and special hw/sw arrangements are required. The long-term strategy is 
recommended to be a co-operative cold site for two reasons: 
(See co-operative cold site strategy in Chapter 3) 
• external personnel support is not required; and 
• a cold co-operative alternative site can be established and managed with 
other organisations with the same business and hardware/software platform. 
At the end of the rule the location of the alternative sites (short and long-term) , 
should be several miles away from the original site but within the city area because the 
organisation is exposed to a Type II threats: building. 
The following two rules, smalthighJloor_l and smalChighJloor_2, deal with 
organisations with similar characteristics but different requirements The 
characteristics of both are: 
::::> Small size; 
::::> High degree of dependency on computer; 
::::> Organisation exposed to Type III threat: floor; and 
~ Fast recovery, less than 2 days, 
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However, the requirements in the first rule (see example D), snudLhighJ100r_l, are 
hardware and/or software modifications and external personnel support, The mobile 
hot site strategy, which serves these requirements and fits the above-mentioned 
characteristics, is therefore recommended as a short-term strategy, A portable site is 
recommended as a long-term strategy which also meets the necessary requirements 
The location is recommended to be adjacent to the organisation because the threat is a 
Type ill threat: floor, 
D) 
rule smaiL high Jloor_l 
if size is small 
and degree is high 
and [ recovery _lime immediate or recovery_time is '1 to 2 days' } 
and threat is floor 
and [ modification is yes or personnel_support is yes} 
then short_strategy becomes 'mobile hot site' 
and long_strategy becomes 'portable site' 
and location becomes 'adjacent to the organisation' 
score 30. 
While the characteristics of the second rule (see example E), smaiLhighJ100r_2, are 
similar to those in the first rule, the requirements are different. The organisation does 
not need special-tailored hardware or software modifications, Therefore, a service 
bureau is recommended which can provide a relatively fast recovery (less than two 
days). The external personnel support factor is not included here because a service 
bureau can meet this requirement. A portable site is also recommended as a long term 
recovery strategy because it is only a small organisation, Again, the location is 
164 
recommended to be adjacent to the organisation because the anticipated threat is a 
Type III threat: floor. 
E) 
rule smale high -1ioor _ 2 
if size is small 
and degree is high 
and [ recovery Jime is immediate or recovery _ time is '1 to 2 days' J 
andthreatisj100r 
and modification is no 
and service_bureau is yes 
then short_strategy becomes 'service bureau. ' 
and long_strategy becomes 'portable site' 
and location becomes 'adjacent to the organisation' . 
It can be seen that there are some questions which have not been asked because they 
do not apply to a particular situation. For example, the question related to work area 
has not been asked in the previous two rules because the scenario is of a Type III 
threat: floor. Since the anticipated damage area is only expected to spread over one 
floor or less, and employees win not be located in another location, there is no need to 
ask a question regarding the need for an additional working area. This has been 
explained in the methodology developed in Chapter 5. 
F) 
rule smalC high _ build_ ., 
if size is small 
and degree is high 
and [recovery_time is immediate or recovery _time is '1 to 2 days' J 
and threat is building 
and personnel_support is no 
and modification is no 
andwork area is no 
and service bureau is no 
and reciprocal is yes 
then short _strategy becomes 'reciprocal agreement. ' 
and long_strategy becomes 'commercial cold site' 
and location becomes 'within the city area' . 
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Example F applies to small organisations that need to achieve recovery within 2 days. 
It fits organisations that do not have any requirements except for an alternative site 
which provides similar hardware and software platforms This solution is only 
recommended if there is the possibility of making a reciprocal agreement with another 
nearby organisation. 
G) 
rule medium low 
if size is medium 
and degree is low 
then short_strategy becomes 'withdraw oj service or manual procedure. ' 
and long_strategy becomes" 
and location becomes " . 
Example G illustrates the situation when there is a medium-size organisation that does 
not depend on computers in running its business. The feasible and economically sound 
recommendation for this type of organisation is to withdraw from the computerised 
service until everything is back to normal, or to provide those services manually until 
the computer is up again. 
The above examples are given only to illustrate the user interface method, the rules 
structure and the adaptability of the flex expert system toolkit The examples also 
show and explain how recommendations are given in the prototype ESDRSS. All the 
rules and the program code for the whole system can be found in Appendix A. 
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7.7 Testing 
Disaster simulation exercises are often used to test the activities and decision-making 
of disaster recovery plans (Rosenthal & Sheiniuk, 1993; Rosenthal & Himel, 1991) 
However, such simulation is a costly exercise, and there is a general reluctance among 
senior managers within organisations to undertake this exercise because of the 
expense and the disruption of normal business activities (Toigo, 1989; Doughty, 
1993; Jackson, 1994). The cost oftesting any methodology or plan requires several 
man-months (CCT A, 1989). According to Barbara DePompa, a certified disaster 
recovery planner, 'the effort of the first integrated test will cost as much as $10,000' 
(DePompa, 1995). In order to carry out a test for a disaster recovery methodology to 
check its validity on a real-world situation, the following criteria must first be 
satisfied: 
• many interviews have to be carried out with key personnel or department 
managers to collect the required data (See examples of questions in the Threat 
Assessment and Business Impact Assessment Phases in Chapter 5); 
• the cost of downtime for all applications and systems must be recorded This may 
take considerable time and may be regarded as sensitive data by some 
organisations; 
• employees should be knowledgeable about the importance ofDRPs so they can 
co-operate with the test process; and 
• individuals who are assigned to do the simulation test should be trained in how to 
collect the information needed and how to perform the required activities. 
Due to the above-mentioned obstacles, it is difficult to locate organisations which are 
willing to conduct a simulation test of the present research on their applications and 
systems. Furthermore, like any other disaster recovery plan, the true soundness of the 
recommendations which are given by the methodology and expert system cannot be 
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really tested until an actual disaster occurs. However, the normal type of test for any 
system was carried out to check the logic of the proposed system and to check against 
any programming errors. 
7.8 Concluding Remarks 
The prototype ESDRSS presented above shows that expert systems technology is 
capable of accommodating the heuristics required to produce solutions to the 
problems and issues involved in disaster recovery strategy selection. Furthermore, it is 
clear from this project that expert systems technology and the rule-based mechanism 
can be used to test and validate the developed methodology and therefore can provide 
IT managers or disaster recovery co-ordinators with a workable system in a usable 
form. 
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Chapter 8 
Discussion and Conclusion 
8.1 Summary of the Research 
The number of organisations who rely on computerised systems to perform their day-
to-day operations and to help them in making decisions has grown rapidly over the 
last few years and continues to expand. Thus, information systems are now considered 
to be a basic component of nearly all private and public organisations. They are here 
to stay and their uses will continue to grow in all sectors in the years ahead. On the 
other hand, the essence of good management is the rational use and protection of 
resources. Next to personnel, an organisation's most important resource nowadays is 
information. Therefore, effective management of the computer centre and information 
resources will be an essential determinant of business success. The destruction or loss 
of these resources can be a nightmare and in many cases, unless restored promptly, 
may lead to an end of trading for the business. 
In recent years, several significant disasters have occurred, which received extensive 
news coverage. This has increased management awareness and understanding of the 
need for a means of protection to survive such disasters. This, in turn, brings into 
sharp focus the necessity for a carefully constructed disaster recovery plan to assure 
the continuation of service and business. Therefore, the time and attention devoted to 
disaster recovery planning (DRP) have increased dramatically over the last few years 
To look more closely at the effects of disasters on organisations and the importance of 
adopting DRPs, the researcher carried out a case study on organisations in Kuwait to 
identify major problems facing IT managers on disaster recovery issues. The study 
169 
identified a number of problems and also identified factors which have contributed a 
great deal to the development of the proposed solution The case study and its 
findings were explained in Chapter 4. 
The literature in this field and the above mentioned study show that senior 
management and IT directors have begun to realise the need for disaster recovery 
plans. However, several questions are often raised by them in this context, such as 
How long can the organisation tolerate the failure of its computer systems? Are we 
spending too much or too little on a recovery strategy? What type of recovery 
strategy is best appropriate for our IT centre? 
Seeking answers to these questions was the malO target of part of this research. 
Several findings relevant to an understanding of the disaster recovery field were 
analysed before finalising the proposed solutions. The findings and the solutions are 
briefly explained in the following sections. 
8.1.1 Findings 
The major findings of the present research can be summarised as follows: 
1) insurance is not considered to be an acceptable alternative to recovery because 
it does not put the company back in business. Instead, it should be part of the 
disaster recovery plan. Indeed, insurance money is needed to fund the 
recovery efforts following a disaster; 
2) disaster avoidance countenneasures are valid to prevent some types of threats. 
But because there are other types of disaster which are beyond the control of 
any preventive countenneasures, another method of protecting the business 
and assuring the survival of the organisation is essential; 
3) much of the literature in the disaster recovery area has dealt with the need for 
disaster recovery planning, how to develop and implement disaster recovery 
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plans, and the consequences of not having one. The wider issues of selecting 
the most suitable recovery strategy and answering the questions posed by IT 
managers have not been fully and adequately addressed; and 
4) the utilisation of expert systems technology in the field of disaster recovery 
has still to be tested and further investigations to check feasibility of 
employing this new technology is needed. 
The literature review presented in Chapter 2 shows that few computerised systems in 
utilising expert systems technology in the field of disaster recovery were introduced 
recently and others are under development. For example, the AUDIT system, 
introduced in late 1996, and the CCT A IT Infrastructure Contingency Planning 
Module developed by the UK Government's Central Computer and 
Telecommunications Agency (CCT A), which is under development. The AL'DIT 
system which is similar to the end-product of the present research, as explained in 
section 2.6.1.1, is an outstanding attempt in this area. However, the present work 
provides better solutions to the disaster recovery problems since it uses a constructed 
methodology and applies a very powerful toolkit, Flex. 
Based on the increasing demands of disaster recovery planning, including answers to 
important questions raised by IT managers and the above findings, a comprehensive 
approach has been developed in this research to assist in the process of selecting the 
most suitable disaster recovery strategy. The approach provides a range of methods 
enabling the continuation of services and the provision of guidance for fast recovery in 
the event of a disaster that affects the IT installation. In addition, a prototype expert 
system is developed as a practical end-product to assist IT managers in the strategy 
selection process. 
The decision to undertake this particular area of research was influenced by the 
following facts 
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a) the potential business impact on organisations of disasters that cause services 
interruptions is considerable and the possibility of business failure, if not 
bankruptcy, cannot be discounted (see Chapters 1, 2 and 4) Thus, more 
attention should be given to this area; 
b) The researchers' past experience in the disaster recovery area notably after the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (see Chapter 7, Knowledge Acquisition) enabled him 
to cite some of the weak points associated with existing disaster recovery 
methodologies. These weaknesses presented an obvious focus for new 
research. An extensive investigation of the disaster recovery literature and 
lengthy interviews with well-informed individuals in the field conformed his 
initial view that there is a strong need to develop a new methodology in order 
to find solutions to these weak points; and 
c) checking the feasibility of using expert systems technology, as successfully 
applied in many other fields, to make a useful contribution in the disaster 
recovery area. 
8.1.2 The Methodology 
The methodology developed in Chapter 5 contained five phases that provide a step-
by-step approach to ensure that the entire recovery strategy selection process is 
covered. The phases are: Threats Assessment; Business Impact Assessment; Recovery 
Strategy Analysis; Cost Analysis, and System Recommendations The following 
paragraphs briefly explain these phases. 
The methodology is intended to assist IT managers in identifying the potential 
disasters that threaten their companies. A new approach for classifying such threats 
was developed so that the nature of the threats can contribute to a more informed 
decision-making process for selecting a recovery strategy. This analysis was carried 
out in the first phase of the methodology and is called the Threats Assessment 
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Once the threats assessment has been finalised, the second phase, Business Impact 
Assessment, was presented. In this phase, computerised systems and applications are 
identified and then prioritised in terms of criticality to the organisation The focus is, 
however, shifted to systems that are deemed critical in terms of importance to the 
survival of the organisation following a disaster. Then, the overall maximum allowable 
downtime for which an organisation can tolerate the failure of its computer systems is 
determined. The main organisational requirements were also identified in this phase 
The IT manager, the disaster recovery co-ordinator/team, or whoever is in charge has 
the responsibility for analysing and selecting the most suitable and efficient recovery 
strategy. This strategy must meet the true recovery requirements of the organisation 
There are a number of factors that influence the right decision in terms of selecting the 
recovery strategy. Some of these factors are related to the organisation itself Others 
relate to the characteristics of different recovery strategies and how will they fit the 
true recovery requirements of the organisation. The third phase, Recovery Strategy 
Analysis, explains these factors and shows how the recovery strategy selection 
process is undertaken. 
Disaster recovery experts state that the cost analysis of accommodating a recovery 
strategy must only be used for budget purposes, not to make a decision on whether to 
adopt one or not. Disaster recovery plans should not therefore be evaluated on the 
basis of cost-effectiveness (Robinson, 1993; Baylus, 1991). This research, however, 
does not ignore the fact that management needs to have some sort of indication of 
how much they need to spend on a disaster recovery strategy. This research provides 
IT directors with a method for calculating the amount of investment required to spend 
on a disaster recovery strategy. This was carried out in the fourth phase of Cost 
Analysis 
In the final phase, a prototype computerised system was developed to provide IT 
managers with some recommendations regarding strategy selection based on several 
inputs from the user. This system is called the Expert System for Disaster Recovery 
Strategy Selection (ESDRSS). 
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8.1.3 The ESDRSS 
A major objective of this research was to develop and deliver a computerised system 
as an end-product, which could test the validity of the previous developed 
methodology and be provided to IT managers, disaster recovery co-ordinators, 
disaster recovery consultants and others in a usable form. Therefore, the prototype 
Expert System for Disaster Recovery Strategy Selection (ESDRSS) was developed to 
perform some computations and rule-based decisions regarding the continuation of 
business and services following a disaster. The development of the prototype 
ESDRSS was accomplished via two stages: 1) the development of a structured 
methodology for the selection process of a recovery strategy in Chapter 5; and 2) the 
development and implementation of the proposed prototype system, based on the 
previous methodology using the expert systems technology. This system, after 
expansion and several tests, can be used as part of the master disaster recovery plan 
for any organisation. The prototype ESDRSS (see Figure 7.1) consists of the 
following three major components (or transactions): 
• computation of the Maximum Allowable Downtime (MAD); 
• computation of the required investment for fitting a recovery strategy; and 
• recommending a disaster recovery strategy, based on the organisation's 
requirements and each recovery strategy's characteristics using a rule-based 
knowledge representation mechanism. 
8.2 Who Will Benefit from this Research? 
Of course, everyone hopes that they will never have to exercise such a disaster 
recovery methodology, but it is important that they should feel secure if eventually 
does arise that there is a means of protection to assure the continuity of work 
Therefore, this research has developed, implemented and delivered a methodology 
and a prototype expert system which reveal what information is required and how that 
information is managed as well as guiding decision-makers regarding investments and 
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the selection of the most suitable recovery strategy. The foUowing individuals are 
expected to benefit from both the methodology and the expert system: 
1) IT directors in organisations that depend heavily on computers and where the 
availability of computers is critical for their revenue The computer 
information systems are used to perform daily work and/or to make critical 
decisions, such as in financial institutions; 
2) IT managers in organisations which perform activities that utilise computer 
facilities but can tolerate interruption of systems for a period of time, such as 
research institutes; 
3) Disaster recovery co-ordinators who need to submit reports to IT managers 
or top management regarding investments and recommendations on disaster 
recovery strategies; 
4) Disaster recovery consultants who are hired by organisations to carry out an 
analysis about the organisation's recovery requirements eventually to provide 
the necessary recommendations for future action; 
5) Disaster recovery vendors who provide different strategies for different 
organisations. This research helps them to decide which of the recovery 
strategies they hold would be most suitable for existing or prospective 
subscribers; and 
6) Insurance underwriters and other risk assessors. 
8.3 Future Research 
The time has finally arrived for IT managers to give adequate attention to the concept 
of disaster recovery, or what others call business continuity (Iyer and Diez, 1997). 
Therefore, disaster preparedness is considered to be a subject which deserves more 
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research studies in the future, as the increasing awareness of the importance of this 
field continues to grow Drawing on the experience gained through this research, the 
following observations are suggested for future work in this field 
I) The development of a methodology and expert system to provide informed 
recommendations as between various vendors who offer different strategies 
Vendors differ, within each recovery strategy, depending on many 
parameters such as hardware and software compatibility, reputation, 
communications facilities, reliability and supplies; 
2) The development of a methodology and expert system to compare the 
various disaster recovery planning software system. The main comparison 
issues are likely to be on product design, flexibility, user friendliness, price, 
product scope, product support, the complexity ofDRPs used, etc.; 
3) Implementing the developed methodology in Chapter 5 using alternative 
mechanisms, in place of the rule-based mechanism, such as frame, object 
oriented programming or neural networks; 
4) The development of a relational database that contains all the relevant 
information about disaster recovery vendors such as strengths, limitations, 
market position, location and other characteristics. Such a database assists 
organisations to select among these vendors; and 
5) Investigating the utilisation of the available WWW-site interfaces for 
recovery to support the many emerging Internet and Intranet applications 
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Appendix A 
System Code 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% this part is the main body of the program 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
Actions 
action flex starter 
do ti 
and ask continue 1 
andinv 
and ask continue2 
and rule_q 
and ask continue 
and riO. 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%% allocating time intervals 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
ti('Financial', giant, 0.125). 
ti('Financial', large, 0.25). 
ti('Financial', medium, 0.5). 
ti('Financial', small, 1). 
ti('Manufacturing', giant, 1). 
ti('Manufacturing', large, 2). 
ti('Manufacturing', medium, 5). 
ti('Manufacturing', small, 7). 
ti('Government', giant, 1). 
ti('Government', large, 2). 
ti('Government', medium, 5). 
ti('Government', small, 7). 
ti('Computer Services', giant, 1). 
ti('Computer Services', large, 2). 
ti('Computer Services', medium, 3). 
ti('Computer Services', small, 4). 
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ti('Retailing', giant, 0.25). 
ti('Retailing', large, 0.5). 
ti('Retailing', medium, 1). 
tiCRetailing', small, 2). 
tiCTelecommunication', giant, 0.125). 
tiCTelecommunication', large, 0.25). 
tiCTelecommunication', medium, 0.5). 
tiCTelecommunication', small, 1). 
ti('Education', giant, 2). 
ti('Education', large, 3). 
ti('Education', medium, 5). 
ti('Education', small, 7). 
ti('Health Care', giant, 1). 
ti('Health Care', large, 3). 
ti('Health Care', medium, 5). 
ti('Health Care', small, 7). 
ti('Insurance', giant, 1). 
ti('Insurance', large, 2). 
ti('Insurance', medium, 3). 
ti('Insurance', small, 5). 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
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% This procedure is to calculate invesment required for adapting a recovery strategy. 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
calc cost :-
lookup( hot_time _I, global, HT 1 ), 
lookup( hot_time_2, global, HT2), 
Hot_time is (HTI + HT2) / 2, 
lookup( cold_time_I, global, CTl ), 
lookup( cold_time_2, global, CT2 ), 
Cold_time is (CTl + CT2) / 2, 
lookup( hot_ cost_I, global, HC 1 ), 
lookup( hot_cost_2, global, HC2 ), 
is(XI, In«HCI + HC2) / 2», 
lookup( cold_cost_I, global, CCI ), 
lookup( cold_cost _ 2, global, CC2 ), 
is(X2, In«CCI + CC2) / 2», 
start :-
M3 is Xl - X2, 
Time} is (Cold_time - Hot_time), 
N is (M3 / Time}), 
Y is (Xl + (Hot_time * N) ), 
is(AX, aln(Y), 
lookup( max_all_time, global, MAXAT), 
is( AXl, (AX * aln(- N· MAXAT»), 
new_slot( i, global, AXI ). 
repeat, 
getb( INPUT ), 
(INPUT = 13 ; INPUT = 27). 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
user _ message(TITLE, TEXT ) :-
wdcreate(udl,TITLE,30,50,500,200,[ws_caption,dlg_modalframe]), 
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wccreate( (ud 1,1 OOO),static, TEXT ,5,5,490,180,[ ws _child, ws _ visible,ss -'eft]), 
wccreate«ud 1,1 OO),button,' OK' ,10,140,100,30,[ ws _child, ws _visible, ws _tabstop,bs_ 
pushbutton)), 
call_dialog( udl, ok). 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% This part is for recomminding a recovery strategy 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
action rule _ q 
do ask size 
and ask degree 
and long_strategy becomes" 
and short_strategy becomes" 
and if degree is low 
then invoke rule set low _degree 
and display_results 
else 
ask security_requirement 
and ask threat 
and ask recovery_time 
and ask modification 
and if [ size is giant or size is large] 
then do size I_questions 
else do size2 _questions 
end if 
end if. 
%% This action for giant and large size organisations 
action size I_questions 
do if [ threat is regional or threat is building] 
then ask hot_cooperative 
and ask cold _cooperative 
and ask personnel_support 
and ask work area 
and invoke ruleset rec strat 
and display Jesuits 
else 
ask hot_cooperative 
and invoke ruleset rec strat 
and display_results 
end if 
%% This action for medium and small size organisations 
action size2 _questions 
do if [ threat is regional or threat is building] 
then 
ask personnel_support 
and ask work area 
and do med _small Jec 
else 
do med_small_rec 
end if. 
action med small rec 
do ask service bureau 
and ask reciprocal 
and ask time broker 
and ask hardware vendor 
and invoke ruleset rec strat 
and display_results 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%~o 
% Printing to the screen section 
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
action display Jesuits 
do open _windows % defn written in data. pi file to create window 
and writer(result, 'For an organisation of size ') and writer(result, size) 
and writer(result, ' and degree of dependency on computer ') 
and writer( result, degree) and nlr( result) 
and writer(result, ' ') and nlr(result) 
and writer(result, 'The recommended short term strategy is ') 
and writer( result, short_strategy) and nlr( result) 
and writer(result, 'and the recommended long term strategy is ') 
and writer(resuit, long_strategy) and nlr(resuIt) 
and writer(result, 'and the recommended location is ') 
and writer(result, location) 
and writer(result,'.' ) and nlr(result) . 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% This part is to calculate the Maximum Allowable Downtime 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
action ti 
do ask organisation_type 
and ask size 
and ti( organisation_type, size, TIV ALUE) 
and ti becomes TIV ALUE 
and open_windows 
and writer(info, 'For this type and size of organisation, 
the proposed time interval is ') and writer(info, ti) 
and writer(info, 'day(s)') and nlr(info) 
and writer(info, ' ') and nlr(info) 
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and msgbox('Time Interval Recommended','Please take a note of the proposed time 
interval', 48, Code) 
and ask daily_income 
and ask total cost 
and total ti becomes ti 
and clear( result ) 
and calc MAD 
and writ;r(result, 'The Maximum Allowable downtime for your organisation is: ') 
and writer(result, total_ti ) and writer(result, ' days(s)') and nlr(result) . 
action get_next_cost 
do repeat 
writer(info, 'We have been unable to establish a MAD in the previous time interval') 
and nlr(info) 
and writer(info, 'Please provide the total downtime cost for the l'.'EXT ') 
and writer(info, ti ) and writer(info, , days') and nIr(info) 
and writer(info, , ') and nIr(info) 
and msgbox('MAD is not reached', 'Further calculation is required',48,Code) 
and ask next _total_cost 
and total_cost becomes (total_cost + next_total_cost) 
and total_ ti becomes total_ ti + ti 
until the total_cost >= daily_income * total_ti 
end repeat 
and mad becomes totaUi . 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% This part is to calculate the invesment required. 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
action inv 
do ask hot _time 
and ask hot_cost_l 
and ask hot_time _ 2 
and ask hot_cost_2 
and ask cold_time_l 
and ask cold_cost_l 
and ask cold_time_2 
and ask cold_cost_2 
and ask max_all_time 
and open_windows 
and clear( result ) 
and do calc cost % this procedure is placed in data. pI 
and writer(~sult, 'The investment required for your organisation is: ') 
and fnwriter( result, i ) and nIr( result) . 
Relations 
relation calc_MAD 
if total_cost >= daily_income * ti 
and mad becomes ti . 
relation calc_MAD 
if get _next_cost . 
relation threat check 1 
if threat is regional 
relation threat _check 
if threat is building 
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Questions 
question size 
What is the size of the organisation?'; 
choose one of sizes; 
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because Size will help in deciding what MAD and recovery strategy are appropriate to 
the organisation. 
question degree 
What is the degree of computer dependancy?'; 
choose one of degrees ; 
because Degree will help in deciding what MAD and recovery strategy are 
appropriate to the organisation . 
question recovery_time 
'How fast does your organisation need to be recovered?'; 
choose one of times ; 
because The answer can be obtained from the first transaction output (MAO) 
question security Jequirement 
'What level of security does your organisation required?'; 
choose one of levels ; 
because If you have very high security requirements eg national defence, a specific 
recovery strategy has to be adapted . 
question modification 
'Does your organisation need special-tailored hardware or software arrangement?'; 
choose one of mods; 
because Some organisations install unique hardware or software such as air control 
system. 
question threat 
'What type of threat are you exposed to?'; 
choose one of threats; 
because This important to decide on the location of the alternative site. 
question personnel_support 
'Does the organisation need outside personnel support?'; 
choose one of yes_no ; 
because Some organisations need outside help for example: staff in organisations 
exposed to regional threats might be busy with their personnel affairs and the 
company needs outside help to run the IT centre . 
question hot _cooperative 
'Is there a possibility that your organisation can establish 
a cooperative HOT site with other near by organisations?'; 
choose one of yes_no . 
question cold_cooperative 
'Is there a possibility that your organisation can establish 
a cooperative COLD site with other near by organisations?'; 
choose one of yes_no . 
question reciprocal 
'Is there a possibility that your organisation make a mutual 
agreement with another organisation that have similar platform?'; 
choose one of yes_no . 
question service_bureau 
'Is there a service bureau facility available that provides recovery arrangements?'; 
choose one of yes_no . 
question time broker 
'Is there a time broker available who can provide recovery arrangements?'; 
choose one of yes_no . 
question hardware_vendor 
'Does your hardware vendor provide recovery arrangements?'; 
choose one of yes_no . 
question work_area 
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'Does your organisation need large working area (more than 10 employees) in the 
alternative site?'; 
choose one of yes_no . 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% questions for time intervals calc. 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
question organisation _type 
'What type of business does your organisation perform?'; 
choose one of organisations . 
question total_cost 
'What is the total downtime cost of the denial of computer facilities for all critical 
resources for the proposed time interval'}'; 
input number ; 
because The value of this input should be collected in the Business Impact Asseement 
Phase. 
question daily_income 
What is the average daily income of the organisation')'; 
input number. 
question next _total_cost 
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'Please provide the total downtime cost of the denial of computer facilities for all 
critical systems for the next time interval?'; 
input number . 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% questions for investment calculation 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
question hot_time_l 
'Provide an estimate ofminmum response time for a commercial HOT site'; 
input number ; 
because Hot site vendors usually have minimum response time that they can not 
provide services before i t. 
question hot_cost_l 
'Provide an estimate of the annual cost for the pervious minmum response time when 
subscribing to a commercial HOT site'; 
input number ; 
because This can be collected from the disaster recovery market . 
question hot_time_2 
'Provide an estimate of maximum response time for a commercial HOT site'; 
input number; 
because Just select any time that you think is appropriate to the hot site provider that 
you know. 
question hot_cost_2 
'Provide an estimate of the annual cost for the pervious maximum response time when 
subscribing to a commercial HOT site'; 
input number . 
question cold_time_l 
'Provide an estimate of minmum response time for a commercial COLD site'; 
input number . 
question cold cost 1 
'Provide an ;stim;te of the annual cost for the pervious minmum response time when 
subscribing to a commercial COLD site'; 
input number . 
question cold_time_2 
'Provide an estimate of maximum response time for a commercial COLD site'; 
input number ; 
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because Cold site vendors usually have minimum response time that they can not 
provide services before it . 
question cold_cost _2 
'Provide an estimate of the annual cost for the pervious maximum response time when 
subscribing to a commercial COLD site'; 
input number . 
question max. _ all_time 
'What is the maximum allowable downtime for your organisation which was 
calculated from the previous transaction'; 
input number ; 
because You can see it in the Results window above this question . 
Groups 
group sizes 
giant, large, medium, small . 
group degrees 
high, medium, low, 'Do not know!!' . 
group times 
immediate, 'I to 2 days', 'more than 3 days', 'Do not know'" . 
group levels 
'very high', high, medium, 'Do not know!!' . 
group mods 
yes, no, 'Do not know'" . 
group threats 
regional, building, floor, 'disk failure only', 'Do not know!" . 
group organisations 
'Financial', 'Manufacturing', 'Government', 'Computer Services', 
'Retailing', 'Telecommunication', 'Education', 'Health Care', 'Insurance', 'Others' . 
group yes_no 
yes, no, 'Do not know!!' . 
Rules 
ruJeset rec _ strat 
ruleset rec strat 
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contains security_I, security_2, security_3, giant_high_reg_I, giant_high_reg_:, 
giant_high _build _1, giant_high _build _1, giant_high _floor_disk _1 , giant_high Jeg_ 3, 
giant_high Jeg_ 4, large_high _build _1, md _ med _reg_I, md _ med _reg_ 2, 
d _ med _build _I, md _ med _build _ 2, md _ med Joom, md _ med _floor, small_high Jeg_I , 
small_high_reg_2, small_highJeg_3, small_high_reg_ 4, small_highJeg_5, 
small_high Jeg_ 6, small_high Jeg_7, small_high Jeg_ 8, small_high _build _1, 
small_high _build _ 2, small_high _build _3, small_high _build_ 4, small_high_ build _5. 
small_high _build_ 6, small_ high_build_7, small_high _build _ 8, small_ high_floor _1. 
small_high _floor _2, small_high _floor _3, small_high _floor _ 4 , small_high _floor _5. 
small_high_floor_6, small_high_floor_7, small_med ; 
initiate by doing location becomes It; 
terminate when location is not" . 
/ ............................................ . 
In rules 1 - 3: duplicate site is recommended becuase the company has 
very high security requirements . 
.............................................. / 
rule security _ 1 
if security Jequirement is 'very high' 
and degree is high 
and threat is regional 
then short _strategy becomes 'Duplicate Site' 
and long_strategy becomes 'The Duplicate Site should be used as 
a long tenn strategy' 
and location becomes remote 
score 100 . 
j •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
If the threat covers the whole building, the site should be located several miles a way 
because the buildings or even the streets around the affected area may be evacuated 
............................. / 
rule security _2 
if security_requirement is 'very high' 
and degree is high 
and threat is building 
then short strategy becomes 'Duplicate Site' 
and long_ ~rategy becomes 'The Duplicate Site should be used as 
a long tenn strategy' 
and location becomes 'within the city area' 
score 100 . 
rule security _ 3 
if security_requirement is 'very high' 
and degree is high 
and [ threat is 'disk failure only' 
or threat is floor] 
then short_strategy becomes 'Duplicate Site' 
and long_strategy becomes 'The Duplicate Site should be used as 
a long term strategy' 
and location becomes 'adjacent to the company or within the city area' 
score 100. 
/ •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ***.** ••••••• 
The following rules deal with organisations that have the following characteristics 
- giant size, 
- high degree of dependency on computer, and 
- need immediate recovery 
- need special HW /SW installation arrangements 
.....•........................................ / 
rule giant_high Jeg_l 
if size is giant 
and degree is high 
and recovery_time is immediate 
and modification is yes 
and threat is regional 
and [ personnel_support is yes 
or cold_cooperative is no ] 
and hot_cooperative is yes 
then short_strategy becomes 'Duplicate site or cooperative hot site 
with realtime recovery' 
and long_strategy becomes 'commercial cold site' 
and location becomes remote . 
rule giant_high Jeg_ 2 
if size is giant 
and degree is high 
and recovery_time is immediate 
and modification is yes 
and threat is regional 
and personnel_support is no 
and hot _cooperative is yes 
and cold cooperative is yes 
then short _strategy becomes 'Duplicate site or cooperative hot site 
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with realtime recovery' 
and long_strategy becomes 'cooperative cold site' 
and location becomes remote 
rule giant_high _build_l 
if size is giant 
and degree is high 
and recovery_time is immediate 
and modification is yes 
and threat is building 
and [ personnel_support is yes 
or cold_cooperative is no ] 
and hot_cooperative is yes 
then short_strategy becomes 'Duplicate site or cooperative hot site 
with realtime recovery' 
and long_strategy becomes 'commercial cold site' 
and location becomes 'within the city area' 
rule giant_high _build_2 
if size is giant 
and degree is high 
and recovery_time is immediate 
and modification is yes 
and threat is building 
and personnel_support is no 
and hot_cooperative is yes 
and cold_cooperative is yes 
then short_strategy becomes 'Duplicate site or cooperative hot site 
with realtime recovery' 
and long_strategy becomes 'cooperative cold site' 
and location becomes 'within the city area' . 
rule giant_high _floor_disk_l 
if size is giant 
and degree is high 
and recovery_time is immediate 
and modification is yes 
and [ threat is 'disk failure only' 
or threat is floor] 
and hot _cooperative is yes 
then short_strategy becomes 'Duplicate site or cooperative hot site 
with realtime recovery' 
and long_strategy becomes 'No need for long term strategy because the 
orginal site should be rebuild within short period of time' 
and location becomes 'adjacent to the organisation' . 
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/ .•........................................... 
The following rules deal with organisations that have the following characteristics 
- giant size, 
- high degree of dependency on computer, and 
- need recovery time from 1 to 2 days 
- need special HW/SW installation arrangements 
••••••• ****.********.********** •• ***.**.* ••••• */ 
rule giant_high_reg_3 
if size is giant 
and degree is high 
and recovery_time is 'I to 2 days' 
and threat is regional 
and [ personnel_support is yes 
or hot _cooperative is no ] 
then short_strategy becomes 'commercial hot site' 
and long_strategy becomes 'commercial cold site' 
and location becomes remote . 
rule giant_high Jeg_ 4 
if size is giant 
and degree is high 
and recovery_time is 'I to 2 days' 
and threat is regional 
and hot_cooperative is yes 
and cold_cooperative is yes 
then short_strategy becomes 'cooperative hot site' 
and long_strategy becomes 'cooperative cold site' 
and location becomes remote . 
rule large_high _build_l 
if size is large 
and degree is high 
and recovery_time is 'I to 2 days' 
and threat is building 
and hot_cooperative is no 
and cold _cooperative is yes 
then short_strategy becomes 'commercial hot site' 
and long_strategy becomes 'cooperative cold site' 
and location becomes 'within the city area' . 
/.* •• ******************.********************** 
The following rules deal with organisations that have the following characteristics 
- medium size, 
:0: 
- medium degree of dependency on computer 
***********************************************/ 
rule md _ med _reg_l 
if size is medium 
and degree is medium 
and threat is regional 
and hardware_vendor is yes 
then short _strategy becomes 'hardware vendor' 
and long_strategy becomes 'portable site' 
and location becomes remote . 
rule md _ med Jeg_ 2 
if size is medium 
and degree is medium 
and threat is regional 
and hardware vendor is no 
then short_strategy becomes 'portable site' 
and long_strategy becomes 'portable site' 
and location becomes remote . 
rule md med build 1 
- - -
if size is medium 
and degree is medium 
and threat is regional 
and hardware_vendor is yes 
then short_strategy becomes 'hardware vendor or reduction of service' 
and long_strategy becomes 'portable site' 
and location becomes 'within the city area' . 
rule md med build 2 
- - -
if size is medium 
and degree is medium 
and threat is regional 
and hardware vendor is no 
then short _strategy becomes 'portable site or reduction of service' 
and Ions_strategy becomes 'portable site' 
and location becomes 'within the city area' . 
rule md med floor 
if size is medium 
and degree is medium 
and threat is floor 
then short _strategy becomes 'portable site or reduction of service' 
and long_strategy becomes 'portable site' 
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and location becomes 'adjacent to the organisation' 
rule md_med_room 
if size is medium 
and degree is medium 
and threat is 'disk failure only' 
then short _strategy becomes 'reduction of service' 
and long_strategy becomes 'reduction of service until the disk failure is fixed' 
and location becomes 'no need' . 
/******************************************* •• ****.* ••• 
The following rules deal with organisations that have the following characteristics 
- small size, 
- high degree of dependency on computer, and 
- need immediate or recovery time from 1 to 2 days 
*************.**.*******.****.******** •••• ** •••••••••••• / 
rule small_high_reg_l 
if size is small 
and degree is high 
and [recovery_time is immediate or recovery_time is 'I to 2 days'] 
and threat is regional 
and [ work_area is yes or modification is yes] 
then short_strategy becomes 'commercial hot site.' 
and long_strategy becomes 'commercial cold site' 
and location becomes remote 
score 30 . 
rule small_high_reg_2 
if size is sman 
and degree is high 
and [ recovery_time is immediate or recovery_time is 'I to 2 days' ] 
and threat is regional 
and modification is no 
and work area is no 
and service_bureau is yes 
then short_strategy becomes 'service bureau.' 
and long_strategy becomes 'commercial cold site' 
and location becomes remote . 
rule small_high_reg_3 
if size is small 
and degree is high 
and [recovery_time is immediate or recovery_time is 'I to 2 days'] 
and threat is regional 
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and personnel_support is yes 
and work_area is no 
and service_bureau is no 
then short_strategy becomes 'mobil hot site.' 
and long_strategy becomes 'commercial cold site' 
and location becomes remote 
score 20, 
rule small_high Jeg_ 4 
if size is small 
and degree is high 
and [recovery_time is immediate or recovery_time is 'I to 2 days'] 
and threat is regional 
and personnel_support is no 
and work area is no 
and modification is no 
and service bureau is no 
and reciprocal is yes 
then short_strategy becomes 'reciprocal agreement' 
and long_strategy becomes 'commercial cold site' 
and location becomes remote, 
rule small_high Jeg_ 5 
if size is small 
and degree is high 
and [ recovery_time is immediate or recovery_time is 'I to 2 days' ] 
and threat is regional 
and personnel_support is no 
and work area is no 
and modification is no 
and service bureau is no 
and reciprocal is no 
and time_broker is yes 
then short_strategy becomes 'time broker,' 
and long_strategy becomes 'commercial cold site' 
and location becomes remote , 
rule small_high_reg_6 
if size is small 
and degree is high 
and [recovery_time is immediate or recovery_time is 'I to 2 days'] 
and threat is regional 
and reciprocal is no 
and time broker is no 
and service_bureau is no 
20S 
then short_strategy becomes 'commercial hot site.' 
and long_strategy becomes 'commercial cold site' 
and location becomes remote 
score 5 . 
rule small_high_reg_7 
if size is small 
and degree is high 
and recovery_time is 'more than 3 days' 
and threat is regional 
and [ work_area is yes or modification is yes 
or hardware_vendor is no ] 
then short_strategy becomes 'warm site' 
and long_strategy becomes 'warm site or commercial cold site' 
and location becomes remote . 
rule small_high Jeg_ 8 
if size is small 
and degree is high 
and recovery_time is 'more than 3 days' 
and threat is regional 
and modification is no 
and work area is no 
and hardware _vendor is yes 
then short_strategy becomes 'hardware vendor' 
and long_strategy becomes 'commercial cold site' 
and location becomes remote . 
rule small_high _build_} 
if size is small 
and degree is high 
and [recovery_time is immediate or recovery_time is '} to 2 days'] 
and threat is building 
and [ work_area is yes or modification is yes] 
then short_strategy becomes 'commercial hot site' 
and long_strategy becomes 'commercial cold site' 
and location becomes 'within the city area' 
score 30. 
rule small_high_build_2 
if size is small 
and degree is high 
and [recovery_time is immediate or recovery_time is '} to 2 days'] 
and threat is building 
and modification is no 
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and work area is no 
and service_bureau is yes 
then short_strategy becomes 'service bureau.' 
and long_strategy becomes 'commercial cold site' 
and location becomes 'within the city area' . 
rule small_high _build _ 3 
if size is small 
and degree is high 
and [recovery_time is immediate or recovery_time is '1 to 2 days'] 
and threat is building 
and personnel_support is yes 
and work_area is no 
and service bureau is no 
then short _strategy becomes 'mobil hot site.' 
and long_strategy becomes 'commercial cold site' 
and location becomes 'within the city area' 
score 20. 
rule small_high_build_ 4 
if size is small 
and degree is high 
and [recovery_time is immediate or recovery_time is '1 to 2 days'] 
and threat is building 
and personnel_support is no 
and modification is no 
and work area is no 
and service bureau is no 
and reciprocal is yes 
then short_strategy becomes 'reciprocal agreement.' 
and long_strategy becomes 'commercial cold site' 
and location becomes 'within the city area' . 
rule small_high _build _ 5 
if size is small 
and degree is high 
and [ recovery_time is immediate or recovery_time is '1 to 2 days'] 
and threat is building 
and personnel_support is no 
and modification is no 
and work area is no 
and service bureau is no 
and reciprocal is no 
and time_broker is yes 
then short _strategy becomes 'time broker.' 
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and long_strategy becomes 'commercial cold site' 
and location becomes 'within the city area' . 
rule small_high _build _6 
if size is small 
and degree is high 
and [ recovery_time is immediate or recovery_time is '} to 2 days' ] 
and threat is building 
and service_bureau is no 
and reciprocal is no 
and time broker is no 
then short _strategy becomes 'commercial hot site.' 
and long_strategy becomes 'commercial cold site' 
and location becomes 'within the city area' 
score 5 . 
rule small_high _build_7 
if size is small 
and degree is high 
and recovery_time is 'more than 3 days' 
and threat is building 
and [ work_area is yes or modification is yes 
or hardware_vendor is no ] 
then short_strategy becomes 'warm site.' 
and long_strategy becomes 'warm site or commercial cold site' 
and location becomes 'within the city area' . 
rule small_high _build _8 
if size is small 
and degree is high 
and recovery_time is 'more than 3 days' 
and threat is building 
and modification is no 
and work area is no 
and hardware_vendor is yes 
then short _strategy becomes 'hardware vendor' 
and long_strategy becomes 'commercial cold site' 
and location becomes 'within the city area' . 
rule small_high _floor_l 
if size is small 
and degree is high 
and [recovery_time is immediate or recovery_time is '} to 2 days'] 
and threat is floor 
and [ modification is yes or personnel_support is yes] 
208 
then short_strategy becomes 'mobil hot site' 
and long_strategy becomes 'portable site' 
and location becomes 'adjacent to the organisation' 
score 30, 
rule small_high _floor _2 
if size is small 
and degree is high 
and [recovery_time is immediate or recovery_time is '} to 2 days' ] 
and threat is floor 
and modification is no 
and service_bureau is yes 
then short_strategy becomes 'service bureau.' 
and long_strategy becomes 'portable site' 
and location becomes 'adjacent to the organisation' , 
rule small_high _floor _3 
if size is small 
and degree is high 
and [ recovery_time is immediate or recovery_time is '1 to 2 days' ] 
and threat is floor 
and personnel_support is no 
and modification is no 
and service bureau is no 
and reciprocal is yes 
then short_strategy becomes 'reciprocal agreement,' 
and long_strategy becomes 'commercial cold site' 
and location becomes 'adjacent to the organisation' , 
rule small_high _floor _ 4 
if size is small 
and degree is high 
and [ recovery_time is immediate or recovery_time is '1 to 2 days' ] 
and threat is floor 
and personnel_support is no 
and modification is no 
and service bureau is no 
and reciprocal is no 
and time_broker is yes 
then short_strategy becomes 'time broker.' 
and long_strategy becomes 'commercial cold site' 
and location becomes 'adjacent to the organisation' , 
rule small_high _floor _ 5 
if size is small 
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and degree is high 
and [recovery_time is immediate or recovery_time is '1 to 2 days'] 
and threat is floor 
and service_bureau is no 
and reciprocal is no 
and time broker is no 
then short_strategy becomes 'mobil hot site.' 
and long_strategy becomes 'portable site' 
and location becomes 'adjacent to the organisation' 
score 5 . 
rule small_high_floor_6 
if size is small 
and degree is high 
and recovery_time is 'more than 3 days' 
and threat is floor 
and [ modification is yes 
or hardware _vendor is no ] 
then short_strategy becomes 'warm site.' 
and long_strategy becomes 'portable site' 
and location becomes 'adjacent to the organisation' . 
rule small_high_floor_7 
if size is small 
and degree is high 
and recovery_time is 'more than 3 days' 
and threat is floor 
and modification is no 
and hardware_vendor is yes 
then short _strategy becomes 'hardware vendor' 
and long_strategy becomes 'portable site' 
and location becomes 'adjacent to the organisation' . 
rule small med 
if size is small 
and degree is medium 
then short _strategy becomes 'withdraw of services or manual procedure.' 
and long_strategy becomes '---' 
and location becomes ,----, . 
ruleset low_degree 
contains giantJow, mediumJow, smallJow ; 
initiate by doing location becomes "; 
terminate when location is not" . 
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rule giant Jow 
if [ size is giant or size is large] 
and degree is low 
then short _strategy becomes 'reduction/withdraw of service or manual procedure' 
and long_strategy becomes '--' 
and location becomes '---' . 
rule medium low 
if size is medium 
and degree is low 
then short_strategy becomes 'withdraw of service or manual procedure' 
and long_strategy becomes" 
and location becomes" . 
rule small low 
if size is small 
and degree is low 
then short_strategy becomes 'manual procedure or null strategy' 
and long_strategy becomes '---' 
and location becomes '---' . 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%% This part is for the printing the results 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
open_windows: -
wcreate(result, text, 'RESULTS', 10,0,600,300,0), 
wcreate(info, text, 'INFORMATION', 10,0,600,300,0). 
writer( WIN, TEXT) :-
my_convert( TEXT, STRING), 
wfocus( WIN ), 
wedttxt« WIN, I), STRING). 
fnwriter( WIN, INPUT) :-
fwrite( f, 0, 3, INPUT ) -> STRING, 
wfocus( WIN ), 
wedttxt( (WIN, 1), STRING ). 
my_convert( TEXT, STRING) :-
atom(TEXT ), 
stratm( STRING, TEXT ),! . 
my_convert( TEXT, STRING) :-
number string( TEXT, STRING), I. 
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nlr(WIN)-
wedttxt« WIN, I), '-M-f ). 
clear(WINDOW) :-
wtext«WINDOW,I), "). 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%% This is the start of the system 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
riO :-
wbload(ult, 'ulti2.bmp'), 
wdcreate(riO,' Knowledge-based Disaster Recovery Strategy 
System', I 0, I 0,600,460,[ dlg_ ownedbyprolog, ws _ sysmenu, ws _caption]), 
wccreate( (riO,900),grafix, " ,90, 10,400,270,[ ws _child, ws _visible, ws _border]), 
wccreate«riO, I OOO),static,' Please wait while the files are loading.' 
,90,295,400,50,[ ws _ child,ws_ visible,ssJeft]), 
wccreate«riO, 1 02),button,", 
30,340,490,55,[ws_child,ws_visible,ws_tabstop,bs-..SToupbox]), 
window handler( riO, riO handler), 
- -
show _ dialog( riO ), 
wflag( 1), wait(O), 
wgfx( (riO,900), [bits(0,0,400,450,55,8,ult)], 0,0,600,600), 
%reconsult rules( control ), 
%reconsult _ rules( quest ), 
%reconsult rules( rules ), 
wtext( (riO,-1000),'WELECOME TO THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED 
DISASTER RECOVERY SYSTEM 
Please press NEXT to continue or EXIT to leave the system.' ), 
wccreate«riO, 101 ),button,' EXIT' ,40,355, 
90,36,[ ws _child, ws _visible, ws _ tabstop,bs -'pushbutton]), 
wccreate«riO, 1 OO),button,'NEXT' ,41 5,355, 
90,36,[ ws _child, ws _visible, ws _ tabstop,bs -'pushbutton]), !. 
riO_handler( (riO, 100). msg_button, _, _)-
wclose( riO ), 
ri 1 . 
riO_handler( (riO, 101), msg_button, -' _) :_ 
wclose( riO ), abort. %halt. 
ri 1-
wdcreate( ri 1, 'Knowledge-based Disaster Recovery Strategy 
System', 1 0, 1 0,600,460, [dlg_ownedbyprolog,ws _sysmenu, ws _caption]), 
wccreate«ri 1,1 000), static, " 
,90,40,400,300, [ws_child,ws_visible,ssJeft]), 
wccreate«ri 1, I 02),button,", 
30,340,490,55,[ws_child,ws_visible,ws_tabstop,bs-BToupbox)), 
window _ handler( ri 1, ri I_handler ), 
show _ dialog( ri 1 ), 
wflag(I), wait(O), 
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wtext( (ril, 1000),'Welecom to the knowledge based system for disaster 
recovery strategy selection. 
The system contains the following three transactions: 
I. Calculation of Maximum Allowable Downtime (MAD) 
2. Calculation of the required investment for fitting a recovery strategy, and 
3. Recommendation of disaster recovery strategy(s). 
The system will ask you several questions about your organisation. Some of the 
questions are self explained. 
For unclear questions, an explaination of the question or why it is been asked can be 
found by clicking in the Explain button next to the question. 
At the end of the first transaction, please take a note of the calculated Maximum 
Allowable Downtime because you need it as an input in one of the questions in the 
second transaction. 
Please press NEXT to start first transaction or EXIT to leave the system.' ), 
wccreate«ril, 101 ),button,'EXIT', 40,355, 
90,36,[ws_child,ws_visible,ws_tabstop,bsyushbutton]), 
wccreate«ri 1,1 OO),button, 'NEXT' ,415,355, 
90,36,[ ws _ child,ws _ visible,ws _tabstop,bs yushbutton]), '. 
ril_handler( (ri1, 100), msg_button, -' _) :-
wclose( ri 1 ), 
flex starter. 
ri 1_ handler( (ri 1, 10 1), msg_ button, -.J _ )-
wclose( ri 1 ), abort. % halt . 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%% continuation screen procedures 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
ask_continue :-
WIN = cont, 
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wdcreate(WIN,' Continue' , 100,230,400,200,[ dlg_ ownedbyprolog, ws _ sysmenu, ws _ ca 
ption]), 
wccreate«WIN, 1 OOO),static, 
'Do you wish to continue to the next transaction? 
Please press Yes to continue or No to leave the 
system.' ,90,30,350,60,[ ws_ child,ws_ visible,ss Jeft]), 
wccreate«WIN, 1 02),button,", 
5,125,390,50,[ ws _child, ws _visible, ws _tabstop,bs --..8foupbox]), 
wccreate«WIN, 1 OO),button, 'Yes', 300,135, 
90,36,[ ws _child, ws _ visible,ws _tabstop,bs yushbutton]), 
wccreate«(WIN, 101),button,'No', 10,135, 
90,36,[ ws _child, ws _ visible,ws _tabstop,bs yushbutton]), 
window_handler( WIN, cont_handler), 
show _ dialog( WIN ), 
repeat, 
wflag(l), wait(O), 
retract( continue ), 
wclose( cont ). 
cont_handler( (cont, 100), msg_button, -.J _) :-
assert( continue ). 
cont _ handler( (cont, 10 1), msg_ button, -.J _ ) :-
wclose( cont ), abort. % halt . 
ask continue 1 :-
WIN = contI, 
wdcreate(WIN 'Second Transaction: Investment 
Calculation', 70: 120,500,350,[ dlg_ownedbyprolog,ws_sysmenu,ws _caption]), 
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wccreate( (WIN, 1 000 ),static, 
'The cost of alternative back up sites vary inversely with respect to the response time 
The user should investigate the disaster recovery market and provide . 
I Two response time estimates (minimum and maximum) 
2. Annual cost estimates for each of the previous response times for two types of 
commercial strategies: hot and cold sites 
3. The Maximum Allowable Downtime (generated from the last transaction) 
Please press Yes to continue or No to leave the 
system.', 70,40,400,220,[ws _child,ws _ visible,ssJeft)), 
wccreate«WIN, 102),button,", 
15,265,435,50,[ ws_child, ws _visible, ws _tabstop,bs~oupbox]), 
wccreate( (WIN, 1 OO),button,' Yes', 350,275, 
90,36, [ws _child, ws _visible, ws _ tabstop, bs -'pushbutton)), 
wccreate«(WIN, IOI),button,'No', 25,275, 
90,36,[ ws _child, ws _visible, ws _tabstop,bs -'pushbutton]), 
window _ handler( WIN, cont _handler ), 
show _ dialog( WIN ), 
repeat, 
wflag(l), wait(O), 
retract( continue ), 
wclose( contI). 
cont_handler( (contI,100), msg_button, -> _) :-
assert( continue ). 
cont _ handler( (cont 1,101), msg_ button, -> _) :-
wclose( cont 1), abort. % halt . 
ask continue2 :-
WIN = cont2, 
wdcreate(WIN 'Third Transaction: Recovery Strategy Recommendati~n', 70,120,500,350,[ dlg_ ownedbyprolog, ws _ sysmenu,ws _caption]), 
wccreate«(WIN,lOOO),static, . 
'The recovery strategy is the ability to process data while a full recovery of the orgmal 
site is underway. 
The recommendation is based on : 
1 Characteristics of the organisation 
2. Threat Type 
3. Organisation's requirments 
4. The availablity of some recovery strategies 
Please press Yes to continue or No to leave the 
system.', 70,30,400,200,[ ws_ child,ws _ visible,ssJeftJ), 
wccreate«WIN, 1 02),button,", 
15,265,435,50,[ ws_child,ws _ visible,ws _tabstop,bsJVoupbox]), 
wccreate«WIN, 100),button,'Yes', 350,275, 
90,36,[ ws _child, ws _visible, ws _tabstop,bs --'pushbutton]), 
wccreate«WIN, 101),button,'No', 25,275, 
90,36, [ ws _child, ws _visible, ws _ tabstop, bs --'pushbutton]), 
window _ handler( WIN, cont_ handler ), 
show _ dialog( WIN ), 
repeat, 
wflag( 1), wait(O), 
retract( continue ), 
wclose( cont2). 
cont _ handler( (cont2, 100), msg_ button, --J _ ) :-
assert( continue ). 
cont _ handler( (cont2, 1 0 1), msg_ button, --J _ ) :-
wclose( cont2), abort. % halt. 
%:- riO. 
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Appendix B 
Examples of Inputs and Outputs Screens 
= [xpert System for Disil51er Recovery Strategy Selection (f~DnSSI 
WELCOME TO THE ESORSS 
PIeaae click NEXT to conlnue Of O4T to le.eve the $}IIlem. 
I ~T J _ pi NEXT u l 
= Expert Sy~tem lor Dis<lster ReclJvery Str<ltt:yy Selntion (ESDRSS) 
Wek:mle to the expert system fa disasler recovery Stlategy teIedicrt 
The ~em contw the loIooHi'lg three lIarnactiats . 
,. CalcUation ci M_um AIowabIe Downtine (MAD) 
2. CalaJation ci the required inveIIsnent IoIIiting a recovery >lIsegy, and 
1 RecornnerdaIiar1 of ditatter reaM!IY >lIale!Ms~ 
T he system MI ask. you several questions about ~ OIganisaIDn. Some 01 tte 
questions are sel expInd 
fOlI6lCle5 questiom, ." eKJ)1atmon 01 the QUe$Iion or ~ l is been &ked C«I be 
found by cicklng in the E ~ bt.iton nelIt to the que1tion. 
AJ. the end 01 the list ITC!I'ltaction. plea:;e talc.e ., note ci the calculated M a>«nu:n 
Albwable Downline because you need it as an intU in one 01 the questions n the 
secord transaction. 
Please P'e!S NEXT to starl firll bamactiorl 01 EXIT to leave the tyIlem. 
EXIT NEXT 
;; Single Choice Options Menu 
PrOft1ll: 
What type 0/ businMs cloe$ your OIgarUation perlorm? 
financial I OK Manufactl.ling 
r!. 
~ 
r-~ 
I Government ExpiMl. .. 
• eJser~~ 
T elecommurllcalron 
Education 
Health Care 
Insl.Iance 
Others 
J 
I 
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== 
Single Choice Options Menu 
PrOfl1lt: I What "Ito." of ... a_' 
I !liaR 
mediun 
small 
r this type and size DE organi.ation~ 
proposed tiAe interval is 8.5 day(s) 
[ 
I 
~ 
01( I 
E~. I 
< Please take a note of the Proposed ti~ ) 
219 
220 
== 
T yp ell I .. put 
Pr~: 
What is the average daily income of the organi$ation? ~ 
l-
f-
~ 
250000 
.!o I OK ) 
...... ( I E~ .. 
., 
.....;.; 
= 
Typed Input 
PtOl'lClt 
What is the total do"",",ime cost of the cierial 01 C~eI faciIitiM 
.!. 
Ioi aR critical 16$OUlCeS for the proposed time interval? 
-
-
..!. 
80000 i.!. I OK I 
~ I E.,. .. I 
f-
.!. 
this type and size of oPganisation~ 
pl'Oposed tillle interval is 1i1.5 day(s) 
have been unable to establish a !'tAD in the pl'eV ious 
interval Please pl'Ouide the total downtI.e 
st fol" the NEXT 8.5 days 
= 
Typed Input 
PrOll'Clt 
Please provide the total dov«ltine cost 0/ the demI 0/ comP\Aef + J-facilities fOi aN critical systems for the next time interva? I-
7 
'-
100000 ~ ( OK I 
r-i I EMPIai't .. I 
+' 
..... 
221 
this tYf and size of organisation~ 
propose ti~e interval is 8.5 day(s) 
--
have been unable to establish a MAD in the previous 
intel"Val Please pl'Ovide the total downti_ 
at for the NEMT 8.5 days 
have been unable to establish a MAD in the previous 
intel"Val Please pl'Ovide the total downti_ 
for the HEXT 8.5 days 
== 
fyped Input 
Proqlt: 
Please plovide the total downtine cost 0/ the denial 01 compUer ~ facilities fOi aU critical systems for the nelCt tine interval? I-
r. 
'-
2~ • I- I OK I 
..... I ExpIai't .. I 
., 
.... 
222 
"axinu~ Allowable downtine for your 
hation is: 1.5 days<s) 
== Second 1 ran5action: Investment Calculdtion 
The cost ci aRematiYe back up sa. YaI'} nY8nl8ly wit! respect to the response tine. 
The l.I$eI should in~ the diUlSter recovery I115ket ond provide : 
1. Two response time estinales (1'Ilinin't.m ond mallinunl 
2. Annuel cos! estim~ for each ci the preWJu$ respome tinM Io! two types 01 
conmercial stJategies: hot and cold $les 
3. The Maxinurn Allowable Downtime (generated !rom the I5SllrMSadion) 
Please pleSS Yes to oonIirue 01 No to leave the system. 
.I,I.-_N0--,,-J 
223 
224 
= Typed Input PrOl'l1ll: 
Provide an estimate 01 minrrun response time fOf a conrnercial • HOT site l-
t-
7 I..,.;.. 
O.~ • ~ ( OK I 
f-' I I ExpIai\ .. 
r.-
"'" 
== 
Typed Inpur 
Pr~ 
Provide an estimate 01 the amuaI cost fOf the pervious mirm.m r! 
response time when subscrhlQ to a cornmefcial HOT site f0-
r. 
.... 
200000 .to I OK I 
.... I ExpIai\ .. J 
0.-, 
+ . 
..... 
225 
== 
Typed Input 
Pr 001lt: 
PIOVide an estimate 0/ maximum response time for a COIMleI'ciai 
HOT site ~ 
l-
I--
L.!. 
3 ... I OK ) ~ ~ ! I E.,. .. 
-; 
.... 
all Typed Input 
Pr~: 
Provide an estimate of the annual cost for the pel'lious rMICiTun 
.!. 
response time when subscribing to a conmeIciai HOT site 
-
~ 
..! 
80000 ~ I OK I 
l- I EJq:Mn .. I 
f-. 
I.! 
226 
II Typed Input 
Pr~: 
Provide an estimate 01 minmum response time fOl a COITflleIciai 
COLD site ~ 
l-
f-
~ 
7 .. ~ ( OK I 
f-o I I E~ .. 
f-
~ 
== 
Typed Input 
Proqlt 
Provide an estimate 01 the ennuaI cost for the pefVious mirm.rn ~ 
response time when subscribing to a commercial COLD site ~ 
f-. 
.!. 
10000 ~ I OK I 
~ I E~ .. I 
~ 
...... 
227 
Typed Input 
Proqt: 
Provide an Mlinate at malQlllUm respome time for a commercial 
COLD ste !.!. 
l-
I-
I.!. 
14 ~ I 01< I 
l- I E~ .. I 
....., 
~ 
== 
Typed Input 
Pr~ 
Provide an estimate 01 the arn.IaI cost lor the pervious rMKiTun .!. 
response time when SI.tIscIibWlg to a corrrnef(:iaI CO LD site 
-
....... 
.!. 
2000 ~ I OK I 
~ I E!IpIaft .. I 
~ 
+ L..,;,j 
== 
1 yped Inp\Jt 
Pr~ 
What ~ the malCirm.m allowable downtime 101 you! OIgamation 
which was calculated from the previous transaction 
1.5 
invest.ent roequired for your 
isation is: 153183.887 
to! 
l-
t-
~ 
1 OK 
I E~. 
228 
..! 
-
'--
..! 
I 
I 
Third Transaction: Recovery Strategy Recommenddtion 
The recovery slJatEIQII is the ~ 00 ~ data whle a ~ recovety of the oroN/ 
sileis~. 
The recarmenc:lation is based on : 
1. Characteristics of the organitaion 
2. TtveatType 
3. Organisation's requimenb 
4. The aveilabiy d ~ome recoYety stralejJes. 
~ Pleu Yes to contirue or No to leave the sy1Iem 
No 
Single Choice Option<; Menu 
PrOl"lllt 
1'"""0 tho ... ~ tho ~-? ~ 
!in ( 01( ) I E~ .. I small 
229 
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12 Single Choice Options Menu 
PrCln1ll: 
What is the degree of computer dependancy? r! 
to-
7 
"-
medium ( 01( I low I J Do not know!! E.,. .. 
== 
Single Choice Options Menu 
Prompt: 
What level of security does your org.yrisation required? ~ 
I"-
r; 
...... 
l vell,higb [ OK I 
medium I ExpIai'I. .. I Do not know !I 
231 
Single Choice Options Menu 
PrOll1lt: 
What type 01 threat are you exposed to? ~ 
I"'" 
-
.!. 
reoional [ OK ) 
HOOI I I disk I ailure only E~ .. 
Do not know!! 
= 
Single Choir.~ Options Menu 
PrIll1¢ 
How last does your organisation need to be recovered? ~ 
r-
f-
.!. 
II immediate I OK I 
more than 3 days I Explaft .. J Do not know II 
:::32 
Single Choice Option!; Mellu 
ProqX: 
D~ your OIgamation need special-tailored hafdware ex r.!. s~e arrangement? 
f-
!---, 
~ 
Illes ( OK ] 
Do not know!! I E~. I 
== 
Sing"'~ Choice Options Mp.nll 
Pr~ 
Is there a possibility that your exganisalion can e$tabish ~ 
a cOope!ative HOT site with other near by organisations? r-
~ 
.... 
I yes I OK I 
Do not know II I EMpIai't .. ] 
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11 Single Chuice Options MenlJ 
Proqlt: 
Is there a possibility that your orgarUation can Mtabish ~ 
a COopel alive CO LD ste with other near by orgari$atiom? 
l-
t-
L!. 
I OJ( ) no 
Do not know!! I EJq:Mi1. .. I 
= 
Single Choice Options Menu 
Prorrci: 
Does the oroanisation need outside pelsornel support? ~ 
I-' 
~ 
L!. 
lues I OK I 
Do not know !I [ EIIIMi't .. ] 
Single Choice Options Menu 
Pr orIllt 
DCle$ your organisation need large working area (more than 10 
employees) n the alternative site? .,! 
I-
~ 
..! 
no I OK ] 
Do not know I! I I ElIPIai't. 
an organisation of size large and degree of 
dency on cOAputer high 
_co_nded short te_ strategy is co_reial hot site 
the reco.-ended long ter. strategy is cooperative cold site 
the reco.aended location is within the city area. 
